ⓒ 2020 Securing a Brighter Future without Line 5 or an Oil Tunnel Meet Our Panelists Stanley "Skip" Pruss Dr. Edward E. Timm, PhD, PE Former Dir. of MI Dept. of Retired as Senior Scientist, Energy, Labor, and Dow Chemical Company Economic Growth & Chief Energy Officer for MI Moderator: Liz Kirkwood, E.D. FLOW Ian Bund Bryan Newland Senior Advisor, Chairman, Plymouth Growth Bay Mills Indian Community 2
ⓒ 2020 Securing a Brighter Future without Line 5 or an Oil Tunnel Questions for Our Panelists? Please enter your questions in the: ● Zoom Q&A ● FLOW’s Facebook Live comments Bryan Newland Ian Bund Edward Timm Skip Pruss 3
Why Do Technological Disasters Happen? “Certain Signs Precede Certain Events” Cicero (106-45 BC) 8/4/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE 4
Why Do Technological Disasters Happen? Challenger, 1986 5 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE
Why Do Technological Disasters Happen? ❖ The Rogers Commission found NASA's organizational culture and decision-making processes had been key contributing factors to the accident, with the agency violating its own safety rules. ❖ NASA managers had known since 1977 that contractor’s design of the Solid Rocket Boosters contained a potentially catastrophic flaw in the O-rings, but they failed to address this problem. ❖ NASA managers disregarded warnings from engineers about the dangers of launching posed by the low temperatures of that morning! Lesson: Never ignore original design information without thorough re-analysis 6 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE 6 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE
Why Do Technological Disasters Happen? Boeing 737 MAX, 2019 7 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE 7 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE
Why Do Technological Disasters Happen? ❖ Original design in 1964 ❖ Stretched twice and re-engine three times while retaining the original cable and pulley flight control system ❖ Modifications made in 2017 to accept more powerful engines resulted in stability problem in certain flight conditions ❖ To patch this problem, engineers added a computer-controlled stability enhancement system ❖ In 2019, two Boeing 737 MAX aircraft crashed with all hands lost. ❖ Investigations showed that the new stability enhancement system could take over control from the pilots and crash the aircraft. ❖ During these investigations numerous communications were uncovered where engineers warned that the system was problematic. Lesson: When remediating a problem that emerges due to a change from an original design always analyze the change for the introduction of new failure modes 8 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE
Why Do Technological Disasters Happen? Edenville, MI Dam, 2020 9 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE 9 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE
Why Do Technological Disasters Happen? ❖ Designed and constructed in 1924 for a circus owner turned real estate developer ❖ In 2006 FEMA engineers determined the dam’s spillways were too small to handle a maximum probable flood based on current weather and geographic information ❖ In 2018, the Federal Energy Commission revoked the dam’s license to generate power and turned regulation of the dam over to the State of Michigan. ❖ Subsequently, State inspectors determined the dam was unsafe but the MIDNR took no enforcement action ❖ In May, 2020, the dam failed during a torrential rainstorm causing great damage to the downstream area. Lesson: When inspectors repeatedly find structural problems, action must be taken to prevent disaster. 10 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE
Why Do Technological Disasters Happen? Enbridge Line 5 in the Straits Bent and Ovaled Pipe Not Fixed in Time Clay Pile Screw Anchor Fix Fix Sandbag Original Excessive Fix Span Another Bent Support Bent and Twisted Support Cause Not Known Cause Not Known Anchor Strike One of Many 11 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE 11 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE
