On the Feasibility and Meaning of Security in Sensor Networks - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Chair of Computer Science 4 Communication and Distributed Systems On the Feasibility and Meaning of Security in Sensor Networks Zinaida Benenson and Felix C. Freiling RWTH Aachen University Chair of Computer Science 4 Communication and Distributed Systems

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Security in Sensor Networks? Who cares? Security is expensive: • energy consuming • increasing code size • slowing things down We just want to get the system running! 2 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 2/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Why and How to Secure Sensor Networks protect right things in a right way • Need appropriate security measures • Killer applications will inevitably be attacked Are there any killer applications in sight? 3 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 3/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Example: Securing Killer Applications protect right things in a right way WLAN and GSM (in)security attackers: researches, criminals, law enforcement gain: research reputation, service, equipment, money, valuable information • WEP over-the-air interception • end device theft • bogus access points • SIM cloning • access point theft • (bogus base stations) • (infrastructure attacks) 4 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 4/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Protect Right Things in a Right Way 1. Security goals: what to protect 2. Adversaries: against whom to protect 3. Solutions: how to protect 4. Open problems and discussion 5 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 5/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Security Goals in Sensor Networks sensor network ≈ distributed database Outside security goals: • Confidentiality: get data only if authorized • Integrity: get the genuine data • Availability: get data whenever needed Solutions: • secure data aggregation (Przydatek et al. 2003, Wagner 2004) • anti-jamming services (Wood et al. 2003) • access control (Benenson et al. 2005) 6 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 6/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Security Goals in Sensor Networks sensor network ≈ distributed system Inside security goal: realize outside security interactions between system components Solutions: • key management (Eschenauer & Gligor 2002, Zhu et al. 2003, Anderson et al. 2004) • link layer encryption (Karlof et al. 2004) • secure routing (Karlof & Wagner 2003, Deng et al. 2003) • secure in-network processing (Deng et al. 2003, Dimitriou & Foteinakis 2004) • data replication (Ghose et al. 2003) 7 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 7/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Adversary Models in Sensor Networks Parameters: • Malignity • Goals • Interference • Presence • Available resources 8 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 8/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Adversary Parameters for Sensor Networks Malignity random malicious failures failures (worst case) dependability security • Malignity • Goals • Interference • Presence • Available resources 9 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 9/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Adversary Parameters for Sensor Networks Goals Integrity Availability (modify) Confidentiality (destroy) (gain access) Data: • valuable • sensitive • critical • Malignity • Goals • Interference • Presence • Available resources 10 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 10/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Adversary Parameters for Sensor Networks Interference active passive malicious fail-stop node capture disturbing • Malignity • Goals • Interference • Presence • Available resources 11 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 11/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Adversary Parameters for Sensor Networks Presence global local partially present • Malignity • Goals • Interference • Presence • Available resources 12 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 12/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Adversary Parameters for Sensor Networks Available Resources expert funding knowledge time equipment • clever outsiders • knowledgeable insiders • Malignity • funded organizations • Goals • Interference • Presence • Available resources 13 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 13/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Adversary Parameters for Sensor Networks Interplay of Parameters hacker malicious active global adversary single sensor node capture node cloning eavesdrop key • Malignity • Goals • Interference • Presence • Available resources 14 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 14/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Protecting Sensor Networks • redundancy => probabilistic security • broadcast communication => witnesses passive active • hierarchical architectures • symmetric encryption • hybrid cryptography • key management • tamper resistance • replication • witnesses • anti-traffic analysis • evasiveness • virtual minefield 15 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 15/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Threat Analysis top-down bottom-up undesired undesired system behavior outcome 2 outcome 1 ... immediate immediate failure of failure of cause 1 cause 2 component 2 component 1 Example: Structural health? Home networks? (Ross Anderson „Security Engineering“) 16 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 16/17

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Open Problems • Realistic adversary models ➔ consider particular applications and systems ➔ base stations ↔ sensor node • Security primitives ➔ symmetric encryption ↔ in-network processing, witnesses ➔ hybrid cryptography? • Securing all protocol layers ➔ jamming ➔ freshness • „Fully“ secure sensor networks ➔ combining existing solutions feasible? 17 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 17/17

2 nd Workshop on Sensor Networks Important Dates: • Submission deadline April 29, 2005 • Acceptance notification May 27, 2005 • Camera ready June 24, 2005 • Preliminary date Sept. 21, 2005 Associated Workshop: Multisensordatenfusion: Aktuelle Trends, innovative Lösungen, neue Anwendungsfelder Organization: • GRK „Software for mobile communication systems“ RWTH Aachen • Fachgespräch Sensornetze

Chair of Computer Science 4 Security in Sensor Networks Communication and Distributed Systems Summary adversary models security goals • malignity • CIA • goals • inside / outside • interference • presence • available resources solutions • probabilistic • witnesses • redundancy 19 Zinaida Benenson March 24, 2005 19/17