johnson v united states 135 s ct 2551 june 26 2015
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Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (June 26, 2015) The - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

F E DE RAL HABE AS BASI CS F OR L I T I GAT I NG JOHNSON CL AI MS NOVE MBE R 18-19, 2015 Ann He ste r F e de ra l De fe nde rs o f We ste rn No rth Ca ro lina , I nc . Ann_He ste r@ fd.o rg Johnson v. United States, 135 S.


  1. F E DE RAL HABE AS BASI CS F OR L I T I GAT I NG JOHNSON CL AI MS NOVE MBE R 18-19, 2015 Ann He ste r F e de ra l De fe nde rs o f We ste rn No rth Ca ro lina , I nc . Ann_He ste r@ fd.o rg

  2. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (June 26, 2015) • The ACCA’s residual clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally vague and violates due process. • ACCA residual clause: “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” • To request FDO training branch materials related to Johnson , email Lisa_Porcari@ao.uscourts.gov with your name, title, and office.

  3. Provisions other than ACCA with residual clauses affected by Johnson:  Guide line s:  Ca re e r o ffe nd e r, 4B1.2(a )(2)  E nha nc e me nts fo r fire a rms o ffe nse s, 2K 2.1 (inc o rpo ra te s c a re e r o ffe nd e r d e finitio n)  Gra d e s o f supe rvise d re le a se vio la tio ns, 7B1.1 (inc o rpo ra te s c a re e r o ffe nd e r d e finitio n)  8 th Cir. no te : In US v. T 5928562 (8 th Cir. Oc t. 9, aylo r , 2015 WL 2015), Co urt o f Appe a ls sa ys tha t the re a so ning in US v. Wive ll , .2d 156 (8 th Cir. 1990), tha t g uide line s c a nno t b e 893 F unc o nstitutio na lly va g ue b e c a use the y do no t pro sc rib e c o nduc t is do ub tful a fte r Jo hnso n.

  4. PROVISIONS OTHER THAN ACCA WITH RESIDUAL CLAUSES AFFECTED BY JOHNSON :  Sta tute :  18 U.S.C. § 16(b ) de finitio n o f “c rime o f vio le nc e – use d fo r de te rmining 8-le ve l “a g g ra va te d fe lo ny” b ump in USSG § 2L 1.2(b )(1)(C) a nd ma ny o the r fe de ra l pro visio ns  Se e Dimaya v. L ync h , 2015 WL 6123546 (9th Cir. 2015) (a pplying Jo hnso n to § 16(b ))  18 U.S.C. § 924(c )(3)(B) – use o r c a rry fire a rm during a nd in re la tio n to a ny c rime o f vio le nc e , o r po sse ss fire a rm in furthe ra nc e o f c rime o f vio le nc e .

  5. OVERVIEW: THREE FEDERAL HABEAS VEHICLES 1. I nitia l Pe titio ns unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2255 2. Se c o nd o r Suc c e ssive (“SOS”) Pe titio ns unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2255 3. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Pe titio ns file d unde r Sa ving s Cla use o f 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e ).

  6. INITIAL 2255 PETITIONS  Ye s! I t’ s a n 11-ste p a na lysis!

  7. INITIAL SECTION 2255 CHECKLIST  Is the conviction or recidivist sentencing enhancement negated by Supreme Court or Circuit decision?  Is the 2255 petition an initial petition – not a successor?  Is the claim cognizable?  Is the Supreme Court or Circuit decision upon which claim is based retroactive on collateral review?  Is the claim timely under the AEDPA statute of limitations provision (28 U.S.C. § 2255(f))?  If not timely, does equitable tolling excuse the statute of limitations?  If no equitable tolling, does actual innocence excuse the statute of limitations?  Did your client procedurally default his claim?  Is procedural default excused by cause and prejudice?  Is procedural default excused by actual innocence?  If district court denies petition, how do you appeal?

  8. Step 1: I s the c o nvic tio n o r re c idivist se nte nc ing e nha nc e me nt ne g a te d b y a Supre me Co urt o r Circ uit de c isio n?

  9. POSSIBL E SCE NARIOS: Be c a use o f Jo hnso n , 1. Clie nt ha s b e e n c o nvic te d fo r c o nduc t tha t is no lo ng e r c rimina l unde r sta tute o f c o nvic tio n (924(c )); o r 2. Clie nt is no lo ng e r sub je c t to a c a re e r o ffe nde r, ACCA, o r o the r re c idivist se nte nc ing e nha nc e me nt tha t re lie d o n a n unc o nstitutio na lly va g ue re sidua l c la use .

  10. STEP 2: I s the 2255 pe titio n a n initia l pe titio n – no t a suc c e sso r?

  11. A PE T IT ION IS NOT CONSIDE RE D SE COND OR SUCCE SSIVE WHE N: Your client has not previously filed a 2255 motion.  Your client used his first 2255 motion solely to reinstate his right to direct  appeal via IAC claim. Your client’s prior 2255 was not determined on the merits.   Client voluntarily dismissed prior motion without conceding that petition lacked merit  Court dismissed motion without prejudice  The prior 2255 motion was dismissed due to some technical deficiency unrelated to the substantive claims for relief.  BUT: Claims dismissed as time-barred or procedurally defaulted ARE on the merits. The subsequent 2255 motion is a motion to amend under Federal Rule of  Civil Procedure 15 filed before the district court rules on the merits. The subsequent 2255 motion was filed while the initial motion was still  pending.

