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Gilad Asharov Gilad Asharov parties, each has some private input, - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Gilad Asharov Gilad Asharov parties, each has some private input, wish to compute a function on their joint inputs average of salaries, auctions, private database query, private data mining parties, each has some private input, wish


  1. π’ˆ is 𝜺 balanced if there exist probability vectors 𝒒 = π‘ž 1 , … , π‘ž 𝑛 , 𝒓 = π‘Ÿ 1 , … , π‘Ÿ β„“ and ⁑0 < πœ€ < 1 s.t: 𝑔 β‹… 𝒓 π‘ˆ = πœ€ β‹… 𝟐 𝑛 π‘ˆ ⁑𝒒⁑ β‹… 𝑁 𝑔 = πœ€ β‹… 𝟐 β„“ AND 𝑁 Theorem If 𝑔 is πœ€ -balanced then it implies fair coin-tossing

  2. 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 (left-balanced, right-unbalanced)

  3. 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 π‘ž 1 0 π‘ž 0 1 1 βˆ’ π‘ž = 0 1 1 βˆ’ π‘ž 1 1 1 1 1 (left-balanced, right-unbalanced)

  4. Theorem if 𝑔 is not πœ€ -balanced for any 0 < πœ€ < 1 , then it does not imply coin tossing*

  5. Theorem if 𝑔 is not πœ€ -balanced for any 0 < πœ€ < 1 , then it does not imply coin tossing* β€’ We show that for any coin-tossing protocol in the 𝑔 -hybrid model, there exists an adversary that can bias the result

  6. Theorem if 𝑔 is not πœ€ -balanced for any 0 < πœ€ < 1 , then it does not imply coin tossing* β€’ We show that for any coin-tossing protocol in the 𝑔 -hybrid model, there exists an adversary that can bias the result β€’ Unlike Cleve – here we do have something simultaneously. A completely different argument is given

  7. Theorem if 𝑔 is not πœ€ -balanced for any 0 < πœ€ < 1 , then it does not imply coin tossing* β€’ We show that for any coin-tossing protocol in the 𝑔 -hybrid model, there exists an adversary that can bias the result β€’ Unlike Cleve – here we do have something simultaneously. A completely different argument is given β€’ Caveat : the adversary is inefficient

  8. Theorem if 𝑔 is not πœ€ -balanced for any 0 < πœ€ < 1 , then it does not imply coin tossing* β€’ We show that for any coin-tossing protocol in the 𝑔 -hybrid model, there exists an adversary that can bias the result β€’ Unlike Cleve – here we do have something simultaneously. A completely different argument is given β€’ Caveat : the adversary is inefficient β€’ However, impossibility holds also when the parties have OT-oracle (and so commitments, ZK, etc.)

  9. Asharov

  10. Gordon, Hazay, Katz and Lindell [STOC08] presented a general protocol and proved that a particular function can be computed using this protocol

  11. Gordon, Hazay, Katz and Lindell [STOC08] presented a general protocol and proved that a particular function can be computed using this protocol Question: What functions can be computed using this protocol?

  12. β€’ Almost all functions with |X| β‰  𝐙 : can be computed using the protocol β€’ Almost all functions with 𝐘 = |𝐙| : cannot be computed using the protocol – If the function has monochromatic input, it may be possible even if π‘Œ = 𝑍 β€’ Characterization of [GHKL08] is not tight! – There are functions that are left unknown

  13. β€’ Special round 𝑗 βˆ— β€’ Until round 𝑗 βˆ— - the outputs are random and uncorrelated (𝑔 𝑦, 𝑧 , 𝑔 𝑦 , 𝑧 ) β€’ Starting at 𝑗 βˆ— - the outputs are correct β€’ At 𝑗 βˆ— , P x learns before P y

  14. β€’ Special round 𝑗 βˆ— β€’ Until round 𝑗 βˆ— - the outputs are random and uncorrelated (𝑔 𝑦, 𝑧 , 𝑔 𝑦 , 𝑧 ) β€’ Starting at 𝑗 βˆ— - the outputs are correct β€’ At 𝑗 βˆ— , P x learns before P y β€’ Security: – P y is always the second to receive output β€’ Simulation is possible for all functions – P x is always the first to receive output β€’ Simulation is possible only for some functions

