Efficient implementation of Objectives code-based cryptography Set new speed records D. J. Bernstein for public-key cryptography. University of Illinois at Chicago & Technische Universiteit Eindhoven Joint work with: Tung Chou Technische Universiteit Eindhoven Peter Schwabe Radboud University Nijmegen
Efficient implementation of Objectives code-based cryptography Set new speed records D. J. Bernstein for public-key cryptography. University of Illinois at Chicago & : : : at a high security level. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven Joint work with: Tung Chou Technische Universiteit Eindhoven Peter Schwabe Radboud University Nijmegen
Efficient implementation of Objectives code-based cryptography Set new speed records D. J. Bernstein for public-key cryptography. University of Illinois at Chicago & : : : at a high security level. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven : : : including protection Joint work with: against quantum computers. Tung Chou Technische Universiteit Eindhoven Peter Schwabe Radboud University Nijmegen
Efficient implementation of Objectives code-based cryptography Set new speed records D. J. Bernstein for public-key cryptography. University of Illinois at Chicago & : : : at a high security level. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven : : : including protection Joint work with: against quantum computers. Tung Chou : : : including full protection Technische Universiteit Eindhoven against cache-timing attacks, Peter Schwabe branch-prediction attacks, etc. Radboud University Nijmegen
Efficient implementation of Objectives code-based cryptography Set new speed records D. J. Bernstein for public-key cryptography. University of Illinois at Chicago & : : : at a high security level. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven : : : including protection Joint work with: against quantum computers. Tung Chou : : : including full protection Technische Universiteit Eindhoven against cache-timing attacks, Peter Schwabe branch-prediction attacks, etc. Radboud University Nijmegen : : : using code-based crypto with a solid track record.
Efficient implementation of Objectives code-based cryptography Set new speed records D. J. Bernstein for public-key cryptography. University of Illinois at Chicago & : : : at a high security level. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven : : : including protection Joint work with: against quantum computers. Tung Chou : : : including full protection Technische Universiteit Eindhoven against cache-timing attacks, Peter Schwabe branch-prediction attacks, etc. Radboud University Nijmegen : : : using code-based crypto with a solid track record. : : : all of the above at once .
Efficient implementation of Objectives The track de-based cryptography Set new speed records 1978 McEliece Bernstein for public-key cryptography. public-key University of Illinois at Chicago & : : : at a high security level. Has held echnische Universiteit Eindhoven optimization : : : including protection ork with: 1962 Prange. against quantum computers. 1988 Lee–Brick Chou : : : including full protection 1989 Krouk. echnische Universiteit Eindhoven against cache-timing attacks, 1989 Dumer. Schwabe branch-prediction attacks, etc. 1990 Coffey–Go oud University Nijmegen 1990 van : : : using code-based crypto 1991 Coffey–Go with a solid track record. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. : : : all of the above at once . 1993 Chabaud.
entation of Objectives The track record cryptography Set new speed records 1978 McEliece prop for public-key cryptography. public-key code-based Illinois at Chicago & : : : at a high security level. Has held up well after Universiteit Eindhoven optimization of attack : : : including protection 1962 Prange. 1981 against quantum computers. 1988 Lee–Brickell. : : : including full protection 1989 Krouk. 1989 Universiteit Eindhoven against cache-timing attacks, 1989 Dumer. branch-prediction attacks, etc. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. University Nijmegen 1990 van Tilburg. : : : using code-based crypto 1991 Coffey–Goodman–F with a solid track record. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. : : : all of the above at once . 1993 Chabaud.
of Objectives The track record Set new speed records 1978 McEliece proposed for public-key cryptography. public-key code-based crypto. Chicago & : : : at a high security level. Has held up well after extensive Eindhoven optimization of attack algorithms: : : : including protection 1962 Prange. 1981 Omura. against quantum computers. 1988 Lee–Brickell. 1988 Leon. : : : including full protection 1989 Krouk. 1989 Stern. Eindhoven against cache-timing attacks, 1989 Dumer. branch-prediction attacks, etc. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. Nijmegen 1990 van Tilburg. 1991 Dumer. : : : using code-based crypto 1991 Coffey–Goodman–Farrell. with a solid track record. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. : : : all of the above at once . 1993 Chabaud.
