efficient public key cryptography with bounded leakage
play

Efficient Public-Key Cryptography with Bounded Leakage and Tamper - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Sep 01, 2022 •413 likes •763 views

Efficient Public-Key Cryptography with Bounded Leakage and Tamper Resilience Antonio Faonio 1 Daniele Venturi 2 Department of Computer Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Department of Information Engineering and Computer Science,

  1. Efficient Public-Key Cryptography with Bounded Leakage and Tamper Resilience Antonio Faonio 1 Daniele Venturi 2 Department of Computer Science, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Department of Information Engineering and Computer Science, University of Trento, Trento, Italy December 8, 2016 1/14

  2. (Provable Secure) Crypto before Physical Attacks P1 P2 2/14

  3. Crypto with Physical Attacks P1 P2 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Leak Attacks [Koc96], 3/14

  4. Crypto with Physical Attacks P1 P2 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Leak Attacks [Koc96], Tampering Attacks [BDL97] 3/14

  5. (Minimal) Related Works Memory Circuit [GLMMR04] [IPSW06] Restricted Bounded [DPW10,BK03] [DFMV13] 4/14

  6. (Minimal) Related Works Memory Circuit [GLMMR04] [IPSW06] Restricted Bounded [DPW10,BK03] [DFMV13] Definitions of Bounded-Tamper (and Leakage) Resilience, Identification Scheme and Signatures (ROM), CCA-Secure PKE. 4/14

  7. Our Contributions BTL Signature Scheme. Example. The Imp. result of [GLMMR03] does not hold. 5/14

  8. Our Contributions BTL Signature Scheme. Example. The Imp. result of [GLMMR03] does not hold. BLT CCA Public Key Encryption. Naor-Yung paradigm, what about Cramer-Shoup? 5/14

  9. Introduction BLT-CCA PKE Section 2 BLT-CCA PKE 6/14 Antonio Faonio, Daniele Venturi Efficient Public-Key Cryptography with Bounded Leakage and Tamp

  10. ( t , ℓ )-BLT IND-CCA PKE: c m 7/14

  11. ( t , ℓ )-BLT IND-CCA PKE: ppar c c m m ... A leaks before challenge ℓ bits; A instantiates before challenge t oracles (for ℓ + t � | sk | − ω (log k )) 7/14

  12. The Scheme of [QL13]: Building Blocks 8/14

  13. The Scheme of [QL13]: Building Blocks ǫ -Hash Proof System Complete: For c ∈ V , Pub pk ( c , w ) = Λ sk ( c ). Sound: For c ∈ C \ V ,any pk = µ ( sk ): � H ∞ ( K := Λ sk ( c ) | pk ) � − log ǫ Set Membership Problem. 8/14

  14. The Scheme of [QL13]: Building Blocks ǫ -Hash Proof System Complete: For c ∈ V , Pub pk ( c , w ) = Λ sk ( c ). Sound: For c ∈ C \ V ,any pk = µ ( sk ): � H ∞ ( K := Λ sk ( c ) | pk ) � − log ǫ Set Membership Problem. δ -extractor � H ∞ ( X | Z ) � δ , we have ( Z , S , Ext( X , S )) ≈ ( Z , S , U ) 8/14

  15. The Scheme of [QL13]: Building Blocks, Pt.2 ℓ -(OT-)Lossy Filter LF φ : T × X → Y 9/14

  16. The Scheme of [QL13]: Building Blocks, Pt.2 ℓ -(OT-)Lossy Filter LF φ : T × X → Y tag 9/14

  17. The Scheme of [QL13]: Building Blocks, Pt.2 ℓ -(OT-)Lossy Filter LF φ : T × X → Y tag tag 9/14

  18. The Scheme of [QL13]: Building Blocks, Pt.2 ℓ -(OT-)Lossy Filter LF φ : T × X → Y tag tag Losiness: |{•}| � 2 ℓ ∈ { 0 , 1 } ∗ × T c tag tag Indistinghuishable: 9/14

