Design and Simulation Issues for Secure Power Networks as Resilient - PDF document

November 2015 Design and Simulation Issues for Secure Power Networks as Resilient Smart Grid Infrastructures Prof. O. A. Mohammed mohammed@fiu.edu Tel: 305-321-5622 Energy Systems Research Laboratory Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering Florida International University Miami, Florida Keynote Presentation at IEEE SmartGridComm 2015 November 5, 2015 Miami, Florida Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm_Keynote, Miami, FL USA 1

November 2015 Challenges of integrating distributed resources • Management of increased levels of distributed and renewable energy sources. (control challenge) • Integrating a wide variety of systems governed by different regulations and owned by different entities.(interoperability challenge) • The variable nature of renewable energy sources. (Generation uncertainty ) • Real time energy forecasting and energy management system for generation and demand balancing. (Demand uncertainty) • New distributed architectures with many microgrids. (Resiliency) Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U • Interoperability between different protocols and applications (in software layer). • Identify the communication network and bandwidth required to collect measurement and control remote sites (Distributed control) . • Data availability (Delay, corrupted data, denial of service,…etc.) • Data security and privacy Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm_Keynote, Miami, FL USA 2

November 2015 Power Grid Cyber Attack Risk Trustworthy Critical Infrastructures 300 Healthcare Number of Attacks 250 Government Facilities 200 Sectors 28X Nuclear 150 100 Water 50 Power Grid 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 0 20 40 60 80 100 Year Percentage (%) Critical infrastructures increasingly targeted by cybercriminals Some Governmental initiatives – Identified by NSF as a key research area – Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) set by the US Presidential Directives – North American electric reliability corporation (NERC) CIP requirements, 2013 Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Smart Grid Cyber Infrastructure Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm_Keynote, Miami, FL USA 3

November 2015 Smart Meter Security Threats SMART Meter Vulnerability: • The AMI network is open to external unsecured environments such as cellular channels, power line Disconnection signal. Incorrect Load Data carriers and radio signals. Incorrect price • The AMI can provide a communication path Cellular, to customer systems such as building Power line modem Radio Signal (900MHZ) management systems (BMS) through the customer gateway. Adversary ZigBee • If the adversary succeeds in penetrating into WiFi, etc. the AMI network and pretending to be a valid smart meter management system, he can easily send a disconnect signal to millions of customers. AMI: Advanced Metering Infrastructure Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Smart Meter Security Threats • In January 16, 2014 Proofpoint, Inc. uncovered Cyber attack involving conventional household Example: an attack on a "smart" appliances. The global attack campaign customer appliance involved more than 750,000 malicious communications coming from more than 100,000 everyday consumer gadgets such as home- networking routers, connected multi-media centers, televisions and at least one refrigerator that had been compromised and used as a platform to launch attacks. Secure Measures • The network topology should prevent interaction between customers in the NAN. • Price signal should be authenticated Zigbee, Wifi • Smart meters use X.509 authentication certificate. • Most of the smart meters doesn't update the certificate for life time (that is a problem). Example latest discovered bug “Heartbleed” in OpensSSL used to compromise the certificate X.509 Certificate is an Authentication Protocol Between Smart Meter and Utility. Uses SSL Certificate Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm_Keynote, Miami, FL USA 4

November 2015 Smart Grid Cyber Infrastructure (FAN Threats) Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Field Area Network (FAN) • FAN shared multi service IP network cover Distribution automation, Integrated Distributed resources, Demand Response and field devices • Based on Broad Band wireless resources. FAN routers has WIFI interface for field technician. • Data integrity and confidentiality should be ensured for smart meter data and field devices. • If adversary succeed to compromise FAN router the intruder could easily send wrong signal to switches or FAN routers located on the pole field devices NIST reference Model NIST Publication 1108 Page 35 Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm_Keynote, Miami, FL USA 5

November 2015 Smart Grid Cyber Infrastructure (WAM Threats) Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Security challenges: • Most of the protocols were developed for efficient data transmission in isolated control network without considering the security required for wide spread and open system. • Phasor Measurement units PMU depend on external clock source which can be spoofed or jammed. • PMU protocols ( C37.118 and IEEE 1334 ) doesn't support authentication. Network Attack Spoof Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A, Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm_Keynote, Miami, FL USA 6

November 2015 • State estimator can detect bad data form faulty meters or communication State estimator stealth attack Bad data from faulty errors meter Bad data not identified • Stealth attack can be designed to be hidden from state estimator. Bad data • Several types of stealth Identified attack can be performed against state estimator such as (state, framing and topology attack) Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA To design security aware WAM, different factors should be considered in the communication and system design such as:  Data authentication (insure the source of the Data)  Data integrity (detect corrupted or changed data)  Proper location of highly secured and encrypt meters to prevent state estimator attack.  Data mining techniques could be used to detect altered data. Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm_Keynote, Miami, FL USA 7

November 2015 • Cyber Physical security should not only be considered in the cyber component but also the power system network topology should be designed to be resilient in cases of attack. • The control system should be designed to withstand cyber attack and cyber component failures. • Centralized control suffer from single point of failure problems. • Successful attack against centralized control system could lead to serious damage and loss of service Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA • Decentralized control reduce the risk of single point of failures and loss of service. • Risk of attacking area and loss of service still high Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm_Keynote, Miami, FL USA 8

November 2015 • Distributed control minimize the risk of cyber attack. • Each node exchange information and cooperate with neighbor node to improve the system stability. • Attack detection can be improved by data mining from different sources completely distributed multi-agent control Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA • The types and levels of data protection used to encrypt or authenticate signals should be coordinated with signal sensitivity and impact on the system stability. • The attack detection should rely on physical system characteristics as well as the cyber security rules • Cyber attack countermeasures should consider the dynamics and the special nature of the power system. Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm, Miami, FL USA Energy Systems Research Laboratory, FI U Prof. O. A. Mohammed, IEEE SmartGridComm_Keynote, Miami, FL USA 9