Kay Fjørtoft, SINTEF Ocean Tony Haugen, Kongsberg Seatex
The IMAT project will develop and test land-based sensors, The main purpose is to define the minimum shore-based infrastructure, communication systems and control systems used as a support in order to conduct safe and cost effective integrated maritime transport to autonomous vessels navigation and operation. operations. Project focus areas: Verification and integration of land-based sensor data with sensor data from autonomous vessels. Adaptation of land-based surveillance technology for data fusion and automatic transfer of navigation data between infrastructure installations, control centres and vessels. Ensure the human-in-the loop when implementing new technology. Standardization of messages and technology, interaction procedures, robust technology for digital information exchange between the systems and parties. Development of new guidelines for interaction, new regulations and standards for information exchange. 2 Project manager: kay.fjortoft@sintef.no
MBR DGNSS AIS VDES 3
The paper; Integrated Maritime Autonomous Transport System (IMAT) • Introduction to the IMAT concept • Integrated Maritime Autonomous System • Addressing the hazards and compare with sensor site infrastructure • The use case Yara Birkeland • Summary 4
⇒ It is about the transport system, not only the vessel ⇒ Autonomous shipping needs digital infrastructure ⇒ Autonomous shipping must be safer than conventional ⇒ The humans must be is in the loop ⇒ An autonomous vessel has nothing to do in a "stupid" infrastructure that can not support or RCC (Remote Control Centre) operations
Introduction to the IMAT concept 1. Sensors and communication infrastructure 2. Local monitoring and information Centre 3. Shore Control Centre 4. Collaboration "A fully autonomous vessel will be without crew on board. How can we operate a MASS as good as, or even better than a conventional vessel with crew and how can land based infrastructure assist?". 6
Sensor and communication infrastructure • It depends on the level of • Sensors autonomy! • It depends on the level of • On board the vessel security! • Sensor infrastructure • It depends on the level of communication capabilities • It depends on collaboration • Communication with other vessels and stakeholders • On board the vessel • It depends on the …… • With other vessels There are no room for failures • With the infrastructure in implementing autonomous • With the Control Centre transport systems https://loveforquotes.com 7
Local monitoring and information centre • The main goal will be to provide enough data, that are needed to build awareness and trust • A LMC will have different requirements to different operation types • Typical information elements; traffic data, local data in the area, integration possibilities, processing, analytics, provision, digital ports, etc. 8
Shore Control Centre • Operational requirements A Concept of Operation (CONOPS) refer to the awareness of a situation. It gives the perception • Technological requirements of an event with respect to time and condition, and the system behavior (actual and future). A • Communication requirements CONOPS will address the human factors in the MASS operation aspect: • Collaboration requirements Situation and automation awareness • Regulation requirements The understanding between automation and human role There are several User experiences and usability of the • Knowledge requirements initiatives to standardize solutions Trust in automation operational procedures, Graphical user interface and and to develop guidelines visualization how to do operation of Hazards reflections autonomous vessels 9
Collaboration • Between technologies and sensors The future will be • Between humans more digital, and Machine to Machine • Between humans and machine integration will be normal procedure. • Between organizations The humans will still • Between conventional and autonomous be in the loop, but in • Between regulators and operators "another loop". • Between providers and users 10
Integrated Maritime Autonomous System Onshore Systems Ship Systems Remote Control Shipping plan Manning (SCC) Mission plan (SCC) Maintenance & Reenergize Transport to vessel Transport to customer Loading and Stability Unloading and Ballast Reporting Sailing plan Remote Monitoring & Control Decision support CUSTOME MER TRANSP SPORT TRANSP SPORT PRODUCTION PACKING TRANSPORT TERMINAL TRANSPORT CRANE VESSEL TRANSPORT CRANE TRANSPORT TERMINAL TRANSPORT CUSTOMER 11 Source: Massterly
