Introduction to Metaethics Felix Pinkert 103 Ethics: Metaethics, - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Introduction to Metaethics Introduction to Metaethics Felix Pinkert 103 Ethics: Metaethics, University of Oxford, Hilary Term 2015

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? 1 What is Metaethics? 2 A spectrum from more to less “objective” theories 3 Specifying Non-Cognitivism 4 How not to argue for Non-Cognitivism 5 Outline of the lectures 6 Discussion seminar 7 Notes

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? Normative Language A: “Should I have stayed in bed instead of coming here?” B: “No, if you want to succeed in your degree, then you ought to go to the lectures.” A: “I think I should have slept in. And I don’t think you should take things so seriously. But since you do, it only serves you right that you have a reputation for caring about nothing but your studies.”

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? B: “It is regrettable that you think so. But I don’t think that you have a right to judge the lectures before giving them a try.” C: “Indeed, you really shouldn’t believe just anything that other students have told you about the usefulness of going to lectures.” B: “Yes, and I think that we have a moral duty to make the best of the opportunities we have.” A: “Don’t even start talking about moral duties. It’s bad enough to get up early in the morning and have to endure the likes of you.”

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? Asking meta-questions What do “should” and “ought” mean? If A says that you should do something, and B says that it’s not the case that you should, must one of them be right, and one wrong? If yes, what kind of fact makes their claims true or false? And how could we know who is right?

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? Normativity and Morality “Ought” and related terms can have non-moral meaning: “You should arrive early if you want to get a good seat.” “Students shouldn’t just believe everything that’s on the slides.” “You shouldn’t feel disappointed – you should have expected this outcome.” Morality is a subset of normativity.

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? Moral Language “Eating meat is wrong!” “Pain is bad, pleasure is good.” “We need to do something about climate change!” “It is a bad thing if good people suffer.” “It is irresponsible to not be informed about politics.” “You have no right to say that!” “This would indeed be a very desirable outcome.”

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? “Her behaviour is inacceptable!” “Young people oughtn’t complain so much. When I was young. . . ” “You ought to clean up after your party.” “It only serves him right.” “It is inappropriate to play computer games during lectures.”

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? Core metaethical questions Moral psychology: What is it to judge that something is good/bad/ought to be done. . . ? Moral semantics: What are we saying when we say that something is good/bad/ought to be done. . . ? Moral metaphysics: What kind of facts , if any, do these claims refer to? Moral epistemology: If there are such facts, do we know about them, and if so, how?

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? Condensing moral language Core concepts for metaethics: (moral) ought right, wrong: ought to do, ought not to do good, bad there is / X has reason to φ reducing other concepts to the above: “inappropriate”: ought not to be done “inacceptable:” ought not to be done, can/ought not to be condoned “should”: ought “desirable”: good, ought to be desired “irresponsible”: wrong, and it is right to blame the agent for it / hold them accountable “x has a right that y φ ”: y ought to φ , x is permitted (it is not the case that they ought not) to demand y φ -ing

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? Why care about metaethics? (1) Metaethical questions and claims are very common and matter to our moral practice. Suppose you think that eating meat is wrong: Is it wrong for anyone else? For your peers in the vegetarian society, or everyone? Is it OK for you tell people that it is wrong? How sure can you be that it is wrong?

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? Why care about metaethics? (2) Some metaethical positions can undermine your moral convictions, or at least their strength: “Right or wrong are just social conventions.” “Right and wrong is subjective. What is wrong for you need not be wrong for me.” “There is no such thing as right or wrong.”

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? Why care about metaethics? (3) Some metaethics claims entail further philosophical commitments you may or may not want to share: “Moral right and wrong is rooted in a divine will.” Conversely: “If there is moral right and wrong, then there must be a divine being.” If moral properties are non-natural, then naturalism is false. Allowing for other non-natural properties and objects becomes more plausible. e.g. numbers, logical relations, but also e.g. souls (especially if we are to have access to non-natural moral facts)

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? What metaethics is not Metaethics is not 1 Applied Ethics: Is research on human embryos morally permissible? (first-order ethics) 2 Moral Theory: What makes actions right or wrong in general? (first-order ethics) 3 Descriptive Ethics: What do people believe about the moral status of embryo research?

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? Metaethics and first-order ethics Metaethics and first-order ethics are often separate: Asserting that “Research on human embryos is wrong” does not commit one to a particular view of what “wrong” means, of what kind of fact that wrongness is etc. But they also often connect: If the property of rightness just is the property of maximizing overall happiness, then Utilitarian ethics is necessarily true. If right = permitted by God, and God would not permit embryo research, then embryo research is impermissible.

Introduction to Metaethics What is Metaethics? “Fieldwork” Observe your and others’ usage of normative language. How do we use normative language? What do we seam to take it our utterances to mean? Introspect your mental states when you make normative judgments. Examine what the different metaethical theories we discuss entail about those situations. Are these entailments plausible?

Introduction to Metaethics A spectrum from more to less “objective” theories 1 What is Metaethics? 2 A spectrum from more to less “objective” theories 3 Specifying Non-Cognitivism 4 How not to argue for Non-Cognitivism 5 Outline of the lectures 6 Discussion seminar 7 Notes

Introduction to Metaethics A spectrum from more to less “objective” theories Non-Cognitivism Moral psychology Moral judgements are not beliefs. They are non-cognitive mental states, like desires, intentions, approval and disapproval. Moral semantics Moral sentences express the above at- titudes, and do not have descriptive meaning. They cannot be true or false. Moral metaphysics There are no moral facts or properties. Moral epistemology We can not have moral knowledge or justified moral beliefs.

Introduction to Metaethics A spectrum from more to less “objective” theories Error Theory Moral psychology Moral judgments are beliefs. Moral semantics Moral sentences have descriptive meaning. They can be true or false. But they are all false. Moral metaphysics There are no moral facts and proper- ties. Moral epistemology We can not have moral knowledge or justified moral beliefs.

Introduction to Metaethics A spectrum from more to less “objective” theories Naturalist Cognitivism: Subjectivism Moral psychology: Moral judgments are beliefs. Moral semantics: Moral sentences have descriptive meaning. They can be true or false. Some of them are true. Moral metaphysics: There are moral facts and properties in the world. Moral properties are natu- ral properties, i.e. part of the empiri- cally observable world. They are prop- erties of agents’ minds. Moral epistemology: We can have knowledge of these moral facts inasmuch as we have knowledge about our own and others’ mental states.

Introduction to Metaethics A spectrum from more to less “objective” theories Naturalist Cognitivism: Robust Naturalist Realism Moral psychology: Moral judgments are beliefs. Moral semantics: Moral sentences have descriptive meaning. They can be true or false. Some of them are true. Moral metaphysics: There are moral facts and properties in the world. Moral properties are natu- ral properties, i.e. part of the empiri- cally observable world. Moral facts are external to and independent of agents’ minds. Moral epistemology: We can have knowledge of these moral facts inasmuch as we have knowledge about these external natural facts.