Democratization of Ukraine as a Way to Anchor Russian - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Democratization of Ukraine as a Way to Anchor Russian Neo-imperialism By Ostap Kushnir, Ph.D. Lazarski University Prepared for delivery at the 2016 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association as part of the panel “Democratization and the Experience of Freedom in Central Eastern Europe”, Eric Voegelin Society

Introduction The recent conflicts in the post-communist space prove that the Russian brand stands behind every of them. Russia arrives as mediator, peacemaker, or peacekeeper with the Kremlin always denying its part in provoking and fueling of the conflict. Ukraine is a valuable brick in Russia’s foreign policy and geopolitical competition with the West. Direct or indirect control over Ukraine allows Russia to build a credible counter-pole to the EU. I would like to put forward the following hypotheses: H1. Russia is an expansion-oriented imperial state regardless of epochs and political regimes ruling over it. H2. Contemporary Russian aggressive foreign policy is predefined by the historic tradition of domination over its neighbours. H3. Ukraine is a young post-colonial state which, unlike Russia, is more prone to democratize. H4. Democratic Ukraine may seriously undermine Russian abilities and ambitions for the geopolitical expansion.

Introduction To summarize, the rationale behind Russia's aggressive actions in its neighborhood resides in its goal of achieving certain geostrategic objectives which are largely predefined by the country's imperial traditions, memories, and fears that the Kremlin may irretrievably lose control over the lands which were once Russian. Therefore, democratic Ukraine may shift away from its post-communist Russia-centered geopolitical orbit and become a rigid obstacle for the Kremlin in the pursuit of its expansionist geostrategic objectives.

Russian Political Culture. Russian Expansionism Russian philosophic views on Russian exceptionalism, expansionism, and messianism: Vladimir Soloviev – Russian-led global empire built on the principles of religious Christian universalism; Nikolai Fedorov – Russian “duty” before humankind to unify the world through Orthodoxy and autocracy; Nikolai Berdiaev – religion and authoritarianism were two cornerstones of the Muscovite state, which later nurtured the Russian imperialistic idea, and finally provided the impetus to Soviet expansionism. The Western philosophic views on the Russian state were completely opposite: Adolf Bocheński – Russia is an artificial state full of disgust and moral decay. Expansionism was not the salvation of humankind, but the enslavement of nonconformists. Arnold Toynbee – Russia is a permanent Byzantium-type state. Russian leaders considered their decisions and judgments always correct and indisputable.

Russian Political Culture. Russian Expansionism The rivalry between “Byzantian” Russia and the democratic West should never come as a surprise; it cyclically reappears in history. The principles of western governance and democratic identity cannot be incorporated into the Russian state's policies : this weakens Russian state. Russia does not seek to expand by all the means possible. Russia expands because it acquires the proper opportunity. George Kennan (1946), the U.S. ambassador to the USSR: Soviet foreign policy was cautious, flexible, and deceptive. Valerii Gerasimov (2013), the Russian Chief of General Staff: the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals exceeded the power of force of weapons. Andrei Tsygankov (2015): four most popular reasons behind Russian participation in the Ukrainian crisis: 1. Imperial reason; 2. Diversionary reason; 3. Divergent identities reason; 4. The "angry guy" reason.

Russian Expansionism Contemporary Russia conducts aggressive foreign policies because its Byzantium model of governance lost out to its Western alternative. Russia with its primordial imperial thinking can not accept the democratization of the post-soviet space easily. Losing the competition, but not wanting to lose, Russia started to "forcefully export" its model of governance through "hybrid" wars and asymmetric operations . This was the best way to deal with Western "tempted" states before they become irreversibly westernized. Numerous conflicts in the Russian neighbourhood were – and remain – a message to all post-communist states that their security and prosperity depend on the extent of their coherency to Russia.

