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On the (In-)Security of Machine Learning Nicholas Carlini Google Brain Written: Sept 24, 2014 Written: Sept 24, 2014 Today: Oct 16, 2018 Written: Sept 24, 2014 Today: Oct 16, 2018 ... 4 years ago So how are we doing? 95% it is a


  1. On the (In-)Security of Machine Learning Nicholas Carlini Google Brain

  2. Written: Sept 24, 2014

  3. Written: Sept 24, 2014 Today: Oct 16, 2018

  4. Written: Sept 24, 2014 Today: Oct 16, 2018 ... 4 years ago

  5. So how are we doing?

  6. 95% it is a French Bulldog

  7. 83% it is a Old English Sheepdog

  8. 78% it is a Greater Swiss Mountain Dog

  9. 67% it is a Great Dane

  10. 99.99% it is Guacamole

  11. 96% it is a Golden 
 Retriever

  12. 99.99% it is Guacamole

  13. This phenomenon is known as an adversarial example B. Biggio, I. Corona, D. Maiorca, B. Nelson, N. Srndic, P. Laskov, G. Giacinto, and F. Roli. Evasion attacks against machine learning at test time. 2013. C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. ICLR 2014. I. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. 2014.

  14. Why should we care about adversarial examples? Make ML robust

  15. Why should we care about adversarial examples? Make ML Make ML robust better

  16. How do we generate adversarial examples?

  17. DEFN: The loss of a neural network on an input x for a label y is a measure of how wrong the network is on x .

  18. loss( , dog) is small loss( , guacamole) is large

  19. neural network loss 
 MAXIMIZE on the given input the perturbation is less SUCH THAT than a given threshold

  20. What do we need to know? Everything.

  21. WHY does this work?

  22. Truck Dog

  23. Truck Dog Airplane

  24. ( (

  25. Okay, lesson learned.

  26. Okay, lesson learned. Don't classify dogs with neural networks.

  27. 99.99% it is a School Bus

  28. Okay, lesson learned.

  29. Okay, lesson learned. images Don't classify dogs with neural networks.

  30. And now for something And now for something And now for something completely different completely different completely different

  31. Mozilla's DeepSpeech

  32. Mozilla's DeepSpeech transcribes this as "most of them were staring 
 quietly at the big table"

  33. Mozilla's DeepSpeech transcribes this as "most of them were staring 
 quietly at the big table"

  34. What about this?

  35. "It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity"

  36. Okay, lesson learned.

  37. Okay, lesson learned. or audio Don't classify images with ^ neural networks.

  38. Okay, lesson learned.

  39. Okay, lesson learned. Don't let adversaries perform gradient descent.

  40. Okay, lesson learned.

  41. Okay, lesson learned. Don't let adversaries have ANY access to my model

  42. Okay, lesson learned.

  43. Okay, lesson learned. Give up.

  44. Yes, machine learning gives amazing results

  45. However, there are 
 also significant 
 vulnerabilities Guacamole (99%)

  46. Questions? https://nicholas.carlini.com nicholas@carlini.com

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