  19. The Scheme of [QL13]: Building Blocks, Pt.2 ℓ -(OT-)Lossy Filter LF φ : T × X → Y tag tag Losiness: |{•}| � 2 ℓ ∈ { 0 , 1 } ∗ × T c tag tag Indistinghuishable: Evasiviness: It is hard to forge t ∗ c lossy even given one lossy tag. 9/14

  20. The Scheme of [QL13]: m C K Ext S 10/14

  21. The Scheme of [QL13]: m m C C K K Ext Ext S S 10/14

  22. The Scheme of [QL13]: m m m C C C K K K Ext Ext Ext S S S H ∞ ( K ∗ | pk , C ∗ , L ) � − log ε − | L | 10/14

  23. The Scheme of [QL13]: m m m C C C K K K Ext Ext Ext S S S H ∞ ( K ∗ | pk , C ∗ , L ) � − log ε − | L | H ∞ ( K ∗ | pk , C ∗ , L , Π ) � − log ε − | L | − ℓ 10/14

  24. Reduce Tampering to Leakage aux aux = L ( sk ) Interact unbounded with Dec T ( sk ) , while aux small and bounded . 11/14

  25. aux 12/14

  26. aux Let ˜ sk = T ( sk ), leak µ ( ˜ sk ) (( C , S , Φ) , t c , Π) 12/14

  27. aux Let ˜ sk = T ( sk ), leak µ ( ˜ sk ) (( C , S , Φ) , t c , Π) C ∈ V ( C , µ ( ˜ sk )) fully define K . Execute Decryption. 12/14

  28. aux Let ˜ sk = T ( sk ), leak µ ( ˜ sk ) (( C , S , Φ) , t c , Π) C ∈ V ( C , µ ( ˜ sk )) fully define K . Execute Decryption. C �∈ V Depend on H ∞ (Λ ˜ sk ( C ) | View = v ). If big then output ⊥ ; If small then leak ˜ sk and run Dec ˜ sk . 12/14

  29. aux Let ˜ sk = T ( sk ), leak µ ( ˜ sk ) (( C , S , Φ) , t c , Π) C ∈ V ( C , µ ( ˜ sk )) fully define K . Execute Decryption. C �∈ V Depend on H ∞ (Λ ˜ sk ( C ) | View = v ). If big then output ⊥ ; If small then leak ˜ sk and run Dec ˜ sk . Yeah, but what do big and small even mean? 12/14

  30. aux Let ˜ sk = T ( sk ), leak µ ( ˜ sk ) (( C , S , Φ) , t c , Π) C ∈ V ( C , µ ( ˜ sk )) fully define K . Execute Decryption. C �∈ V Depend on H ∞ (Λ ˜ sk ( C ) | View = v ). If big then output ⊥ ; If small then leak ˜ sk and run Dec ˜ sk . Yeah, but what do big and small even mean? I would tell you, if I had time.. 12/14

  31. Mathemagical!! β = s − log ε , s = log | SK | α = log | PK | We pay approx α + β bits of leakage for each tampering oracle. s t = α + β 13/14

  32. Mathemagical!! β = s − log ε , s = log | SK | α = log | PK | We pay approx α + β bits of leakage for each tampering oracle. s t = α + β We can instantiate the HPS using RSI. 13/14

  33. Introduction BLT-CCA PKE Open Problems Is the tampering rate O (1 / k ) inherent? A better Hash Proof System? 14/14 Antonio Faonio, Daniele Venturi Efficient Public-Key Cryptography with Bounded Leakage and Tamp

  34. Introduction BLT-CCA PKE Open Problems Is the tampering rate O (1 / k ) inherent? A better Hash Proof System? Thank You! 14/14 Antonio Faonio, Daniele Venturi Efficient Public-Key Cryptography with Bounded Leakage and Tamp

Recommend

Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Cryptography in the Bounded-Retrieval Model Jol Alwen, Yevgeniy

Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Cryptography in the Bounded-Retrieval Model Jol Alwen, Yevgeniy

Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Cryptography in the Bounded-Retrieval Model Jol Alwen, Yevgeniy Dodis, Daniel Wichs New York University Speaker: Daniel Wichs CRYPTO 09 Goal of Leakage-Resilient Crypto Model of Leakage Resilience

303 views • 29 slides
LEAKAGE - RESILIENT PUBLIC - KEY ENCRYPTION FROM OBFUSCATION Dana Dachman-Soled, S. Dov

LEAKAGE - RESILIENT PUBLIC - KEY ENCRYPTION FROM OBFUSCATION Dana Dachman-Soled, S. Dov

LEAKAGE - RESILIENT PUBLIC - KEY ENCRYPTION FROM OBFUSCATION Dana Dachman-Soled, S. Dov Gordon, Feng-Hao Lui, Adam, ONeill, and Hong-Sheng Zhou O UTLINE OF T ALK Leakage Models for PKE Bounded, Continual, and Continual w/ Leakage on

1.05k views • 102 slides
Implementing Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography Daniel J. Bernstein

Implementing Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography Daniel J. Bernstein

Implementing Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography Daniel J. Bernstein University of Illinois at Chicago, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven CHES 2012 paper Practical leakage-resilient symmetric cryptography (Faust,

669 views • 30 slides
Leakage-Resilient Zero Knowledge Sanjam Garg Abhishek Jain Amit Sahai Leakage-Resilient

Leakage-Resilient Zero Knowledge Sanjam Garg Abhishek Jain Amit Sahai Leakage-Resilient

Leakage-Resilient Zero Knowledge Sanjam Garg Abhishek Jain Amit Sahai Leakage-Resilient Cryptography Traditional Cryptography: adv has only black-box access to a cryptosystem I O LR-Cryptography: open the black-box more

279 views • 25 slides
Strong Cryptography from Weak Secrets Building Efficient PKE and IBE from Distributed Passwords

Strong Cryptography from Weak Secrets Building Efficient PKE and IBE from Distributed Passwords

Distributed Cryptography Distributed Password Public-Key Cryptography The Decision-Linear Case Strong Cryptography from Weak Secrets Building Efficient PKE and IBE from Distributed Passwords Xavier Boyen 1 Cline Chevalier 2 Georg Fuchsbauer 3

680 views • 36 slides
and the Bounded Moment Leakage Model G. Barthe, F. Dupressoir, S. Faust, B. Grgoire, F.-X.

and the Bounded Moment Leakage Model G. Barthe, F. Dupressoir, S. Faust, B. Grgoire, F.-X.

Parallel Implementations of Masking Schemes and the Bounded Moment Leakage Model G. Barthe, F. Dupressoir, S. Faust, B. Grgoire, F.-X. Standaert , P.-Y. Strub IMDEA (Spain), Univ. Surrey (UK), Univ. Bochum (Germany), INRIA Sophia- Antipolis

685 views • 65 slides
Public-Key Cryptography Public-Key Cryptography Lecture 9 Public-Key Cryptography Lecture 9

Public-Key Cryptography Public-Key Cryptography Lecture 9 Public-Key Cryptography Lecture 9

Public-Key Cryptography Public-Key Cryptography Lecture 9 Public-Key Cryptography Lecture 9 CCA Security SIM-CCA Security (PKE) Recv Send PK/Enc SK/Dec Replay Filter Secure (and correct) if: s.t. output of is distributed

1.26k views • 101 slides
Efficient implementation of Objectives code-based cryptography Set new speed records D. J.

Efficient implementation of Objectives code-based cryptography Set new speed records D. J.

