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M A -L L I , W O M O - S , W P AC CR RO IN NK KA AG GE ES O OI IL L P PR RI IC CE ES S A AN ND D D DE EF FL LA AT TI IO ON N OR RK KS SH HO OP J A 6 9 9, , 20 00 09 9 J 6 2 AN NU UA AR


  1. M A -L L I , W O M O - S , W P AC CR RO IN NK KA AG GE ES O OI IL L P PR RI IC CE ES S A AN ND D D DE EF FL LA AT TI IO ON N OR RK KS SH HO OP J A 6– –9 9, , 20 00 09 9 J 6 2 AN NU UA AR RY Y Price Level Targeting in a Small Open Economy with Financial Frictions: Welfare Analysis Ali Dib, Caterina Mendicino, and Yahong Zhang

  2. Price Level Targeting in a Small Open Economy with Financial Frictions: Welfare Analysis ∗ Ali Dib Caterina Mendicino Yahong Zhang Bank of Canada Bank of Canada Bank of Canada December 16, 2008 ∗ The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.

  3. Introduction • The maintenance of price stability is established as the principal objective of most central banks worldwide. • Inflation targeting (IT) has been proved successful in sustaining low inflation and low inflation volatility. • However, some central banks, in particular the Bank of Canada, have started investigating the merits of price-level path (PLT) targeting rather than inflation targeting. • The Bank of Canada is considering alternative monetary policies when renewing its contract with the government in 2011. 1

  4. Introduction (con./t) • Two different implications: (1) IT ⇒ all shocks to price level are permanent; (2) PLT ⇒ past shocks to price level must be reversed in the future. • PLT would be equivalent to target a long-run average of inflation rate, but not require central bank to stabilize inflation in the short terms. • Under PLT, the central bank aims at correcting deviations of the price level from the target using inflationary and deflationary policies to bring the price level to its target. 2

  5. Introduction (con./t) • Conventional wisdom (Fisher 1994 and Duguay 1994): PLT implies trade- off between long-term price level variability and short-term volatility of inflation and output. • New view : 1. Svensson (1999): Under rational expectations (RE), PLT leads to lower inflation without increasing output variability (free lunch); 2. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999): In a forward-looking model, optimal monetary policy under commitment is characterized by a stationary price level; 3. Vestin (2006): If central bank commits to PLT, then rational expectations become automatic stabilizers. 3

  6. Introduction (con./t) • Main motivation behind PLT is the presence of nominal contracts in the economy (in particular debt contracts). • Nevertheless, most of previous DSGE studies that have compared IT vs PLT ignore the presence of nominal debt contract (Batini and Yates 2003, Ortega and Rebei 2006, and others). • Other recent papers at the Bank of Canada have included nominal contracts, but using different approaches: Covas and Zhang (2007); Kryvtsov, Shukayev and Ueberfeldt (2007); Meh, Rios-Rull and Terajima (2008); and others 4

  7. This paper • Extends Dib (2008), a multi-sector small open economy model, by incorporating financial frictions (corporate balance sheet channel ` a la BGG 1999) and nominal debt contracts ⇒ debt deflation effects. • Its main objective is to assess and compare the merits of PLT vs IT using optimized monetary policy rules and a second-order approximation method. • Examines the role of financial imperfections in PLT vs IT debate. • It also estimates the structural parameters of the model using Bayesian approach. 5

  8. Outline • Overview of the model • Calibration and Estimation • Variance decomposition • Optimized monetary policy and welfare analysis • Conclusion 6

  9. Main features of the model • A multi-sector SOE model with financial frictions ` a la BGG (1999)and allowing for domestic and cross-border lending; • Continuum of households, entrepreneurs in traded and non-traded goods sectors, capital producers, retailers, importers, and a monetary authority; • Sectorial-specific price and wage rigidities ` a la Calvo-Yun style contract ⇒ price and wage dispersions and partial exchange rate pass-through; • Different elasticities in the aggregation of consumption and investment; • Eleven shocks (including two financial shocks to external finance premia). 7

  10. Households • Continuum of household with monopoly power in labour markets � ∞ t =0 β t u ( C ht , H ht ) , • Preferences: E 0 � � ς 1+ ς C 1 − τ 1+ ς 1+ ς 1 − τ + (1 − H ht ) 1 − γ ς ς where u ( · ) = ht and H ht = η T H T,ht + η N H , N,ht 1 − γ • Budget constraint: P t C ht + D ht + e t B ∗ ht ≤ W T,ht H T,ht + W N,ht H N,ht κ t R ∗ t + R t − 1 D ht − 1 + e t B ∗ ht − 1 + Ω ht − T ht 8

  11. Entrepreneurs • Produce wholesale traded or non-traded goods using labour supplied by households and capital constructed by capital producers. • Risk neutral and have finite expected lifetime with a given probability of surviving to next period. • Borrow from a domestic or foreign financial intermediaries to finance a fraction of their capital acquisitions. • Information asymmetry between financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs and costly state verification imply external finance premia. 9