Addressing the hazards and compare with sensor site infrastructure • Hazards for the voyage • Hazards for the navigation • Hazards for the detection • Hazards for the communication • Hazards for the ship integrity, machinery and systems • Hazards for the cargo and passenger management • Hazards for the remote control • Hazards for the security 12
Hazards for the voyage • Hazards for the voyage Sensor Site Hazards for the Human error in input of voyage plan • Planning of an operation voyage Failure of updated information (nautical, • The interaction between SCC and the MASS weather, publications) Failure in position fixing (due to e.g. GPS selective • The infrastructure, sensors and communication capabilities availability) • The possibilities to recover It must be possible to use different sensor sources, for positioning fixing. Cyber attack such as jamming is more and more common. Resilient PNT (Position, Navigation, Timing) is important for autonomous shipping. Figure 1 - Density map. Source: Marinetraffic.com 13
Hazards for the navigation • Shore-based infrastructure can be used for Heavy traffic Heavy weather or unforeseeable events (e.g. • Identify traffic (AIS, Camera, Radar, histogram, etc) freak wave) Hazards for the navigation Low visibility • Identify weather (weather radars, met.no, information sources) Collision with other ships or offshore infrastructures • Identify visibility (land based infrastructure as an extra eye) Collision with floating objects • Collision avoidance (traffic tools, ECDIS, etc) Collision with marine wildlife (e.g. whales, squids, carcasses) Collision with onshore infrastructures or failure in • Collision with objects (position based on observations, inform vessels) mooring process Loss of intact stability due to unfavorable ship • Collision wildlife (avoid area, notify traffic from land based sources) responses (e.g. to waves) Loss of intact stability due to icing • Collision infrastructure (redundancy, human interventions when needed, assistance in navigation) • Loss of stability due to ship response (hard to trust land-based infrastructure) • Loss of stability due to ship response (hard to detect ice from shore infrastructure) 14
Water flooding due to structural damage or Unavailability of SCC (fire, environmental Hazards for the remote control Failure in detection of small objects (wreckage) watertightness device failure phenomenon...) or of operators (faitness, Hazards for the ship integrity, Fire Failure in detection of collision targets emergency situation, etc.) machinery and systems Human error in remote monitoring and Sensor or actuator failure Failure in detection of navigational marks Hazards for the detection control (e.g. through situation unawareness, Failure in detection of ship lights, sounds or Temporary or permanent loss of electricity shapes Human error in remote maintenance (e.g. due to black-out) Failure in detection of semi-submerged towed or Figure 1 - Hazards for the remote control Propulsion or steering failure floating devices (e.g. seismic gauges, fishing Failure in detection of discrepancy between Failure of ship's IT systems (e.g. due to bugs) Willful damage to ship structures by others charted and sounded water depth (e.g. wreckage) Failure of ship's IT infrastructure (e.g. due to Hazards for the security (e.g. pirates, terrorists) fire in the server room) Attempt of unauthorised ship boarding (e.g. Failure in detection of discrepancy between Failure of anchoring devices when drifting pirates, terrorists, stowaways, smugglers) weather forecast and actual weather situation Jamming or spoofing of AIS or GPS signals Figure 1 - Hazards for the cargo and passenger management Jamming or spoofing of communications, Failure in detection of slamming or high vibration Too many cargo or passenger aboard hacker attack, also on RCC (e.g. in case of Figure 1 - Hazards for the detection (overload) pirate or terrorist attack) Hazards for the cargo and passenger management Loss of intact stability due to shift and/or Failure in data confidentiality (e.g. data Reduction of communication performance liquefaction of cargo or due to cargo interception by unauthorized 3rd party) (e.g insufficient bandwidth) Hazards for the communication overboard Figure 1 - Hazards for the security Passenger overboard Communication failure (e.g. with SCC, with relevant authorities, with ships in vicinity) Passenger illness Communication failure with another ship in distress Passenger injured during arrival or departure Failure in data integrity (e.g. error in data transmission) Passenger interfering in an aboard system Figure 1 - Hazards for the communication Figure 1 - Hazards for the cargo and passenger management
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