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Online event registration with minimal privacy violation Research project nr. 2 presentation Niels van Dijkhuizen Introduction Sharing captured network data IDS rule Privacy concerns Image source:


  1. Online event registration with minimal privacy violation Research project nr. 2 – presentation Niels van Dijkhuizen

  2. Introduction

  3. Sharing captured network data

  4. IDS rule

  5. Privacy concerns Image source: www.birminghamavs.com/tag/surveillance-cameras

  6. Research Question Is it possible to create a system that indicates network threats with minimal privacy violation?

  7. Approach

  8. Anonymisation example 1

  9. Anonymisation example 1

  10. Anonymisation example 1

  11. Anonymisation example 2

  12. Anonymisation example 2

  13. Anonymisation example 2

  14. Techniques and concepts  Anonymisation or Pseudonymisation?  Transformation primitives Image source: www.open.edu/openlearn/society/the-white-mask

  15. Inference attacks  Passive fingerprinting to infer objects and topology  Active Data injection attack (chosen plaintext)  Cryptographic attacks  Even PETs are not safe! source: www.grumpycats.com

  16. Requirements of the Anonymisation system  Full support for Link-, Internet- and Transport layers;  Features for application layer anonymisation;  Real time processing network streams.

  17. State of current tools

  18. Speed improvements [1]  Process parallelisation  GPU Accelerated Crypto  AES-NI, PadLock, etc. Image source: www.nvidia.com

  19. Speed improvements [2]  Special purpose capture cards  Programmable NICs and FPGAs  Random Number Generator  Inline data anonymisation / filtering Image source: digilentinc.com/sume/

  20. Suggestions

  21. Plan Needed steps: Identify proto/apps; 1. Get statistics; 2. Identify threats; 3. Identify sensitive fields; 4. Build privacy and threat policies. 5.

  22. Network native way Privacy Packets Threat rule-sets policies Identification IDS Further and Anonymisation Detection conditional classification Engine anonymisation Unknown is Alerts & discarded Storage Anonymiser Intrusion Detection

  23. White fielding Privacy Packets Threat rule-sets policies Identification Erase irrelevant and Simplified IDS fields classification Unknown is Alerts & discarded Storage Intrusion Anonymiser Detection

  24. Conclusions

  25. Conclusions [1] It is possible to anonymise network traces to a certain extent and keep some of the usefulness for threat detection Image source: www.justice-for-families.org.uk/

  26. Conclusions [2]  Do not share complete datasets;  Only specific new threat-related parts;  Maturity of frameworks:  Primitive enhancements;  Improving of parsing;  Speed / Scalability.

  27. Acknowledgement

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