Efficient implementation of Objectives code-based cryptography Set new speed records D. J. Bernstein for public-key cryptography. University of Illinois at Chicago & Technische Universiteit Eindhoven Joint work with: Tung Chou

870 views • 73 slides
Challenges in Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography Krzysztof Pietrzak ECRYPT II Workshop on

Challenges in Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography Krzysztof Pietrzak ECRYPT II Workshop on

Challenges in Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography Krzysztof Pietrzak ECRYPT II Workshop on Physical Attacks, Graz, November 28, 2012 Krzysztof Pietrzak Challenges in Leakage-ResilientSymmetric Cryptography Krzysztof Pietrzak Challenges

994 views • 96 slides
Bounded-Communication Leakage Resilience via Parity-Resilient Circuits Vipul Goyal 1 Yuval Ishai 2

Bounded-Communication Leakage Resilience via Parity-Resilient Circuits Vipul Goyal 1 Yuval Ishai 2

Bounded-Communication Leakage Resilience via Parity-Resilient Circuits Vipul Goyal 1 Yuval Ishai 2 , 3 Hemanta K. Maji 4 Amit Sahai 3 Alexander A. Sherstov 3 1 Microsoft Research, India 2 Technion 3 University of California, Los Angeles 4 Purdue

488 views • 21 slides
Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage Moni Naor Gil Segev Weizmann Institute of

Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage Moni Naor Gil Segev Weizmann Institute of

Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage Moni Naor Gil Segev Weizmann Institute of Science Israel Foundations of Cryptography Rigorous analysis of the security of cryptographic schemes Adversarial model Notion of security

428 views • 20 slides
Public Key Cryptography in Practice Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 372 Public Key Cryptography in

Public Key Cryptography in Practice Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 372 Public Key Cryptography in

Public Key Cryptography in Practice Eli Biham - May 3, 2005 c 372 Public Key Cryptography in Practice (13) How Cryptography is Used in Applications The main drawback of public key cryptography is the inherent slow speed of the public key

442 views • 14 slides
Public Key Cryptography Cryptography School of Engineering and Technology CQUniversity Australia

Public Key Cryptography Cryptography School of Engineering and Technology CQUniversity Australia

Cryptography Public Key Cryptography Concepts of Public Key Cryptography Public Key Cryptography Cryptography School of Engineering and Technology CQUniversity Australia Prepared by Steven Gordon on 20 Feb 2020, public.tex, r1803 1

421 views • 7 slides
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography from Puncturable Primitives and Obfuscation ASIACRYPT 2018 Dec.

Leakage-Resilient Cryptography from Puncturable Primitives and Obfuscation ASIACRYPT 2018 Dec.

Leakage-Resilient Cryptography from Puncturable Primitives and Obfuscation ASIACRYPT 2018 Dec. 5th 2018 1 / 55 Yu Chen 1 Yuyu Wang 2 Hong-Sheng Zhou 3 1 SKLOIS-IIE-CAS, UCAS 2 Tokyo Institute of Technology, IOHK, AIST 3 Virginia Commonwealth

1.29k views • 116 slides
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography from Puncturable Primitives and Obfuscation ASIACRYPT 2018 Dec.

Leakage-Resilient Cryptography from Puncturable Primitives and Obfuscation ASIACRYPT 2018 Dec.

Leakage-Resilient Cryptography from Puncturable Primitives and Obfuscation ASIACRYPT 2018 Dec. 5th 2018 1 / 51 Yu Chen 1 Yuyu Wang 2 Hong-Sheng Zhou 3 1 SKLOIS-IIE-CAS, UCAS 2 Tokyo Institute of Technology, IOHK, AIST 3 Virginia Commonwealth

1.2k views • 104 slides
Lecture 7 Public Key Cryptography (Diffie-Hellman and RSA) 1 Public Key Cryptography

Lecture 7 Public Key Cryptography (Diffie-Hellman and RSA) 1 Public Key Cryptography

Lecture 7 Public Key Cryptography (Diffie-Hellman and RSA) 1 Public Key Cryptography Asymmetric cryptography Invented in 1974-1978 (Diffie-Hellman and Rivest-Shamir- Adleman) Two keys: private (SK), public (PK) Encryption:

810 views • 42 slides
Lecture 8 Public Key Cryptography (Diffie-Hellman and RSA) 1 Public Key Cryptography