  15. Trusted Party

  16. 𝑧 Trusted Party

  17. 𝑦⁑ 𝑧 Trusted Party

  18. 𝑦⁑ 𝑧 Trusted Party 𝑔(𝑦, 𝑧)

  19. 𝑦⁑ 𝑧 Trusted Party 𝑔(𝑦, 𝑧) 𝑔(𝑦, 𝑧)

  20. Before 𝑗 βˆ— : 𝑔(𝑦 , 𝑧) 1/3 1/3 1/3 ( 2 3 ⁑, 2 3 )

  21. Before 𝑗 βˆ— : 𝑔(𝑦 , 𝑧) ( 2 3 + πœ—, 2 3 )

  22. Before 𝑗 βˆ— : 𝑔(𝑦 , 𝑧) 1/3 βˆ’Ο΅ 1/3 1/3 +Ο΅ ( 2 3 + πœ—, 2 3 )

  23. Before 𝑗 βˆ— : 𝑔(𝑦 , 𝑧) 1/3 βˆ’Ο΅ 1/3 1/3 +Ο΅ ( 2 3 + πœ—, 2 3 )

  24. Before 𝑗 βˆ— : 𝑔(𝑦 , 𝑧) y 1 y 2 1/2 x 1 0 1 x 2 1/2 1 0 (1/2, 1/2)

  25. Before 𝑗 βˆ— : 𝑔(𝑦 , 𝑧) y 1 y 2 1/2 x 1 0 1 x 2 1/2 1 0 (1/2, 1/2) (1/2+ 𝝑 1/2)

  26. Before 𝑗 βˆ— : 𝑔(𝑦 , 𝑧) y 1 y 2 1/2 1/2 x 1 0 1 1/2+ πœ— x 2 1/2 1 0 (1/2, 1/2) (1/2+ 𝝑 1/2)

  27. (1 βˆ’ π‘ž, π‘ž) (1 βˆ’ π‘ž 1 , 1 βˆ’ π‘ž 2 )

  28. (1 βˆ’ π‘ž, π‘ž) (1 βˆ’ π‘ž 1 , 1 βˆ’ π‘ž 2 )

  29. (1 βˆ’ π‘ž, π‘ž) (1 βˆ’ π‘ž 1 , 1 βˆ’ π‘ž 2 )

  30. 1) General for multiparty computation: β€œThe power of the ideal adversary” – Geometric representation 2) Specific for the [GHKL08] protocol: Adding more rounds – less to correct!

  31. REAL Before 𝒋 βˆ— : 𝑔(𝑦 , 𝑧) for uniform 𝑦 (1/3,1/3,1/3) β‡’ (2/3, 2/3) 𝐹 𝑆 = 5 𝐹 𝑆 = 100

  32. All points that the simulator needs are inside some β€œball” β€’ The center – the output distribution of REAL β€’ The radius – a function of number of rounds

  33. All points that the simulator needs are inside some β€œball” β€’ The center – the output distribution of REAL β€’ The radius – a function of number of rounds

  34. β€’ Let 𝑔: 𝑦 1 , … , 𝑦 β„“ Γ— 𝑧 1 , … , 𝑧 𝑛 β†’ {0,1} β€’ Consider the β„“ points π‘Œ 1 , … , π‘Œ β„“ in ℝ 𝑛 (the β€œrows” of the matrix)

  35. β€’ Let 𝑔: 𝑦 1 , … , 𝑦 β„“ Γ— 𝑧 1 , … , 𝑧 𝑛 β†’ {0,1} β€’ Consider the β„“ points π‘Œ 1 , … , π‘Œ β„“ in ℝ 𝑛 (the β€œrows” of the matrix) Definition If the geometric object defined by β‘β‘π‘Œ 1 , … , π‘Œ β„“ ∈ ℝ 𝑛 is of dimension 𝑛, Then the function is full-dimensional

  36. Theorem If 𝑔 is of full-dimension , then it can be computed with complete fairness

  37. Theorem If 𝑔 is of full-dimension , then it can be computed with complete fairness Proof: β€’ We use the protocol of [GHKL08]