Objectives The track record Set new speed records 1978 McEliece proposed for public-key cryptography. public-key code-based crypto. : : : at a high security level. Has held up well after extensive optimization of attack algorithms: : : : including protection 1962 Prange. 1981 Omura. against quantum computers. 1988 Lee–Brickell. 1988 Leon. : : : including full protection 1989 Krouk. 1989 Stern. against cache-timing attacks, 1989 Dumer. branch-prediction attacks, etc. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. 1990 van Tilburg. 1991 Dumer. : : : using code-based crypto 1991 Coffey–Goodman–Farrell. with a solid track record. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. : : : all of the above at once . 1993 Chabaud.
Objectives The track record 1994 van 1994 Canteaut–Chabanne. new speed records 1978 McEliece proposed 1998 Canteaut–Chabaud. public-key cryptography. public-key code-based crypto. 1998 Canteaut–Sendrier. a high security level. Has held up well after extensive 2008 Bernstein–Lange–P optimization of attack algorithms: 2009 Bernstein–Lange– including protection 1962 Prange. 1981 Omura. Peters–van against quantum computers. 1988 Lee–Brickell. 1988 Leon. 2009 Bernstein including full protection 1989 Krouk. 1989 Stern. 2009 Finiasz–Sendrier. against cache-timing attacks, 1989 Dumer. 2010 Bernstein–Lange–P ranch-prediction attacks, etc. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. 2011 Ma 1990 van Tilburg. 1991 Dumer. 2011 Beck using code-based crypto 1991 Coffey–Goodman–Farrell. 2012 Beck solid track record. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. 2013 Bernstein–Jeffe of the above at once . 1993 Chabaud. Meurer (p
The track record 1994 van Tilburg. 1994 Canteaut–Chabanne. records 1978 McEliece proposed 1998 Canteaut–Chabaud. cryptography. public-key code-based crypto. 1998 Canteaut–Sendrier. security level. Has held up well after extensive 2008 Bernstein–Lange–P optimization of attack algorithms: 2009 Bernstein–Lange– rotection 1962 Prange. 1981 Omura. Peters–van Tilborg. computers. 1988 Lee–Brickell. 1988 Leon. 2009 Bernstein (post-quantum). full protection 1989 Krouk. 1989 Stern. 2009 Finiasz–Sendrier. cache-timing attacks, 1989 Dumer. 2010 Bernstein–Lange–P rediction attacks, etc. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. 2011 May–Meurer–Th 1990 van Tilburg. 1991 Dumer. 2011 Becker–Coron–Joux. de-based crypto 1991 Coffey–Goodman–Farrell. 2012 Becker–Joux–Ma track record. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. 2013 Bernstein–Jeffe ove at once . 1993 Chabaud. Meurer (post-quantum).
The track record 1994 van Tilburg. 1994 Canteaut–Chabanne. 1978 McEliece proposed 1998 Canteaut–Chabaud. cryptography. public-key code-based crypto. 1998 Canteaut–Sendrier. level. Has held up well after extensive 2008 Bernstein–Lange–Peters. optimization of attack algorithms: 2009 Bernstein–Lange– 1962 Prange. 1981 Omura. Peters–van Tilborg. ers. 1988 Lee–Brickell. 1988 Leon. 2009 Bernstein (post-quantum). rotection 1989 Krouk. 1989 Stern. 2009 Finiasz–Sendrier. attacks, 1989 Dumer. 2010 Bernstein–Lange–Peters. etc. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. 2011 May–Meurer–Thomae. 1990 van Tilburg. 1991 Dumer. 2011 Becker–Coron–Joux. crypto 1991 Coffey–Goodman–Farrell. 2012 Becker–Joux–May–Meurer. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. 2013 Bernstein–Jeffery–Lange– once . 1993 Chabaud. Meurer (post-quantum).
The track record 1994 van Tilburg. 1994 Canteaut–Chabanne. 1978 McEliece proposed 1998 Canteaut–Chabaud. public-key code-based crypto. 1998 Canteaut–Sendrier. Has held up well after extensive 2008 Bernstein–Lange–Peters. optimization of attack algorithms: 2009 Bernstein–Lange– 1962 Prange. 1981 Omura. Peters–van Tilborg. 1988 Lee–Brickell. 1988 Leon. 2009 Bernstein (post-quantum). 1989 Krouk. 1989 Stern. 2009 Finiasz–Sendrier. 1989 Dumer. 2010 Bernstein–Lange–Peters. 1990 Coffey–Goodman. 2011 May–Meurer–Thomae. 1990 van Tilburg. 1991 Dumer. 2011 Becker–Coron–Joux. 1991 Coffey–Goodman–Farrell. 2012 Becker–Joux–May–Meurer. 1993 Chabanne–Courteau. 2013 Bernstein–Jeffery–Lange– 1993 Chabaud. Meurer (post-quantum).
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