Enhancing the resilience of Telecommunications … a partnership with RAYNET
Overview Conversation in two parts: 1: Civil Contingencies Secretariat ► Who we are and what we do look in more depth work we are doing in a specific area 2: Resilient telecommunications ► Mitigating the effects of major incidents in the UK 2 / 32
Overview Conversation in two parts: 1: Civil Contingencies Secretariat ► Who we are and what we do look in more depth work we are doing in a specific area 2: Resilient telecommunications ► Mitigating the effects of major incidents in the UK 3 / 32
Introduction ● Civil Contingencies Secretariat sits within the Cabinet Office at the heart of government ● To enhance the UK's ability to: ► prepare for ► respond to and ► recover from emergencies ● Work in partnership with: ► government departments ► devolved administrations and ► key stakeholders ● Chronology ► established July 2001 ► Civil Contingencies Act (2004); Regulations (2005) ► Act Enhancement Programme commenced 2008 4 / 32
What we get up to … preparing for emergencies ● Spotting trouble, assessing its nature and providing warning ► “horizon scanning” ► assessment capability ● Identifying the hazards that might pose a problem ► assessing our level of concern ► communicating with Ministers through the National Risk Assessment (NRA) ● Assessing our level of preparedness ► capability assessments ● Enhancing capability to respond ► specific programmes, for example “New Dimension” 5 / 32
What we get up to … preparing for emergencies ● Training ► Emergency Planning College at Easingwold ● Exercising ► pan-government exercise co-ordination ● COBR response arrangements ► guided by the NRA ● Guidance on response arrangements – CONOPS ► local ► regional and ► national 6 / 32
Response arrangements SIGNIFICANT – level 1 Geographical extent SERIOUS level 2 Impact 7 / 32
What we get up to … responding to emergencies ● Providing central co-ordination ► in extremis COBR ► assisting departments come to terms with their responsibilities ● Identifying and mitigating consequences ► “Grand Strategic” ► looking forward and broader ► thinking the “unthinkable” 8 / 32
Part 2: Overview Conversation in two parts: 1: Civil Contingencies Secretariat ► Who we are and what we do look in more depth work we are doing in a specific area 2: Resilient telecommunications ► Mitigating the effects of major incidents in the UK 9 / 32
Enhancing resilience - Overview ● Resilience arrangements in the UK ● Context for a resilience agenda ► the changing landscape ► are we talking communications or telecommunications? ► just paying lip service? ► the wake-up calls ● Resilience … just another Whitehall weasel word? ► is this Information Assurance? ► the National Risk Assessment process ► a framework for testing your resilience ● Our approach to enhancing resilience of responder’s communications ► Five Guiding Principles 10 / 32
Resilience arrangements in the UK Complicated as a consequence of our Devolved Administrations … ● National policy and strategy lead rests in Cabinet Office, London Scotland ► responsible for the legislative instrument the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) ● Implementation is devolved to: ► England ► Scotland ► Wales England ● Within England, Scotland and Wales Wales there are local groups focused on enhancing resilience of responders communications
Context for a resilience agenda ● The changing landscape ► communications are now a commodity rapidly achieving the standing of a utility ► ECN decommissioned (Aug 2005) ► all computers communicate all communicators compute ► platform and technological diversity is diminishing ► society’s affair with the mobile (GSM / UMTS) ‘phone ● Do you now need to be an expert to communicate? ● Telecommunications are a fundamental enabler underpinning the effective response to any emergency ► implicit in the UK Civil Contingencies Act (2004) 12 / 32
Resilient telecomms: the wake-up calls ● Telecommunications have been cited as a concern in response to a number recent incidents including: ► flooding: Boscastle , UK (August, 2004) ► fire at oil storage depot: Buncefield , UK ( December 2005) ► terrorist bomb attacks: London , UK (July 2005) ► flooding following hurricane Katrina: New Orleans, USA (August, 2005) but … ● In each incident, the cause of degradation or failure has been different … 13 / 32
Flooding (Boscastle, UK) August, 2004
Fire at a major oil storage depot (Buncefield, UK) December 2005
