Person to People Part 1/3 Kitty Genovese The Bystander Effect - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

from Person to People Part 1/3 Kitty Genovese

The Bystander Effect Kitty Genovese The Bystander Effect The Bystander Effect 100 % who intervene 75 50 25 0 Small Group (2) Large Group (6) (Darley & Latané, 1968)


 
 
 Questions + Themes How do groups affect our behavior toward others? How quickly and easily do we form impressions of other people? How pervasive and consequential are group stereotypes ? Are groups a force for good or for evil ? My Mom Pres Daniels

My Mom Pres Daniels Minimal Group Paradigm Group A Group B +5 -3 Fewer resources Henri Tajfel Lower favorability (1919-1982) Enjoy outgroup failures

Categorization: Helpful, efficient, fast “Thin Slicing” Nalini Ambady (1959-2013)

“Thin Slicing” “Thin Slicing” How ‘thin’? A. One lecture 
 B. Twenty minutes 
 C. Five minutes 
 D. Thirty seconds 
 E. Six seconds


 
 
 How ‘thin’? Accuracy vs. Stickiness vs. Self-Fulfillment Talkativeness Politics Lying 
 Psychopathology “Gaydar” (“Straighdar”)

Group bias + diffusion of responsibility + categorization + snap judgments… from Person to People Up next: Part 2/3 from Person to People Part 2/3

Group bias + diffusion of responsibility + categorization + snap judgments… Implicit Bias

Implicit Bias Explicit Bias

“Do you think there should be laws against marriages between African-Americans and Whites?” 50 % of Whites who agree 40 30 20 10 0 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006 Implicit Bias bias we don’t (or can’t ) verbally express (because we may not know it exists!)

Implicit Association Test http://implicit.harvard.edu

Spade Heart or or Club Diamond Spade Heart or or Club Diamond Spade Heart or or Club Diamond

Spade Heart or or Club Diamond Black White or or Good Bad wonderful terrible amazing horrifying positive negative Black White or or Good Bad amazing positive terrible

Black White or or Good Bad wonderful horrifying terrible So what? What’s half a second?

Gun or Tool?

Gun Tool 460 Reaction Time (ms) 450 440 430 420 White Prime Black Prime (Payne, 2001) Hiring Qualifications Experience Description Pregnancy Advice Team captain, Sensitive, Explain options, offer Strong disciplinary intelligent, phone # of health center board relaxed Sensitive, Offer phone # of Moderate Team captain intelligent, very health center emotional Independent, Don’t ask me, Weak Chess captain forthright, talk to your intense parents Race: Candidate is either a member of a fraternity or the Black Student Union Hiring Would you recommend the candidate? Strong and Weak qualifications: No effect of race Moderate qualifications: “Fraternity” ( 76% ) preferred over “Black Student Union” ( 45% ) (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000)


 
 
 
 
 Implicit Bias Effects especially likely when decisions are: • Fast (e.g. shoot or don’t shoot) 
 • Ambiguous (e.g. hiring with unclear criteria or borderline qualifications) 
 • Subtle (e.g. how far to sit, how long to talk) http://implicit.harvard.edu Race Age 
 Sexuality Weight Disability Gender Gender-Science 
 Gender-Career from Person to People Up next: Part 3/3

from Person to People Part 3/3 “Dark Side” “Light Side”? of Groups

Prisoner’s Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player 1 Cooperate Defect Player 2 Cooperate Defect Prisoner’s Dilemma Player 1 Cooperate Defect Player 2 Cooperate 1: Two years 2: Two years Defect

Prisoner’s Dilemma Player 1 Cooperate Defect Player 2 Cooperate 1: Two years 1: One year 2: Two years 2: Ten years Defect Prisoner’s Dilemma Player 1 Cooperate Defect Player 2 Cooperate 1: Two years 1: One year 2: Two years 2: Ten years 1: Ten years Defect 2: One year Prisoner’s Dilemma Player 1 Cooperate Defect Player 2 Cooperate 1: Two years 1: One year 2: Two years 2: Ten years 1: Ten years 1: Six years Defect 2: One year 2: Six years

Prisoner’s Dilemma Player 1 Cooperate Defect Player 2 Cooperate 1: Two years 1: One year 2: Two years 2: Ten years Prisoner’s Dilemma Player 1 Cooperate Defect Player 2 1: Ten years 1: Six years Defect 2: One year 2: Six years Prisoner’s Dilemma Player 1 Cooperate Defect Player 2 Cooperate 1: Two years 1: One year 2: Two years 2: Ten years 1: Ten years 1: Six years Defect 2: One year 2: Six years

Prisoner’s Dilemma Player 1 Cooperate Defect Player 2 1: $2 1: $3 Cooperate 2: $2 2: $0 1: $0 1: $1 Defect 2: $3 2: $1

Prisoner’s Dilemma Player 1 Cooperate Defect Player 2 1: $2 1: $3 Cooperate 2: $2 2: $0 1: $0 1: $1 Defect 2: $3 2: $1 Prisoner’s Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma

Prisoner’s Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma ✓ Prisoner’s Dilemma ✓ ✓

Prisoner’s Dilemma It pays to be nice when your reputation is on the line ✓ Ultimatum Game OK NO $7/$3? ($7/$3) ($0/$0) Proposer $10 Responder Public Goods Game $10 $10 x3 $10 $10

Public Goods Game $20 $5 $5 x3 $5 $5 Public Goods Game $60 $5 $5 x3 $5 $5 Public Goods Game $20 $20 x3 $20 $20

Public Goods Game $10 $10 x3 $10 $10 Public Goods Game $16 $9 $5 x3 $5 $5 Public Goods Game $48 $9 $5 x3 $5 $5

Public Goods Game $21 $17 x3 $17 $17

from Person to People