  12. Entrepreneurs (con./t) Balance sheet identity : • Non-tradable sector: X N,t = q N,t K N,t +1 − D t , • Tradable sector: X T,t = q T,t K T,t +1 − s t D ∗ t , 10

  13. Optimal Loan Contracts • Optimal loan contracts: � � � � − ψ N Γ N,t X N,t R t - Non-tradable sector: E t f N,t +1 = E t π t +1 q N,t K N,t +1 � � � � − ψ T Γ T,t R ∗ X T,t s t +1 - Tradable sector: E t f T,t +1 = E t , t π ∗ s t q T,t K T,t +1 t +1 where Γ j,t ∼ AR (1) are EFP (financial sector) shocks and � z j,t +1 + (1 − δ ) q j,t +1 � E t f j,t +1 = E t q j,t 11

  14. Optimal Loan Contracts (con./t) • Net worth - Non-tradable sector: X N,t = ζ N [ f N,t q N,t − 1 K N,t − E t − 1 f N,t D t − 1 ] , � � f T,t q T,t − 1 K T,t − E t − 1 f T,t s t D ∗ - Non-tradable sector: X T,t = ζ T , t − 1 12

  15. Capital producers • Capital producers use aggregated investment to produce capital goods. � I j,t � 2 χ j • Investment adjustment costs: S ( I j,t , I j,t − 1 ) = I j,t − 1 − 1 I j,t . 2 • Maximization problem is dynamic �� � � ∞ t =0 β t λ t E t j = N,T q j,t [ µ t − S ( I j,t , I j,t − 1 )] − p I,t I j,t , where µ t ∼ AR (1) , investment-efficiency shock. 13

  16. Capital producer (con./t) • FOC ⇒ Capital prices in sector j = N, T is given by µ t q j,t = p I,t { 1 + S ′ ( ., t ) } − βE t [ p I,t +1 S ′ ( ., t + 1) p I,t +1 ] • Laws of motion of capital stocks: K j,t +1 = µ t I j,t + (1 − δ ) K j,t 14

  17. Consumption Goods • Consumption, νC � � νC − 1 νC − 1 νC − 1 νC − 1 1 1 1 νC + ω C νC + ω C � ω C νC Y C νC Y C νC Y C C t = νC , T T,t N N,t F F,t where � C t = C t + G t • consumer-price index ( P t ) � � 1 / (1 − ν C ) T P 1 − ν C N P 1 − ν C F P 1 − ν C ω C + ω C + ω C P t = T,t N,t F,t 15

  18. Investment Goods • Investment: νI � � νI − 1 νI − 1 νI − 1 νI − 1 1 1 1 νI Y I νI Y I νI Y I ω I + ω I + ω I I t = νI νI νI T T,t N N,t F F,t where I t = I Nt + I T t • Investment-price index ( P I,t ) � � 1 / (1 − ν I ) T P 1 − ν I N P 1 − ν I F P 1 − ν I ω I + ω I + ω I P I,t = T,t N,t F,t • ν C > ν I and ω C � = ω I ⇒ P t � = P I,t . 16

  19. Monetary authority • Inflation Targeting (IT) rule: � � � � � e � � R t � R t − 1 π t Y t log = ̺ R log + ̺ π log + ̺ Y log + ε Rt , R R π t ˜ Y π t ∼ AR (1) is an inflation targeting shock and � where ˜ Y t is output gap. • Price Level Targeting (PLT) rule: � � � � � e � � R t � R t − 1 P t Y t log = ̺ R log + ̺ P log + ̺ Y log + ε Rt , R R e Y P t where P t = π t P t − 1 and � π t � P t = � P t − 1 are level and targeted prices, respectively. 17

  20. Table 1: Calibration of the parameters Financial sector : X T X N ζ T = 0.987 ; ζ N = 0.987 ; q T K T = 0.6 ; q N K N = 0.6 Preferences : β =0.991; τ = 2; ς =1 ; γ =1 Technology : α T =0.35; α N =0.3; δ =0.025 Aggregation : ν C =0.8; ω C ω C ω C T =0.2; N =0.58; F =0.22; ν I =0.6; ω I ω I ω I T =0.2 N =0.4; F =0.4; θ =6; ϑ =8 Nominal interest and inflation rates : R =1.0182; π =1.0089; R ∗ =1.0149; π ∗ =1.0088 18

  21. Estimation • Estimation procedure: Bayesian procedure is used • Only structural parameters not affecting the steady-state equilibrium are estimated: Elasticities of external finance premia ψ T and ψ N ; monetary policy parameters; price and wage rigidity parameters; investment adjustment cost parameters; exogenous processes parameters. • Data: We use 11 Canadian and US time series covering the period 1981Q1–2007Q2. 19

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