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CANS 17 @ Hong Kong Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac WLAN D ANIELE A NTONIOLI (SUTD), S. S IBY (EPFL), N. O. T IPPENHAUER (SUTD) Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in


  1. CANS 17 @ Hong Kong Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac WLAN D ANIELE A NTONIOLI (SUTD), S. S IBY (EPFL), N. O. T IPPENHAUER (SUTD) Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac 1

  2. Our Motivations • Some PHY features theoretically disadvantage an eavesdropper ◮ Eg: reduce eavesdropping range ◮ Few practical evaluations of those claims ◮ Typically not focusing on a real protocol • 802.11n/ac WLAN amendments ◮ Use of MIMO and beamforming • Is eavesdropping affected by recent PHY features? ◮ If yes, we get extra resilience for free ◮ Even from COTS devices Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Introduction 2

  3. Our Metrics • SNR: Signal-to-Noise-Ratio ◮ Power of the useful signal divided by the noise power at the receiver ◮ 10 log 10 SNR = SNR dB • BER: Bit-Error-Rate ◮ Probability of erroneously decoding 1-bit at the receiver ◮ Not exact quantity (MCS, fading model) ◮ 10 − 6 is considered a reasonable BER value • PER: Packet-Error-Rate ◮ Computed as: PER = 1 − ( 1 − BER ) N ◮ N is the average packet size in bits Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Introduction 3

  4. Our Evaluation of 802.11 Eavesdropping • 802.11n/ac vs. 802.11b ◮ Passive eavesdropper (Eve) ◮ Downlink channel (from Alice to Bob) ◮ NLOS environment (exploit multipath) ◮ 802.11b as a baseline: no MIMO • Predictions ◮ Eve’s SNR disadvantage in b vs. n/ac ◮ Eve’s PER disadvantage compared to Bob in n/ac • Experimental evaluation ◮ With COTS devices in an indoor environment ◮ Measure PER and SNR ◮ Compare results with predictions Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Introduction 4

  5. 802.11 Downlink Passive Eavesdropping • 802.11n/ac (MIMO) • 802.11b (SISO) ◮ Alice uses L antennas ◮ Alice uses 1 antenna ◮ Transmit-beamforming ◮ No disadvantages for Eve towards Bob disadvantages Eve ◮ Eve success depends on: ◮ Eve success depends on: d AE d AE , d BE , and L Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Introduction 5

  6. Our Attacker Model • Eve is a passive eavesdropper ◮ Eavesdrop the downlink ◮ Outside the main lobe (if Alice uses beamforming) • Equipotent to Bob ◮ COTS devices ◮ Same number of antennas • Eavesdrops in monitor mode ◮ No retransmissions Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Models 6

  7. Theoretical Discussion Goals • Quantify the disadvantages of Eve ◮ In 802.11n/ac (MIMO) compared to 802.11b (SISO) • Eve’s SNR disadvantage ◮ Upper bound from BER formula (Rayleigh fading) ◮ Lower bound from transmit-beamforming gain • Expected BER and PER of Eve vs. Bob ◮ Varying their distances to Alice ◮ Using 802.11n/ac different path loss models Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Theoretical Discussion 7

  8. Passive Eavesdropping 802.11n/ac • 802.11n/ac (MISO) ◮ Alice uses L antennas ◮ Transmit-beamforming towards Bob disadvantages Eve ◮ Eve success depends on: d AE , d BE , and L Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Theoretical Discussion 8

  9. SNR Disadvantage: Upper Bound Number of transmitting antennas (L) is key: � SNR λ = (1) 2 + SNR BER SISO = 1 2 ( 1 − λ ) (2) L − 1 � L � i � 1 − λ � L + i − 1 � � 1 + λ � BER MISO = · (3) 2 i 2 i = 0 • If L = 4 and BER = 10 − 6 , then ◮ SNR SISO = 57 (no diversity) ◮ SNR MISO = 16 (diversity order = 4) ◮ Eve’s SNR disadvantage in 802.11n/ac is 41 dB (at most) Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Theoretical Discussion 9

  10. SNR Disadvantage: Lower Bound The MISO transmission gain from Alice to Bob is (using CCD): � g � 2 = 10 log 10 ( L ) dB (4) • Eve is not benefiting from g • If L = 4, then ◮ Eve’s SNR disadvantage in 802.11n/ac is 6 dB (at least) Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Theoretical Discussion 10

  11. SNR Disadvantage: Lower Bound The MISO transmission gain from Alice to Bob is (using CCD): � g � 2 = 10 log 10 ( L ) dB (4) • Eve is not benefiting from g • If L = 4, then ◮ Eve’s SNR disadvantage in 802.11n/ac is 6 dB (at least) • Eve’s SNR disadvantage in 802.11n/ac form 6 to 41 dB Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Theoretical Discussion 10

