NPT: state of play and possible evolution Dr Rebecca Johnson, Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy Presentation to the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) on 'The review of the NPT', Thursday, 29 January, 11.00 - 12.30. (This presentation accompanies the powerpoint, giving background unable to be fitted into the initial 10 min opening, and may be adapted so as to avoid duplicating the preceding presentation by the first speaker.) In the run-up to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, four challenges stand out: 1) Disarmament – Lack of implementation of the 2010 disarmament action plan, following on from reneging on the “13 Steps” adopted by consensus by states parties to the 2000 NPT Review Conference. 2) Middle East – Failure to make progress on the central 2010 commitment to hold “a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution;” 3) Proliferation – Notably concerns about the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea – and ‘nuclear security’ – focussing on preventing nuclear trafficking and terrorism 4) Nuclear energy after Fukushima – Unlikely to hear repeats of the triumphalism about ‘nuclear renaissance’ that dominated in 2010, but increased concerns about safety. There will be support for the IAEA, the additional protocol and medical and small scale nuclear uses, but diminished interest in nuclear power as such. Taking these in reverse: Re 4) There will be a lot of posturing on Article IV , mainly from France, Russia and certain states from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), especially from Iran and various Arab states, but there is little appetite for making this a central issue, amid continuing public and insurance anxieties over nuclear safety and lack of convincing solutions for radioactive waste disposal after 60 years of trying. There may be more voices than in 2010 arguing that large nuclear power projects are not necessary and contribute to greater insecurities in terms of safety, environment, security and proliferation, perhaps accompanied by calls for the Article IV promotion of nuclear energy to be restricted to small scale uses such as medical, scientific and agricultural. Re 3) I have put these together because the agendas of non-proliferation and security are closely connected in terms of political strategy, leadership and emphasis. Four nuclear-armed states – India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea – are outside the NPT. There will be ritualistic calls for universality and for these to join the NPT as non-nuclear- weapon states (or rejoin/comply in the case of North Korea), but no-one expects this to influence anyone’s poli cies in the real world. The situations in Iran and North Korea are being managed through diplomacy involving government representatives and key geopolitical players. The P5 + 1 (or EU3 + 3) are taking the lead with Iran, with more constructive engagement from the IAEA and President Hassan 1
Rouhani’s administration. North Korea’s withdrawal fro m the NPT in 2003, development of nuclear weapons and periodic nuclear tests are a direct challenge to the Non-Proliferation regime, but are being managed diplomatically through bilateral and Six Party Talks, but as North Korea does not attend NPT meetings, the most that is expected is that the US and China will broker some form of agreed criticism. Under Pres. Rouhani, Iran’s nuclear diplomacy is likely to be more nuanced than in recent NPT conferences, but much will depend on how the US delegation behaves on this issue. There will undoubtedly be clashes, especially in the context of efforts to address the Middle East impasse, but Iran per se is unlikely to be centre stage in 2015. Nuclear security is of course relevant to the NPT but was prioritised as a political issue by Western governments since 9/11, with initiatives such as George W Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative and Pres. Obama’s Nuclear Security Su mmits. Though many developing governments in the NPT are sceptical about the emphasis given by Western states to the nuclear security agenda, few oppose outright. The nuclear security mechanisms are generally formulated as parallel processes intended to support the NPT, and their advocates argue that these initiatives enable them to implement their NPT obligations more effectively, especially with regard to Article II. Re 2) Achieving agreement on appointing a Middle East facilitator and holding a regional conference was the centre piece that made adoption of a final document possible in 2010. The fact that no such conference has been convened, despite the assiduous shuttle diplomacy of the Finnish Facilitator, Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, will likely have negative impact on the 2015 Review Conference. Considerable efforts are being expended by the P5 and others to find some kind of fix to avoid the Middle East becoming a make or break issue for the Review Conference. I’d be happy to respond to questions on any of the above NPT -related issues, but will focus the rest of my presentation on the core issue of nuclear disarmament . Nuclear disarmament is a fundamental obligation expressed through the NPT’s preamble and Articles VI and VII in particular. Complaints about the poor pace of compliance by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) with the disarmament objectives and obligations of the NPT have been a basic feature of all NPT meetings since it entered into force in 1970. Until 1996 the key demand was a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Once that was achieved – after over 40 years of civil society campaigning finally overcame opposition in the key nuclear-armed governments – a range of disarmament-enhancing steps have been put forward by the nuclear free states at all the meetings, but without seeing these implemented: 1995 Principles and Objectives 2000 “13 Steps” 2010 Action Plan (Action points 1 – 6) The NWS focus mainly on Actions 4+5, which address only reducing (not eliminating) numbers, risks, operational status, role of nuclear weapons in security postures etc. Look at ACTION 3, however, and recall that in both 2000 and 2010 emphasis was put on making all steps irreversible. While formally accepting the commitments made through the NPT and at every subsequent review conference, the Nuclear-armed Five in the NPT (N5) have continued to modernise and refine their arsenals, while claiming that the numerical reductions they made when the Cold War ended should satisfy the nuclear free states. These reductions were welcomed, but there 2
Recommend
More recommend
