Non-Repudiation and End-to-End Security for Electric-Vehicle - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Non-Repudiation and End-to-End Security for Electric-Vehicle Charging Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe 2019 September 30 th , 2019 1/40 Pol Van Aubel

Authors Pol Van Aubel pol.vanaubel@cs.ru.nl Erik Poll erikpoll@cs.ru.nl This work is supported by the Joost Rijneveld European Regional Development joost@joostrijneveld.nl Fund (ERDF), Rijksoverheid, and Province of Gelderland, as part of the project Charge & Go. 2/40 Pol Van Aubel

Overview The EV-charging infrastructure The need for security End-to-end security Conclusions

Where is the EV-charging infrastructure? Source: openchargemap.io 3/40 Pol Van Aubel

Where is the EV-charging infrastructure? Source: openchargemap.io 4/40 Pol Van Aubel

Where is the EV-charging infrastructure? Source: openchargemap.io 5/40 Pol Van Aubel

Where is the EV-charging infrastructure? Source: openchargemap.io 6/40 Pol Van Aubel

Where is the EV-charging infrastructure? Source: openchargemap.io 7/40 Pol Van Aubel

What is the EV-charging infrastructure? Source: EV Related Protocol Study – ElaadNL 8/40 Pol Van Aubel

Most important aspects Many roles, fulfilled by many different parties. • 9/40 Pol Van Aubel

Most important aspects Many roles, fulfilled by many different parties. • The only way for some of these to communicate is via other parties . • 9/40 Pol Van Aubel

Overview The EV-charging infrastructure The need for security End-to-end security Conclusions

What could go wrong? Fraud • 10/40 Pol Van Aubel

What could go wrong? Fraud • Vandalism • 10/40 Pol Van Aubel

What could go wrong? Fraud • Vandalism • Activism • 10/40 Pol Van Aubel

What could go wrong? Fraud • Vandalism • Activism • – “Chaos Computer Club hacks e-motor charging stations” https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2017/e-motor 10/40 Pol Van Aubel

What could go wrong? Fraud • Vandalism • Activism • – “Chaos Computer Club hacks e-motor charging stations” https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2017/e-motor Grid destabilization • 10/40 Pol Van Aubel

What could go wrong? Fraud • Vandalism • Activism • – “Chaos Computer Club hacks e-motor charging stations” https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2017/e-motor Grid destabilization • – Horus Scenario: hacking PV-installations https://horusscenario.com/ 10/40 Pol Van Aubel

What could go wrong? Fraud • Vandalism • Activism • – “Chaos Computer Club hacks e-motor charging stations” https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2017/e-motor Grid destabilization • – Horus Scenario: hacking PV-installations https://horusscenario.com/ – “Public Plug-in Electric Vehicles + Grid Data: Is a New Cyberattack Vector Viable?” https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.08283 10/40 Pol Van Aubel

What could go wrong? Privacy breaches • 11/40 Pol Van Aubel

What could go wrong? Privacy breaches • – Customer location is sensitive information! 11/40 Pol Van Aubel

What could go wrong? Privacy breaches • – Customer location is sensitive information! – What other information should be secret? 11/40 Pol Van Aubel

What could go wrong? Privacy breaches • – Customer location is sensitive information! – What other information should be secret? – GDPR compliance is not straightforward. 11/40 Pol Van Aubel

Current state of security Authentication / authorization with RFID cards • 12/40 Pol Van Aubel

Current state of security Authentication / authorization with RFID cards • Some TLS, lacking clear instructions • 12/40 Pol Van Aubel

Envisioned state of security Strong authentication using challenge-response • 13/40 Pol Van Aubel

Envisioned state of security Strong authentication using challenge-response • TLS everywhere, standardized & specified well • 13/40 Pol Van Aubel

Envisioned state of security Strong authentication using challenge-response • TLS everywhere, standardized & specified well • Better implementations and testing • 13/40 Pol Van Aubel

Are we done then? I S O 1 5 1 1 8 EV Charge Point O C P P O C P I eMSP CPO 14/40 Pol Van Aubel

Are we done then? I S O 1 5 1 1 8 TLS TLS EV Charge Point O C P P TLS O C P I TLS TLS eMSP CPO 15/40 Pol Van Aubel

We’re not done TLS protects the network traffic between individual parties. • 16/40 Pol Van Aubel

We’re not done TLS protects the network traffic between individual parties. • Provides confidentiality and authenticity for the data • only while being communicated between these parties. 16/40 Pol Van Aubel