Ukrainian Political Culture Ukrainian political culture was not never nurtured by expansion ; instead, it originated from adjustments to foreign rule, rejection of foreign rule, or escaping foreign rule. The latter is very important to understand the "hybrid" democracy and statehood in Ukraine. Experiencing no state revival in the interwar period (i.e. having no "collective memory" about the times of independence), contemporary Ukrainian political culture is the reflection of medieval Cossack political tradition. Zaporozhian Cossacks were a grassroots movement of people who attempted to escape the restricting realities of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (i.e. religious oppression, feudal obligations, and state taxation). In 1552-1556 the Zaporozhian Sich – the fortress – was erected by Cossacks on one of the Dnipro islands. Cossacks developed their loyalties, liberties, culture, and armed forces without the state's authorization ; Zaporozhian Sich was a state within a state.

Ukrainian Political Culture The revolutions of 2004 and 2014 reintroduced the idea of multiple loyalties and Cossack traditions into Ukrainian political culture: protests against the “oppressions” of the state; l grassroots leaders; l sporadic mobilization of supporters; l building up fortified camps in the center of Kyiv. l The latter is a reminder of the structure of Zaporozhian Sich; a state within the state. Source: http://museum.dp.ua/ Source: http://euro-maidan.info

Ukrainian Political Culture Inscription [In Ukrainian]: In any unclear situations build a Sich source: texty.org.ua

Ukrainian Political Culture With Crimean annexation and eruption of conflict in Donbass Ukrainians self-organized themselves and established a sophisticated movement of volunteers. This perfectly reflects the Cossack military tradition. Ukrainians can construct alternative power structures which replace the state whenever the latter is weak, poorly-governed, or inefficient. Ukrainian and Russian political cultures may seem alike, but are different. The first is not grounded on three " Byzantium pillars" : true faith, authoritarian governance, and exclusive identity. Ukrainian political culture is about: multi-religious environmen t allowing various interpretations of Orthodoxy; l sporadic grassroots democracy allowing multiple loyalties; l non-conflicting multi-national relations based on trust and coherency. l

Democratization of Ukraine Democratization of Ukraine may hamper Russian Byzantium-type expansionist ambitions: questioning the value of historical and cultural heritage connecting both nations (i.e. l undermining the concept of the Russian "civilizational space”); providing proof for other post-Soviet republics that the “Russian factor” should not be l overestimated , as well as that Russian aggression may be contained; allowing Ukraine to grow into one of Eastern Europe’s powerhouses and security l guarantors aligned with the West. The challenge for Ukraine's democratization is the tradition of multiple loyalties'. Ukraine should not aim to defeat Russia and Russian proxies on a battlefield, but to exhaust Russia : multifarious cooperation with the Western partners ; l Western-initiated financial sanctions; l discretization of Russian expansionist policies. l

Democratization of Ukraine Contemporary Ukrainian political culture still remains post-communist: the majority of citizens are politically apathetic and lack legal education; l high tolerance to corruption ; l civil society and the middle class are comparatively weak; l grassroots leaders have poor idea how to govern the state; l oligarchs and former state functionaries tend to sabotage reforms on various levels. l In order to make a national political culture more mature, the support from Western allies is crucial: sharing of knowledge about proper statecraft and governance; l educating citizens about the nature of democracy through demonstrating its best l achievements (which also includes visa liberalization with the EU) coordinating Ukraine's efforts in economic transformation. l

Summary To summarize, all hypotheses are proved to be correct: H1. Russia is an expansion-oriented imperial state regardless of epochs and political regimes ruling over it [PARTIALLY TRUE]. There were several attempts to liberalize state's policies (i.e. under President Boris Yeltsyn), but they weakened the state and could – in the long run – lead to partition of Russia. Thus, the Byzantium-type expansionist policies work much better for Russia. H2. Contemporary Russian aggressive foreign policy is predefined by the historic tradition of domination over its neighbours [PARTIALLY TRUE]. Russia utilizes any proper opportunity to project its power outwards This said, it may seek for geopolitical expansion even beyond the post-communist space (i.e. to the regions / states where Russia has no historic tradition of domination). H3. Ukraine is a young post-colonial state which, unlike Russia, is more prone to democratize [TRUE]. H4. Democratic Ukraine may seriously undermine Russian abilities and ambitions for the geopolitical expansion [TRUE].