Lauren R. Alpert The Graduate Center, CUNY Southern Society for - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Lauren R. Alpert The Graduate Center, CUNY Southern Society for Philosophy & Psychology March 10th, 2016

variance in human embodiment occurs along many dimensions, including: - height - weight - proportionality - symmetry - muscularity - flexibility - range of motion - strength - endurance - etc. …but tends to be in discussions about 2 ¡ photography: Howard Schatz, Athlete

Let ( ) refer to the claim that J. Kevin O’Regan Alva Noë (the exact nature of this ‘contribution’ – e.g., constitutive or modulatory – is orthogonal to my present concerns) Theorists committed to this claim often underspecify Lawrence Shapiro , or in other words, . Liam Dempsey Itay Shani 3 ¡

Andy Clark has criticized expressions of EP (especially O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor theory, 2001 ) which are “ of bodily form and dynamics,” implying that: even that ensues.” (2008c; my italics) Clark worries that , ¡ EP conflicts with the : He urges that until we have good reason to believe that phenomenal states ¡ cannot be multiply realized in subtly different bodies. 4 ¡

To avoid Clark’s worry, between physical details that contribute to our phenomenology, and details that are too trivial; – ? One option is to treat ¡ as the markers of . ¡ This implies that (e.g., legs, wings, or fins?) . ¡ I will argue that . It suggests that we can neglect the 5 ¡

: 1) defend the plausibility of the . I will: Ø explain what we can take for granted about kinesthesia Ø appeal to theories of motor learning & control Ø argue that (more likely than not) 2) explain Focusing on kinesthesia indicates that: , without allowing that every bodily detail contributes to the realization of mental states. 6 ¡

= def qualitative experience of one’s body movement & posture Plays an important in by supplying sensory feedback used to refine motor commands. The embedded in muscles, are tendons, joints, and skin changes in the : mechanical properties ¡ - the magnitude of of body parts, muscle contraction and in response to relaxation, motor commands - the intensity of (in active movement) stretches in tendons or external forces and skin, (in passive movement) - the degree of change - for short, changes in in the angle of . skeletal joints. 7 ¡

Neurophysiologists currently favor a complex account of kinesthesia, on which: “ from muscle, joint, and skin receptors, as well as related to motor command, Sensory all prediction error ” (Taylor 2013) – effort – fluidity – force – balance – speed – stability Wolpert and Ghamarani (2000), fig. 3 – tension 8 ¡

differs from our , in that: stimuli for are to any particular body ( and thereby ), whereas the stimuli for are to one subject’s body (and thus ). – not any one else’s, nor a generic, unspecified human form. 9 ¡

Consider two agents (A and B) with performing the . *stipulation: tokens of the same state type = phenomenal states that would be indiscriminable if both experienced & compared by one subject. In other words, A B (both backbending), (A’s body backbending vs. B’s body backbending)? 10 ¡

To assess whether their kinesthetic states are type-identical (i.e., sensation A = sensation B ), we would have to investigate not only: whether they undergo equivalent processes of sensory transduction (stimuli A è sensation A = stimuli B è sensation B ), but also: whether they are transducing equivalent stimuli in their respective bodies (stimuli A = stimuli B ). For kinesthetic phenomenology, stimuli A = stimuli B is equivalent to movement mechanics A = mechanics B . So, do movement mechanics A = mechanics B ? 11 ¡

Let’s consult . environment ¡ Both dynamical systems and computational models of motor control emphasize that task ¡ body ¡ In short, these models converge in positing de Rugy et al. (2013) 12 ¡

A , which emerge from the interaction of its structural properties with nonspecific effects of the environment, are called . Bodies differing in intrinsic dynamics develop particularized, “individually appropriate solutions” for motor coordination. (Thelen et al. 1993) ≠ This suggests that , whenever structural differences between A’s and B’s bodies yield differences in intrinsic dynamics. In other words: 13 ¡

I want to claim that: One could defend this conditional as follows: ¡ A difference in A’s movement mechanics at two timepoints ( ) likely produces a discriminable difference in kinesthetic sensation ( ≠ ). When the same mechanical difference occurs between A & B ( ≠ ), it likely produces a discriminable difference in kinesthetic sensation ( ≠ ). 14 ¡

…but the possibility remains that , even though ≠ . This would be the case if kinesthetic sensations are by various sets of mechanical inputs. Clark argues that , due to “compensatory differences in key aspects of ¡ downstream [neural] processing”. (2008b) ¡ If such compensatory processing takes place, then it’s that at least . ¡ 15 ¡

for interpersonal bodily differences But in the realization of kinesthetic states? It’s unclear what purpose it would serve us to have our kinesthetic sensations normalized to correct for body diversity. It’s also not apparent why it would be detrimental for us to have , the uniqueness of which mirrors the uniqueness of our bodies. After all, the is the . It makes more sense for kinesthetic sensations to be than for body diversity to fail to produce interpersonal kinesthetic diversity. 16 ¡

So, I stand by: By modus ponens, . 2. If , then . …which is a qualified version of the 17 ¡

Intrinsic dynamics could likely be by bodies of individuals sharing structural features at a macro level of description, but varying at microscopic levels of detail. Thus, my claim that avoids Clark’s slippery slope worry: that if every physical difference produces a difference in phenomenology, embodied phenomenology conflicts with multiple realizability. ¡ 18 ¡

If one wants to claim that “the nature of one’s experience profoundly reflects the details of one’s embodiment” (Dempsey and Shani 2013) , Dempsey and Shani state it would be to assert that: ¡ ¡ ¡ Instead, their account emphasizes that we ought to expect members of to . e.g., dogs, bats, humans, et al. are , ¡ which . 19 ¡

HUMAN phenomenology DOG phenomenology realizes realizes are an Intraspecies body variance can be enormous, and its potential phenomenal impact is neglected on this approach. 20 ¡

The is an , about which bodily differences, at what level of physical description, make phenomenal differences. – at least for the kinesthetic modality of experience. By , our view of the embodied mind will come closer to encompassing the intricacies of our lived experiences moving through the world. 21 ¡

- Clark, A. (2008b) Pressing the flesh: A tension in the study of the embodied, embedded mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 76(1), 37-59. - Clark, A. (2008c) Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension . New York: Oxford U Press. - Dempsey, L.P., and Shani, I. (2013) Stressing the flesh: In defense of a strong embodied cognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 86(3), 590-617. - de Rugy, A. , Loeb, G.E., and Carroll, T.J. (2013) Are muscle synergies useful for neural control? Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience 7(19). - de Vignemont, F., & Haggard, P. (2008). Action observation and execution: lauren.r.alpert What is shared? Social Neuroscience 3(3-4): 421-433. @gmail.com - Latash, M.L. (2008) Synergy . New York: Oxford U. Press. - O’Regan, J.K., and Noë, A. (2001) A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 939-1031. - Schatz, H. (2002) Athlete. New York: HarperCollins. - Thelen, E., Corbetta, D., Kamm, K., Spencer, J. P., Schneider, K., & Zernicke, R. F. (1993). The transition to reaching: Mapping intention and intrinsic dynamics. Child Development, 64(4), 1058-1098. - Wolpert, D.M., and Ghahramani, Z. (2000) Computational principles of movement neuroscience. Nature Neuroscience 3, 1212-1217.

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