  12. MORE SIT UAT IONS WHE RE PE T IT ION IS NOT CONSIDE RE D SE COND OR SUCCE SSIVE  The subsequent 2255 motion presents a claim that was not ripe at time of first motion.  The court limited the presentation of substantive claims in the prior 2255.  The prisoner obtained relief on a prior motion and the subsequent motion raised only claims that originated from retrial or re-sentencing.  The prior 2255 motion was incorrectly dismissed as untimely or as second or successive. See Another Bite at the Apple, Janice L. Bergmann, for case cites.

  13. STEP 3: I s the c la im c o g niza b le ?

  14. COGNIZABL E CL AIMS UNDE R 2255(A)  Se nte nc e is in e xc e ss o f sta tuto ry ma ximum.  Co nvic tio n o r se nte nc e vio la te s the la ws o f the Unite d Sta te s a nd re sults in a c o mple te misc a rria g e o f justic e .  Co nvic tio n o r se nte nc e vio la te s the Co nstitutio n  Co nvic tio n o r se nte nc e is in e xc e ss o f the c o urt’ s jurisdic tio n.  Co nvic tio n o r se nte nc e is o the rwise sub je c t to c o lla te ra l a tta c k E rro r tha t is ne ithe r jurisdic tio na l no r c o nstitutio na l must b e “a funda me nta l de fe c t whic h inhe re ntly re sults in a c o mple te misc a rria g e o f justic e .”

  15. A note about Sun Bear v. United States , 644 F.3d 700 (8 th Cir. 2011):  Ho lds tha t c a re e r-o ffe nde r Guide line e rro r is no t a c o mple te misc a rria g e o f justic e c o g niza b le unde r 2255.  Sun Be ar do e s no t a pply to Jo hnso n c la ims, b e c a use tho se c la ims a re c onstitutional .

  16. STEP 4: I s the c la im b a se d o n a re tro a c tive Supre me Co urt o r Circ uit de c isio n? Note : Re troac tivity is an affirmative de fe nse that Gove rnme nt c an waive .

  17. A SIDE NOTE ABOUT AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES AND WAIVER:  Go ve rnme nt’ s fa ilure to ra ise a n a ffirma tive de fe nse wa ive s it, b ut c o urt still ma y a pply a n a ffirma tive de fe nse sua spo nte  UNL E SS g o ve rnme nt de lib e ra te ly wa ive s the de fe nse .  I n tha t c a se , it wo uld b e a n a b use o f judic ia l disc re tio n to o ve rride the g o ve rnme nt’ s de lib e ra te wa ive r. Day v. Mc Do no ug h , 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006); Wo o d v. Milyard , 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012)

  18. IS INT E RVE NING SUPRE ME COURT OR CIRCUIT COURT DE CISION RE T ROACT IVE ? Under Teague v. United States , 489 U.S. 288 (1989), a new rule of criminal procedure is not generally retroactive on collateral review. A rule established by an intervening decision is only retroactive if: 1. It is an old rule (meaning that rule established by intervening case was dictated by then- existing precedent upon which all reasonable jurists would have felt compelled to rule in the defendant’s favor). See Lambrix v. Singletary , 520 U.S. 518 (1997); 2. It is a substantive rule (the intervening decision, on constitutional or statutory grounds, narrows “the range of conduct” criminalized by the statute or “prohibits a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” See Schriro v. Summerlin , 542 U.S. 348, 353; Graham v. Collins , 506 U.S. 461, 477 (1993)); or 3. It is a watershed rule of criminal procedure (must “alter our understanding of bedrock procedural elements” essential to fairness of proceeding) See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.

  19. IS JOHNSON RETROACTIVE? T he g o ve rnme nt ha s c o nc e de d tha t Jo hnso n is sub sta ntive a nd re tro a c tive in ACCA c a se s, b ut it is a sse rting tha t the rule is pro c e dura l a nd no n-re tro a c tive “a s a pplie d” in c a re e r o ffe nde r c a se s.

  20. Sub sta ntive : Baile y v. Unite d State s , 516 U.S. 137 (1995) Unite d State s v. Santo s , 553 U.S. 507 (2008) Be g ay v. Unite d State s , 553 U.S. 137 (2008) No t sub sta ntive : Appre ndi v. Ne w Je rse y , 530 U.S. 466 (2000) Unite d State s v. Bo o ke r , 543 U.S. 220 (2005) Alle yne v. Unite d State s , 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013)

  21. STEP 5: I s the c la im time ly unde r the AE DPA sta tute o f limita tio ns pro visio n (28 U.S.C. § 2255(f))? Note : Statute of L imitations is an affirmative de fe nse that the gove rnme nt c an waive .

  22. TWO RELEVANT LIMITATIONS PROVISIONS NUMBER 1: A pe titio n is time ly unde r 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) if file d within o ne ye a r a fte r judg me nt o f c o nvic tio n b e c o me s fina l. When does conviction become final? It depends.

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