  38. Theorem If 𝑔 is of full-dimension , then it can be computed with complete fairness Proof: β€’ We use the protocol of [GHKL08] β€’ We show that all the points that the simulator needs are inside a small β€œball”

  39. Theorem If 𝑔 is of full-dimension , then it can be computed with complete fairness Proof: β€’ We use the protocol of [GHKL08] β€’ We show that all the points that the simulator needs are inside a small β€œball” β€’ The ball is embedded inside the geometric object defined by the function

  40. y 1 y 2 y 3 x 1 1 0 0 x 2 0 1 0 x 3 0 0 1 x 4 1 1 1

  41. β€’ In ℝ 2 - all points do not lie on a single LINE β€’ In ℝ 3 - all points do not lie on a single PLANE β€’ … β€’ In ℝ 𝑛 - all points do not lie on a single HYPERPLANE Not Full-Dimensional β€’ In ℝ 2 - 𝑨 1 , 𝑨 2 βˆƒ π‘Ÿ 1 , π‘Ÿ 2 , πœ€ ∈ ℝ s.t. π‘Ÿ 1 𝑨 1 + π‘Ÿ 2 𝑨 2 = πœ€ ? β€’ In ℝ 3 - (𝑨 1 , 𝑨 2 , 𝑨 3 ) βˆƒ π‘Ÿ 1 , π‘Ÿ 2 , π‘Ÿ 3 , πœ€ ∈ ℝ⁑ s.t. π‘Ÿ 1 𝑨 1 + π‘Ÿ 2 𝑨 2 + π‘Ÿ 3 𝑨 3 = πœ€ ?

  42. β€’ Full-dimensional function β€’ The function is right-unbalanced : – For every non-zero 𝒓 ∈ ℝ 𝑛 , πœ€ ∈ ℝ it holds that: 𝑁 𝑔 β‹… 𝒓 β‰  πœ€ β‹… 𝟐

  43. β€’ Full-dimensional function β€’ The function is right-unbalanced : – For every non-zero 𝒓 ∈ ℝ 𝑛 , πœ€ ∈ ℝ it holds that: 𝑁 𝑔 β‹… 𝒓 β‰  πœ€ β‹… 𝟐 Easy to Check Criterion: No solution 𝒓 for: 𝑁 𝑔 β‹… 𝒓 = 𝟐 Only trivial solution for: 𝑁 𝑔 β‹… 𝒓 = 𝟏

  44. Balanced with respect to probability vector: IMPOSSIBLE!

  45. Balanced with respect to probability vector: IMPOSSIBLE! Unbalanced with respect to arbitrary vectors: FAIR!

  46. Balanced with respect to probability vector: IMPOSSIBLE! Unbalanced with respect to probability vector, balanced with respect to arbitrary vectors: β€’ If the hyperplanes do not contain the origin: cannot be computed using [GHKL08] (with particular simulation strategy) β€’ If the hyperplanes contain the origin: not characterized (sometimes the GHKL protocol is possible) Unbalanced with respect to arbitrary vectors: FAIR!

  47. CONCLUSIONS

  48. P d : The probability that a 0/1 matrix is singular?

  49. β€’ P d : The probability that a 0/1 matrix is singular? – Conjecture: (1/2+o(1)) d (roughly the probability to have two rows that are the same) – Komlos (67): 0.999 𝑒 – Tao and Vu [STOC 05]: (3/4+o(1)) d – Best known today [Vu and Hood 09] : (1/ √2 +o(1)) d

  50. β€’ P d : The probability that a 0/1 matrix is singular? – Conjecture: (1/2+o(1)) d (roughly the probability to have two rows that are the same) – Komlos (67): 0.999 𝑒 – Tao and Vu [STOC 05]: (3/4+o(1)) d – Best known today [Vu and Hood 09] : (1/ √2 +o(1)) d

  51. β€’ P d : The probability that a 0/1 matrix is singular? d P d – Conjecture: (1/2+o(1)) d 1 0.5 (roughly the probability to have two rows that are 5 0.627 the same) 10 0.297 – Komlos (67): 15 0.047 0.999 𝑒 20 0.0025 – Tao and Vu [STOC 05]: 25 0.0000689 (3/4+o(1)) d 30 0.0000015 – Best known today [Vu and Hood 09] : (1/ √2 +o(1)) d

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