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FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA/PCN How closed need your network needs - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA/PCN How closed need your network needs to be? How open can you afford your network to be? Where from the vulnerability is coming? How to mitigate the vulnerability? How to detect that anyone


  1. FIREWALL DEPLOYMENT FOR SCADA/PCN

  2.  How closed need your network needs to be?  How open can you afford your network to be?  Where from the vulnerability is coming?  How to mitigate the vulnerability?  How to detect that anyone un-authorized is trying to jeopardize the network services?  How the Business Continuity can be maintained in the long run with the steps taken?  How to envisage future requirements? Network Security

  3. 1. Denial of Service Types of 2. Unauthorized Access: Attempt to access Attacks command shell 3. Illicit command execution: Hacking  Administrator’s password Changing IP Address  Putting a Start-up  Script 4. Confidentiality Breach 5. Destructive Attacks Data Diddling  Data destruction 

  4. Balancing act between:  Keeping equipment and processes protected.  Allowing them to touch larger computing realms via Ethernet protocols and the internet to gain new connections and capabilities. Solution:  Multiple Zone Network with Subzone. Network Security

  5. Generic IT security goals versus ICS security goals

  6. Assessment process flow chart

  7. OSI Model – 7 Layers

  8. Network Security Tools  Intelligent Network Switches and Routers  Firewalls  Hardware and Software Devices for managing network connections  User Authentication  Encrypting Data  DMZ Network Security

  9. Firewall Firewall is a mechanism used to control and monitor traffic to and from a network for the purpose of protecting devices on a network.  Compares traffic passing through it to a pre- defined security criteria  Can be a hardware device (CISCO PIX or Semantic Security Gateway)  Can be a hardware/Software unit with OS based firewall capabilities (“ iptables ” running on a Linux Server)  Host based software solution installed on the workstation directly (Norton Personal Firewall or Sygate Personal Firewall) FIREWALL

  10. Internet facing firewall protecting PC & PLC

  11. Network Traffic Network traffic is sent in discrete group of bits, called a packet which includes  Sender’s Identity (Source Address)  Recipient’s Identity (Destination Address)  Service to which the packet pertains (Port Number)  Network Operation and Status Flags  Actual payload of data to be delivered to service A firewall analyzes these characteristics and decides what to do with the packet based on a series of rules, known as Access Control Lists (ACL). Content of Network Traffic

  12. Host Based Firewalls  Available on Windows or Unix based platforms  Primary function is Workstation or Server Tasks like Database Access or Web Services  Can do little to regulate traffic destined for Embedded Control Devices Classes of Firewall

  13. Packet Filter Firewall  Simplest class of Firewall following a set of static rules  Only the IP Addresses and the port number of the packet is examined  No intelligence to identify spoofed (Forged source IP Address) packages Classes of Firewall

  14. Packet Filter Firewall

  15. Application Proxy Firewalls  Open Packets at Application Layer  Process them based on specific application rules  Reassemble and forward to target devices  No direct connection to external server  Possible to configure internal clients to redirect traffic without the knowledge of the sender  Possible to apply access control lists against the application protocol Classes of Firewall

  16.  Acting as Intrusion Detection System ; Logging denied packets, Recognizing network packages specifically designed to cause problems, Reporting unusual traffic patterns  Blocking infected traffic by deploying Front-line Anti-Virus Software on firewall  Authentication services through passwords or Public Key Encryption  Virtual Private Network (VPN) gateway services by setting up an encrypted tunnel between firewall and remote Host devices  Network Address Translation (NAT) where a set of IP addresses used on one side of a firewall are mapped to a different set on the other side. Other Firewall Services

  17.  No direct connection from the Internet to the PCN/SCADA Network and vice versa  Restricted access from the enterprise network to the control network  Unrestricted (but only authorized) access from the enterprise network to shared PCN/Enterprise servers  Secured methods for authorized remote support of control system  Secure connectivity for wireless devices  Well defined rules outlining the type of traffic permitted  Monitoring the traffic attempting to enter PCN  Secure connectivity for management of firewall Overall Security Goals of PCN/SCADA Firewalls

  18. Security: The likely effectiveness of the architecture to prevent possible attacks. Manageability: Ability of the architecture to be easily managed (both locally as well as from remote). Scalability: Ability of the architecture to be effectively deployed in both large and small systems or in large numbers. Firewall Selection Criteria

