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Distributed ledgers: how, why, and why not? Sarah Meiklejohn (University College London) company company data consumers data producers company company 2 (icons by parkjisun from noun project) data consumers data producers 3 (icons by


  1. Distributed ledgers: how, why, and why not? Sarah Meiklejohn (University College London)

  2. company company data consumers data producers company company 2 (icons by parkjisun from noun project)

  3. data consumers data producers 3 (icons by parkjisun from noun project)

  4. top ten obstacles for blockchains 10 usability 9 governance 8 comparisons 7 key management 6 agility 5 interoperability 4 scalability 3 cost-e ff ectiveness 2 privacy 1 scalability 4

  5. 10 usability 9 governance 8 comparisons 7 key management 6 agility 5 interoperability 4 scalability 3 cost-e ff ectiveness 2 privacy 1 scalability 5

  6. Bitcoin / blockchains / distributed ledgers “mining” 6

  7. over 4 EH/s (4 × 10 18 H/s) to achieve 7 tx/s! 7

  8. full state replication 8

  9. 120 GB and (always) rising 9

  10. full state replication ↑ computational power ⇒ ↓ throughput 10

  11. RSCoin [D M NDSS’16] RSCoin monetary supply decentral central central ledger decentral distribute central transparent? y y (or n) n pseudonyms? y y (or n) n computation high! low low 11

  12. user mintettes store info only within a given shard mintette mintette mintette mintette bank mintettes already reach consensus before sending info to bank 12

  13. RSCoin consensus 4 service tx 1 mintette 2 1 mintette 1 ✓ 2 2 mintette 2 user mintette 1 ✓ ✓ 1 tx tx 3 tx: 1 2 ✓ mintette 2 mintette 1 simple adaptation of Two-Phase Commit (2PC) 13

  14. service 1 1 1 : 2 : 2 user tx: 1 2 mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette mintette t r a n s a c t i o n s 14

  15. mintettes check for double spending … service 1 1 mintette 1 2 user mintette 1 1 tx: 1 2 mintette 1 …using lists of unspent transaction outputs (utxo) 15

  16. signed ‘yes’ vote service 1 1 mintette 1 ✓ 2 2 user mintette 1 1 tx: 1 2 ✓ mintette 1 16

  17. mintettes check validity of bundle by checking for signatures from authorized mintettes… service 1 mintette 2 1 mintette 1 ✓ 2 2 mintette 2 user mintette 1 ✓ ✓ 1 tx 3 tx: 1 2 ✓ mintette 2 mintette 1 “bundle of evidence” contains ‘yes’ votes from majority of mintettes in shard 17

  18. …and if satisfied they add transaction to be committed and send back receipt 4 service tx 1 mintette 2 1 mintette 1 ✓ 2 2 mintette 2 user mintette 1 ✓ ✓ 1 tx tx 3 tx: 1 2 ✓ mintette 2 mintette 1 18

  19. security properties no double spending (if honest majority per shard) non-repudiation auditability (if mintettes log their behavior) 19

  20. consensus features conceptually simple no broadcast mintettes communicate only with users no expensive hashing! scalable ↑ computational power ⇒ ↑ throughput 20

  21. consensus features T = set of txs generated per second Q = # mintettes per shard M = # mintettes ∑ tx ∈ T 2(m tx +1)Q comm. per mintette per sec = M scales infinitely as more mintettes are added! 21

  22. compared to Bitcoin’s 7 each new mintette adds ≈ 75 tx/sec 22

  23. user mintette mintette mintette mintette bank 23

  24. Elastico [LNZBGS CCS’16] run PBFT directory committee committee member committee member committee member committee member consensus committee run PBFT 24

  25. Elastico [LNZBGS CCS’16] 25

  26. 10 usability 9 governance 8 comparisons 7 key management 6 agility 5 interoperability 4 scalability 3 cost-e ff ectiveness 2 privacy 1 scalability 26

  27. 10 usability 9 governance 8 comparisons 7 key management 6 agility 5 interoperability 4 scalability 3 cost-e ff ectiveness 2 privacy 1 scalability 27

  28. RSCoin [D M NDSS’16] user mintette mintette mintette mintette bank 28

  29. user mintette mintette mintette mintette 29

  30. user log server log server log log log server log log server log no unified log ⇒ no need for consensus can (retroactively) detect inconsistencies between logs 30

  31. transparency overlays [C M CCS’16] system GenEventSet CheckEvidence Log log server log CheckEntry Inspect auditor snap monitor snap E BE evidence Gossip 31

  32. system GenEventSet GenEventSet Log log server log server log log log server log server log log 32

  33. system GenEventSet Log log server log CheckEntry auditor snap (meaning |snap| ≪ |log|) auditors (e ffi ciently) determine if events are in the log 33

  34. system GenEventSet Log log server log CheckEntry Inspect auditor snap monitor snap E BE (meaning |E| ≈ |log|) monitors (ine ffi ciently) detect bad events in the log 34

  35. system GenEventSet CheckEvidence Log log server log CheckEntry Inspect auditor snap monitor snap E BE evidence Gossip auditors and monitors ensure consistent view of log (can output evidence of inconsistencies) 35

  36. security properties consistency: log server can’t offer different views of log non-frameability: auditor and monitor can’t frame the log accountability: log server is held to its promises 36

  37. prover verifier log server log ? ? auditor snap monitor snap E BE 37

  38. prover verifier log server log ? ? auditor snap monitor snap E BE 38

  39. Bitcoin blockchain receiver sender miner Log CheckEvidence log server log CheckEntry Inspect auditor snap monitor snap E BE evidence Gossip sender and receiver don’t need to store blockchain gives rise to hybrid system ( ≈ RSCoin) with no mining 39

  40. Certificate Transparency [LL13] CA website client CheckEvidence Log log server log CheckEntry Inspect auditor snap monitor snap E BE evidence Gossip bad certificate issuance is exposed ⇒ clients are less likely to accept bad certificates 40 (icon by parkjisun from noun project)

  41. CONIKS [MBBFF USENIX Sec’16] client client Inspect Log id provider log CheckEntry auditor snap 41 (icon by parkjisun from noun project)

  42. ARPKI [BCKPSS CCS’13] CA website client Log ILS log ILS log CheckEntry validator snap 42 (icon by parkjisun from noun project)

  43. ARPKI CONIKS RSCoin opaque transparent centralized decentralized what is this distance? 43

  44. ⇔ ⇔ security properties (transparency overlays) (RSCoin) consistency no double spending non-frameability non-repudiation ⇔ accountability auditability privacy (of what)? privacy (of what)? 44

  45. ARPKI CONIKS RSCoin opaque transparent centralized decentralized what is this distance? what security properties to look for? 45

  46. 10 usability 9 governance 8 comparisons 7 key management 6 agility 5 interoperability 4 scalability 3 cost-e ff ectiveness 2 privacy 1 scalability 46

  47. 10 usability 9 governance 8 comparisons 7 key management 6 agility Thanks! Any questions? 5 interoperability 4 scalability 3 cost-e ff ectiveness 2 privacy 1 scalability 47

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