Trust We have to trust that every party doesn’t send what it shouldn’t, • 17/40 Pol Van Aubel

Trust We have to trust that every party doesn’t send what it shouldn’t, • doesn’t change what it relays, • 17/40 Pol Van Aubel

Trust We have to trust that every party doesn’t send what it shouldn’t, • doesn’t change what it relays, • doesn’t peek at what it shouldn’t see, • 17/40 Pol Van Aubel

Trust We have to trust that every party doesn’t send what it shouldn’t, • doesn’t change what it relays, • doesn’t peek at what it shouldn’t see, • doesn’t later dispute sending something, • 17/40 Pol Van Aubel

Trust We have to trust that every party doesn’t send what it shouldn’t, • doesn’t change what it relays, • doesn’t peek at what it shouldn’t see, • doesn’t later dispute sending something, • for whatever reason. 17/40 Pol Van Aubel

Overview The EV-charging infrastructure The need for security End-to-end security Conclusions

What is end-to-end security? Main aspects: confidentiality. • 18/40 Pol Van Aubel

What is end-to-end security? Main aspects: confidentiality. • authenticity. • 18/40 Pol Van Aubel

What is end-to-end security? Main aspects: confidentiality. • authenticity. • non-repudiation. • 18/40 Pol Van Aubel

What is end-to-end security? Main aspects: confidentiality. • authenticity. • non-repudiation. • from end to end: • 18/40 Pol Van Aubel

What is end-to-end security? Main aspects: confidentiality. • authenticity. • non-repudiation. • from end to end: • – from the initial sending party on one side, 18/40 Pol Van Aubel

What is end-to-end security? Main aspects: confidentiality. • authenticity. • non-repudiation. • from end to end: • – from the initial sending party on one side, – to the eventual receiving party on the other side, 18/40 Pol Van Aubel

What is end-to-end security? Main aspects: confidentiality. • authenticity. • non-repudiation. • from end to end: • – from the initial sending party on one side, – to the eventual receiving party on the other side, – regardless of how many parties are in between. 18/40 Pol Van Aubel

This is not end-to-end! I S O 1 5 1 1 8 TLS TLS EV Charge Point O C P P TLS O C P I TLS TLS eMSP CPO 19/40 Pol Van Aubel

And it doesn’t provide non-repudiation! Long-term guarantee of authenticity • 20/40 Pol Van Aubel

And it doesn’t provide non-repudiation! Long-term guarantee of authenticity • Proof that a message was produced by that party • 20/40 Pol Van Aubel

And it doesn’t provide non-repudiation! Long-term guarantee of authenticity • Proof that a message was produced by that party • – (very useful in disputes!) 20/40 Pol Van Aubel

An example message Charge Session Start sent from EV to CPO EV ID Time CP Location Contract ID €/kWh 2019-09-30 51°49'30.6"N 101 12501932 0.21 14:50 5°52'06.5"E 21/40 Pol Van Aubel

An example message Charge Session Start sent from EV to CPO EV ID Time CP Location Contract ID €/kWh 2019-09-30 51°49'30.6"N 101 12501932 0.21 14:50 5°52'06.5"E Charge Session Start sent from CPO to eMSP EV ID Time Contract ID €/kWh 2019-09-30 101 12501932 0.21 14:50 21/40 Pol Van Aubel

An example message Charge Session Start sent from EV to CPO EV ID Time CP Location Contract ID €/kWh 2019-09-30 51°49'30.6"N 101 12501932 0.21 14:50 5°52'06.5"E Charge Session Start sent from CPO to eMSP EV ID Time Contract ID €/kWh 2019-09-30 101 12501932 0.21 14:50 CP Location is dropped because the eMSP doesn’t need it. 21/40 Pol Van Aubel

Adding authenticity & non-repudiation – naïvely Charge Session Start sent from EV to CPO EV ID Time CP Location Contract ID €/kWh 2019-09-30 51°49'30.6"N 101 12501932 0.21 14:50 5°52'06.5"E 22/40 Pol Van Aubel

Adding authenticity & non-repudiation – naïvely Charge Session Start sent from EV to CPO EV ID Time CP Location Contract ID €/kWh 2019-09-30 51°49'30.6"N 101 12501932 0.21 14:50 5°52'06.5"E Charge Session Start sent from CPO to eMSP EV ID Time Contract ID €/kWh 2019-09-30 101 12501932 0.21 14:50 22/40 Pol Van Aubel