Terrorist bombs on public transport (London, UK) July, 2005
Flooding following hurricane Katrina (New Orleans, USA) August, 2005
Resilient communications … ● Able to absorb or mitigate the effects of disruption to normal life in the UK ● Events or circumstances such as: ► natural events for example flooding ► human intervention for example an electrical power failure or terrorist incident ● National Risk Assessment processes ► identified and assessed a number of scenarios ► some could affect telecommunications 18 / 32
National Risk Assessment processes ● Annually, approximately 80 scenarios are reviewed for applicability over a 5-year time horizon ► departmental (BIS, Cabinet Office) ► subject specialists (CPNI, Security Service, GCHQ) ● Each scenario is assessed and scored ► relative impact (limited … catastrophic) ► relative likelihood of occurrence (low … high) ● Risk is used to ‘drive’ the capabilities enhancement programme ● Each scenario is visualised on a conventional national risk matrix ● Used to develop Planning Assumptions ► augmented with input Local Risk Register ► framework against which resilience can be tested 19 / 32
Planning Assumptions ● Provide a useful framework for testing arrangements ► derived from the scores ► need to be adapted to local circumstances ● Useful for the purpose of planning for Business Continuity ● Published annually as Generic Challenges to Business Continuity 20 / 32
Generic Challenges to Business Continuity 1. Large-scale temporary absence of staff 2. Permanent or long-term loss of staff 3. Denial of access and displaced persons 4. Disruption to transport 5. Disruption of mains water and sewerage 6. Disruption to oil and fuel supply 7. Disruption to gas supply 8. Disruption to mains electricity 9. Disruption to electronic communications … for more information visit: www.preparingforemergencies.gov.uk/business/generic_cha llenges/index.shtm 21 / 32
9. Disruption to electronic communications ● Background thinking ► physical damage to infrastructure – cabling and ‘exchanges’, base stations, microwave links ► severe weather ► malicious activities ● Direct consequences ► unavailability of public telecommunication services in a region for up to 5 days ► unavailability of communications networks (including the PSTN) locally for up to 3 days affecting up to 150,000 people ► unavailability or severe disruption to the Internet (world-wide web and email) and mobile phone network 22 / 32
Enhancing resilience of telecommunications Focussed on the responder community … ● Privileged access schemes ► fixed and mobile telecommunications ● Airwave – secure mobile telecommunications for use by the Emergency Services ► use outside the Emergency Services ● HITS – the High Integrity Telecommunications System ● NRE – The National Resilience Extranet ● Five Guiding Principles for enhancing telecommunications resilience ► assist in providing focus in this complex environment 23 / 32
1. Look beyond the technical solutions ● Emphasis tends to be placed on the technical solutions ► such as pagers or mobile telephones ● Consider processes and people issues ► such as agreed protocols that make conference calls work smoothly ● Consider structural issues ► such as the way we organise ourselves to respond to emergencies ● There is no silver bullet to enhancing the resilience of telecommunications ► all three components should command attention and ► recognition that none should be considered in isolation 24 / 32
2. Identify and prioritise communication activities ● Resources are invariably constrained – make the best use of them ● Identify the critical communication activities that underpin response arrangements to emergencies ► an 'activity' is essentially 'what we do' ► critical activities are those that are essential to an effective response ● For critical activities concentrate on the underlying need to communicate ► assess basic 'technology free' requirements ● Review your arrangements ► they are not static for long 25 / 32
3. Ensure diversity of your technical solutions ● Consider the technical means to enable communication ► with the objective of increasing overall diversity of telecommunications ● Can be difficult to assess the true technical diversity ► as a consequence of the inherent dependency of one technical solution on another ► Guidance is available at: http://www. ukresilience .gov.uk/preparedness/resilient_ telecommunications/enhancing.aspx 26 / 32
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