Lecture 8 Public Key Cryptography (Diffie-Hellman and RSA) 1 Public Key Cryptography

Lecture 8 Public Key Cryptography (Diffie-Hellman and RSA) 1 Public Key Cryptography Asymmetric cryptography Invented in 1974-1978 (Diffie-Hellman and Rivest-Shamir- Adleman) Two keys: private (SK), public (PK) Encryption:

256 views • 22 slides
Lecture 8 Public Key Cryptography (Diffie-Hellman and RSA) 1 Public Key Cryptography

Lecture 8 Public Key Cryptography (Diffie-Hellman and RSA) 1 Public Key Cryptography

Lecture 8 Public Key Cryptography (Diffie-Hellman and RSA) 1 Public Key Cryptography Asymmetric cryptography Invented in 1974-1978 (Diffie-Hellman and Rivest-Shamir- Adleman) Two keys: private (SK), public (PK) Encryption: with

445 views • 17 slides
Motivation Status quo Providing efficient PKC in embedded systems is challenging

Motivation Status quo Providing efficient PKC in embedded systems is challenging

Faster Hash-based Signatures with Bounded Leakage SAC 2013, Burnaby, Canada Thomas Eisenbarth 1 , Ingo von Maurich 2 and Xin Ye 1 1 Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, USA 2 Horst Grtz Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr University

493 views • 25 slides
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography with Key Derived from Sensitive Data Konrad Durnoga, Stefan

Leakage-Resilient Cryptography with Key Derived from Sensitive Data Konrad Durnoga, Stefan

Leakage-Resilient Cryptography with Key Derived from Sensitive Data Konrad Durnoga, Stefan Dziembowski, Tomasz Kazana, Micha Zaj c , Maciej Zdanowicz Estonian Computer Science Theory Days Jekla 2-4.10.2015 Computers can be

542 views • 32 slides
Public-Key Cryptography Public-Key Cryptography Lecture 8 Public-Key Encryption Public-Key

Public-Key Cryptography Public-Key Cryptography Lecture 8 Public-Key Encryption Public-Key

Public-Key Cryptography Public-Key Cryptography Lecture 8 Public-Key Encryption Public-Key Cryptography Lecture 8 Public-Key Encryption Diffie-Hellman Key-Exchange PKE scheme PKE scheme SKE: Syntax KeyGen outputs K K Enc: M K R

1.18k views • 104 slides
Regular Lossy Functions and Applications in Leakage-Resilient Cryptography CT-RSA 2018 April

Regular Lossy Functions and Applications in Leakage-Resilient Cryptography CT-RSA 2018 April

Regular Lossy Functions and Applications in Leakage-Resilient Cryptography CT-RSA 2018 April 20th, 2018 1 / 41 Yu Chen 1 Baodong Qin 2 Haiyang Xue 1 1 SKLOIS, IIE, Chinese Academy of Sciences 2 Xian University of Posts and Telecommunication

1.92k views • 115 slides
Leakage-Resilient (Symmetric) Cryptography Franois-Xavier Standaert UCL Crypto Group, Belgium

Leakage-Resilient (Symmetric) Cryptography Franois-Xavier Standaert UCL Crypto Group, Belgium

Leakage-Resilient (Symmetric) Cryptography Franois-Xavier Standaert UCL Crypto Group, Belgium Summer school on real-world crypto, 2016 Outline Starting point (link with previous lecture) Seed results (TCC 2004, FOCS 2008)

1.14k views • 111 slides
Outline CPSC 418/MATH 318 Introduction to Cryptography Public Key Cryptography, RSA Public-Key

Outline CPSC 418/MATH 318 Introduction to Cryptography Public Key Cryptography, RSA Public-Key

Outline CPSC 418/MATH 318 Introduction to Cryptography Public Key Cryptography, RSA Public-Key Cryptography 1 Renate Scheidler The RSA Cryptosystem 2 Department of Mathematics & Statistics Department of Computer Science University of

372 views • 7 slides

More recommend