Why Do Technological Disasters Happen? ❖ Constructed in 1953, unanticipated dredging problems resulted in excessive spans which were remediated by piling clay on pipeline ❖ 1954 construction notes include this comment: “If currents over 2 knots are found at the bottom, it was decided that concrete saddles could be lowered into place, over the line, to add the necessary extra weight to maintain the stability of the pipeline.” ❖ Inspections from the ‘70’s on revealed strong currents were undermining the pipe resulting in, extremely long, unstable spans ❖ In 2001, Enbridge field engineers wrote “In order to maintain pipeline integrity and safety, these repairs can wait no longer.” Enbridge waited until 2003 to begin a significant effort to remediate the sagging pipe ❖ Enbridge continues on its program to remediate the pipeline by adding nearly 200 screw anchor supports ❖ The remediated structure is not compliant with the applicable engineering guideline DNVGL-RP-F105 ❖ No documentation can be found that addresses the many new failure modes introduced by this remediation ❖ Several recent incidents demonstrate that the remediated structure is vulnerable to failure modes not considered in the original design and analysis. 12 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE
Why Do Technological Disasters Happen? Is Line 5 in the Straits being operated in accordance with Good Engineering Practice? Lesson: Never ignore original design information without thorough re-analysis Lesson: When remediating a problem that emerges due to a change from an original design always analyze the change for the introduction of new failure modes Lesson: When inspectors repeatedly find structural problems, action must be taken to prevent disaster Line 5 should be decommissioned until a comprehensive engineering investigation by a proven, unbiased engineering firm determines why Line 5 failures keep happening. If it proves possible to make Line 5 safe by further construction, then, and only then, the remediated structural design must be re-permitted under the Great Lakes Submerged Lands Act and other governing legislation before re-commissioning 8/3/2020 E. E. Timm, PhD, PE 13
ⓒ 2020 Presentation by Skip Pruss Risk Factors Supporting a Permanent Shutdown of Line 5 1. Anchor Strikes ● June 1979 - Consumers Power Co. cables cut ● April 2018 - Tugboat dropped and dragged anchor ● May 2020 - Vessels possibly under contract to Enbridge struck pipelines and supports 2. Catenary Events - Tug and barge traffic and vessel density 3. Cable or chain drags 4. Current-Induced Stress on the Elevated Pipelines 14
ⓒ 2020 Presentation by Skip Pruss Risk Factors Supporting a Permanent Shutdown of Line 5 (cont.) 5. Recurrent Pipeline Safety Issues ● Enbridge fined $6.7 M for neglecting pipeline safety issues ● Enbridge’s pipeline network experienced 215 hazardous liquids “incidents” from 2002 to August 2018 ● Line 5 itself has experienced at least 29 leaks and spills since its installation 6. No publicly disclosed risk analysis for now elevated pipelines 7. Lack of Financial Assurances in the Event of a Pipeline Failure 8. Vessel safety priority if vessel loses power 15
ⓒ 2020 Presentation by Skip Pruss: Update on Line 5 Litigation ● ELPC/NWF v. U.S. Coast Guard - Inadequate Oil Spill Response Plan; Filed: 2018 ● Anchor Permit Contested Case - Straits of Mackinac Alliance, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, & City of Mackinac Island; Filed: 2018 ● Enbridge v. State of Michigan - Court of Claims challenging constitutionality of Act 359 to build a proposed tunnel for petroleum pipeline transport using public trust bottomlands in the Straits of Mackinac; Filed: June 6, 2019 ● People of Michigan v. Enbridge - State Circuit Court, Ingham County, alleging 1953 easement is void based on ongoing risk of oil spill and associated harm and pollution to public trust resources and public nuisance. Legal theories include violations of public trust law, public nuisance, and Michigan Environmental Protection Act; Filed: June 27, 2019 ● Bad River Band v. Enbridge - United States District Court, pertaining to 1854 treaty and expiration of easements; Filed: July 23, 2019 16
ⓒ 2020 Presentation by Skip Pruss Regulatory Approvals Required for Enbridge Tunnel Federal Approvals: State Approvals: ● ● Army Corps of Engineers § Michigan Department of ● Environment, Great Lakes and United States Coast Guard Energy (EGLE) ● U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ● § Michigan Public Service ● U.S. Department of Commission (MPSC) Transportation’s Pipeline and ● § State Historic Preservation Hazardous Materials Safety Office (SHPO) Administration (PHMSA) 17
ⓒ 2020 Presentation by Skip Pruss Analysis of the Enbridge Financial Assurances 1. Enbridge, Inc., a Canadian corporation, is not a signatory to any of the agreements made with the Snyder Administration. 2. The subsidiaries who signed the agreements with the Snyder administration do not have the financial wherewithal to address the consequences of a Line 5 rupture. 3. Enbridge, Inc. is not contractually obligated to stand behind the indemnity agreements of its subsidiaries. Key Point: Enbridge Inc. has provided no legally enforceable financial assurances to the State of Michigan, Tribes, or coastal communities. 18
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