  12. BER and PER: Indoor Path Loss Models • From: Next Gen. Wireless LAN: 802.11n and 802.11ac ◮ d BP is the breakpoint distance ◮ σ SF is the shadowing std dev (log-normal) ◮ s PL LOS and NLOS path loss slopes • Model B : Residential (intra-room) ◮ d BP = 5 m ◮ σ SF = 3, 4 dB ◮ s PL = 2, 3.5 • Model D : Office (large conference room) ◮ d BP = 10 m ◮ σ SF = 3, 5 dB ◮ s PL = 2, 3.5 Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Theoretical Discussion 11

  13. Model B (Residential) Expected BER Eve 0 . 175 Bob (L=2) Bob (L=4) 0 . 150 Expected BER 0 . 125 0 . 100 0 . 075 0 . 050 0 . 025 0 . 000 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Distance from Alice d [m] • BER of Eve, Bob(L=2) and Bob(L=4) in 802.11n (BPSK) Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Theoretical Discussion 12

  14. Model B (Residential) Expected PER 1 . 0 0 . 8 Expected PER 0 . 6 0 . 4 PER = 50% 0 . 2 Eve Bob (L=2) Bob (L=4) 0 . 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Distance from Alice d [m] • PER of Eve, Bob(L=2) and Bob(L=4) in 802.11n (BPSK) Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Theoretical Discussion 13

  15. Model B (Residential) Expected PER 1 . 0 0 . 8 20 m: Eve’s PER = 0.98, Bob’s PER = 0 Expected PER 0 . 6 129.5 m from Eve: Bob’s PER 0.5 0 . 4 12.5 m: Eve’s PER = 0.5 PER = 50% 0 . 2 Eve Bob (L=2) Bob (L=4) 0 . 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Distance from Alice d [m] • PER of Eve, Bob(L=2) and Bob(L=4) in 802.11n (BPSK) Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Theoretical Discussion 13

  16. Experimental Indoor Office Layout m 5 . 2 ~ • Alice, Bob, and Eve locations ◮ d AB = 2 m ◮ � d AE = [ 2 . 5 , 5 . 0 , . . . , 20 ] m (8 distances) ◮ ∆ d AE = 2 . 5 m ◮ Constant angle and elevation ◮ NLOS (exploit multipath) Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Experimental Evaluation 14

  17. Experimental Setup: COTS and PHY • COTS devices ◮ Alice: Linksys WRT3200ACM, 4x4, OpenWrt ◮ 802.11n: Bob and Eve use a TL-WN722N USB dongle ◮ 802.11ac: Bob uses an USB-AC68, Eve uses a MacBook Pro • Physical layer setup ◮ P A = 23 dBm (Alice’s tx power) ◮ N 0 = − 91 dBm (mean noise power at receiver) ◮ Ch b / n / ac = 11 , 11 , 36 Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Experimental Evaluation 15

  18. Experimental Setup: Traffic and Metrics • UDP traffic from Alice to Bob ◮ Using iperf ◮ 30 repetitions per distance • SNR ◮ RSSI and noise floor from PHY radiotap headers • PER ◮ From incorrect UDP checksums ◮ Over the total number of packet sent ◮ Underestimate PER (no FCS) Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Experimental Evaluation 16

  19. Eve’s Measured PER vs. Model D (Office) 100 Model D prediction 802.11b Model D prediction 802.11n Model D prediction 802.11ac 80 Measured values 802.11b Measured values 802.11n Measured values 802.11ac Eve’s PER % 60 40 20 0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 d AE [m] • Eve’s PER is increasing with 802.11b/n/ac Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Experimental Evaluation 17

  20. Eve’s Measured SNR 802.11b 60 802.11n 802.11ac 50 Eve’s SNR [dB] 40 30 20 10 0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 d AE [m] • Eve’s SNR in 802.11n/ac is smaller than in 802.11b Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Experimental Evaluation 18

  21. Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac • Predicted 802.11n/ac disadvantages for Eve ◮ SNR is bounded by 6-41 dB ◮ PER increases to 98% when d AE > 20 m ◮ Eve has to be 129.5 m closer to get same performance as Bob • Experimental results about Eve ◮ PER increases significantly when d AE > 15 m ◮ PER is 20% higher in 802.11n than in 802.11b ◮ PER is 30% higher in 802.11ac than in 802.11b • We conclude that ◮ 802.11n/ac PHY features disadvantage an eavesdropper Daniele Antonioli Practical Evaluation of Passive COTS Eavesdropping in 802.11b/n/ac Conclusions 19

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