  19. Dual-Homed Computers Common SCADA/PCN Segregation Architecture

  20. Dual Homed Server with Personal Firewall Software Common SCADA/PCN Segregation Architecture

  21. Packet Filtering Router/Layer-3 Switch between PCN & EN Common SCADA/PCN Segregation Architecture

  22. Two Port Firewall between PCN & EN Common SCADA/PCN Segregation Architecture

  23. Router/Firewall combination between PCN & EN Common SCADA/PCN Segregation Architecture

  24. DMZ is a critical part of a firewall.  Neither part of un-trusted Network, nor part of trusted network  Puts additional layer of security to DDCMIS LAN  Physical or Logical sub-network that provides services to users outside LAN DMZ

  25. Firewall with DMZ between PCN & EN Common SCADA/PCN Segregation Architecture

  26. Paired Firewalls with DMZ between PCN & EN Common SCADA/PCN Segregation Architecture

  27. Firewall with DMZ and SCADA/PCN VLAN Common SCADA/PCN Segregation Architecture

  28. Comparison Chart for PCN/SCADA segregation Architecture

  29. DDCMIS NETWORK SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN AT NTPC/TALCHER-KANIHA

  30. PI Server Port 5450 10.0.120.202 Office Network Firewall Firewall Firewall ABT OPC Gateway PC Gateway PC Server + PI Honeywell + + OPC Server OPC PI OPC PI OPC Interface Interface Interface Stage I Plant Network Stage II Plant Network ABT Network Unit 2 Unit 6 Unit 1 Unit 3 Keltron Honeywell Keltron Honeywell OPC Experion OPC Experion Server System Server System Network T opology

  31. Network Topology PI Server Port 545 PI Client 0 10.0.120.202 Office Network (NTPC LAN) Firewall Firewall-2 Firewall- -3 1 ABT OPC Gateway Server PC Honeywel OPC OPC (Redundant) l WAN + PI OPC Server Server Server Interface Main Standby ABT Network L-3 Switch L-3 Switch Unit 3 Unit 6 Unit 2 Unit 1 Honeywell Honeywell DDCMS DDCMS Experion Experion System System Stage II Plant Network

  32. HEADS OF PLC COOLING CHP-1 CHP-2 DM PLANT PT PLANT COOLING PC - O&M TOWER-1 PLC PLC PLC PLC TOWER2 HEAD - OPER -C&I SHIFT M/C PLC OF - BOILER/TURBINE M/C ENGR PROJ etc -C&I M/C ENGR PT PLANT SWITCH SERVICE BLDG SWITCH Ash handling fire proof AC CPU PLC PLC PLC PLC PC1 … .. P C n SERVER PR SWITCH IT SWAS C&I shift PC Incharge PC FIREWALL BPOS system LA U#3,4,5 &6 N ESP GATEWAY PCs PC # MOR STN LAN STATION LAN SWITCH 3,4,5,6 PC SERVER OWS OWS / OWS UNIT-3 UNIT UNIT UNIT Unit 1 Unit 2 in PR LVS in PR -4 -5 -6 & CER in CCR & CER UNIT HMI LAN U#3 SWITCH Station LAN of Talcher-II UNIT HMI SERVERS Typical before PI connectivity CONTROL SYSTEM

  33. HEADS OF PLC COOLING CHP-1 CHP-2 DM PLANT PT PLANT COOLING PC - O&M TOWER-1 PLC PLC PLC PLC TOWER2 HEAD - OPER -C&I SHIFT M/C PLC OF - BOILER/TURBINE M/C ENGR PROJ etc -C&I M/C ENGR PT PLANT SWITCH SERVICE BLDG SWITCH Ash handling fire proof AC CPU PI- PLC PLC PLC PLC SERVER PC1 … .. P C n PR SWITCH IT FIREWALL LA SWAS C&I shift PI- GATEWAY PC Incharge PC N BPOS system PC Interface U#3,4,5 &6 ESP PCs DMZ # 3,4,5,6 MOR STN LAN STATION LAN SWITCH PC SERVER OWS OWS OWS in PR UNIT-3 UNIT UNIT UNIT / LVS in PR Unit 1 Unit 2 & -4 -5 -6 in & CER UNIT CCR CER HMI LAN U#3 SWITCH Station LAN of Talcher-II UNIT HMI SERVERS after PI connectivity Typical CONTROL SYSTEM

  34. PI- Server NTPC Office LAN PI- Interface - - - PI system connectivity at Talcher-II

  35. Steps: 1. Review the existing LAN of NTPC/Talcher Kaniha 2. Perform a Bandwidth Assessment Test 3. Perform a Vulnerability Test 4. Conduct a Penetration Test 5. Conduct a Security Audit 6. Conduct a CCTV Demo between Talcher Kaniha & EOC-NOIDA 7. Recommendation and Suggested Up- Gradation Network Testing Methodology

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