Human migration in the era of climate change Cristina Cattaneo - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Human migration in the era of climate change Cristina Cattaneo (FEEM) 5 th MEDENER International Conference on Energy Transition 30 November 2017, Lisbon

Historic migration as adaptation  Archeological evidence: periods of drastic climatic change coincided with the collapse of past civilizations  Urban centers of the Harrapan Society in the Indus Valley, were abandoned during a 200-year drought that occurred 4000 years ago  American Dust Bowl in ‘30s: Hundreds of thousand families abandoned large areas of American Plains as a consequence of the large dust storms and desertification process 1

Drivers of migration  Migration is multicausal: climate change is one of the five drivers  Environmental factors alone rarely lead to migration  Environmental drivers may also influence the other drivers  Economic drivers: reduction in agricultural productivity (increase income differentials) or increase in agricultural risks (income variability)  Political drivers: conflicts 2

Drivers of migration Source: Black et al. (2011) “ Climate change: Migration as adaptation “ , Nature 3

Various forms of migration  Temporary and return migration  Permanent  Short Distance  Long Distance and International  Involuntary and forced 4

Various forms of envi ronmental drivers  Migration resulting from fast extreme events (storms, hurricanes, heavy rains and floods)  Migration resulting from slow events (drought, desertification, long-term gradual changes in temperature and rainfall) Direct versus indirect effects 5

Empirical Evidence (???)  Stark contrast between statements and recent evidence  “the gravest effects of climate change may be those on human migration as millions will be displaced” IPCC, 1990  The Stern Review suggested that by 2050 there would be 200 million people who would be affected by adverse climate events that could induce migration  The International Organization of Migration (IOM) predicted that up to one billion people could be displaced by environmental causes by 2050  These figures are known today for overestimating the phenomenon  They are treated more as guesstimates than actual evidence 6

Empirical Evidence: hurricanes, floods  Limited evidence that hurricanes, floods provoke long- term and long-distance migration  Extreme climatic events generally produce displacements of limited duration and short distance  Displacements occur mainly within states (internal migration) and, to a lesser extent, between neighboring states  People displaced tend to return to rebuild their homes as soon as they can 7

Empirical Evidence: sea level rise  The rise in sea levels and coastal erosion are most likely to trigger definitive and large population movements  Contrarily to hurricanes, droughts or floods, these phenomena are irreversible  With a scenario of an increase of 0.3-0.8 metre of the sea level, 150 million people living at an altitude of less than one metre are directly vulnerable (South-east Asia; Pacific Islands) 8

Empirical Evidence 9

Empirical Evidence: drought, desertification, warming  The effect of drought, desertification, gradual changes in temperature on human mobility is less sudden  Some examples of mass migration due to drought  A million people displaced temporarily or permanently during the drought in Niger in 1985  Displaced are relatively small compared to the numbers of people affected by drought  Sometimes we assist to a reduction in migration 10

Empirical Evidence: immobility 11

Empirical Evidence: immobility  Trade-off between higher incentives and lower resources  Poor people have higher incentives to migrate (most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change), but lower resources to invest in migration  Double set of risks  Trapped populations sometimes face worse humanitarian crises than migrants  Trapped populations are typically the most vulnerable ones  Poorest, the least educated, women 12

Trapped Population Source: Black et al. (2011) “ Climate change: Migration as adaptation “ , Nature 13

Empirical Evidence: Cattaneo and Peri (2016)  Analysis of the long-run impacts of gradual changes in temperature and precipitation on international (world- wide) emigration in a panel of 116 countries, classified as poor or middle income, between 1960 and 2000  Bilateral migration flows between all countries of the word in the last five available censuses (Ozden et al., 2011)  Decade average of temperature and precipitation from weather stations 14

Empirical Evidence: Cattaneo and Peri (2016)  Higher temperatures increased emigration rates to other countries but only from middle income economies  In poor countries higher temperatures generate a poverty trap, that lowers the probability to emigrate to cities or internationally  Possible pathway is a decline in agricultural productivity:  Agriculture productivity and warming is hill-shaped: diminishing net returns to adaptation at the highest temperature 15

Empirical Evidence: Cattaneo and Peri (2016)  Temperature and Emigration: OECD versus non OECD destinations  Warming climate increases emigration rates from middle-income countries only to non-OECD destinations  Temperature and Emigration by destination distance  Higher temperatures increase emigration rates from middle-income countries only to close destinations (<1000 km) 16

Indirect effects of climate change: conflicts  Where climate change increases migration, do climate-migrant trigger new conflicts or fuel existing ones in receiving countries?  Climate change may cause large and fast waves of migrants, which might not be smoothly absorbed in the receiving regions  Where climate change reduces migration, do trapped populations increase the risk of conflict in areas of origin?  Immobility increases population pressure, exacerbates scarcity of vital resources and this leads to higher risks of conflicts in areas of origin  Maladaptation or the existence of barriers to migration may represent an additional source of threats in countries where warming increases social unrest 17

Indirect effects (Bosetti, Cattaneo, Peri) 100 80 60 40 20 0 6 8 10 12 14 Predicted Inflows of Migrants (natural log) 18

Indirect effects (Bosetti, Cattaneo, Peri) Bottom quartile of diaspora Second quartile of diaspora 100 50 0 Third quartile of diaspora Top quartile of diaspora 100 50 0 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 Average temperature 19

Indirect effects (Bosetti, Cattaneo, Peri)  No evidence of climate-induced migration’s influence on incidence of civil conflicts in destination countries  In poor origin countries, larger emigration partially moderates the negative effect of climate change on conflicts  Lower chances to emigrate increase the negative effect of warming on conflict 20

Policy Implications  The refugee crisis and growing public concern with migration have seen political upheaval and the rise of populism  Stark contrast between statements and recent evidence  Climate-migration is primarily internal, short distance and often of limited duration  Climate-driven migration should not be viewed as an inevitable catastrophic consequence of climate change  No reason to expect that Europe will be confronted with massive waves of “environmental migrants”  Climate-induced migration should not be perceived as a security threat 21

Policy Implications  We must look to facilitate migration flows of trapped populations  Trapped populations sometimes face worse humanitarian crises than migrants  We need to mitigate the impacts of climate change  People not always move from areas most exposed to the impacts of climate change to less climate-vulnerable ones  Facilitate adaptation to climate change through efficiency in agricultural production  Improved seeds  Changing the water supply systems 22

Policy Implications  Development and cooperation policies should aim at increasing resilience and encourage alternative adaptation strategies  These policies are often substitute for migration  Invest in women empowerment to reduce demographic pressure 23