CSC304 Lecture 18 Fair Division 1: Cake-Cutting [Image and - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

CSC304 Lecture 18 Fair Division 1: Cake-Cutting [Image and Illustration (you ’ ll see!) Credits: Ariel Procaccia] CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 1

Cake-Cutting • A heterogeneous, divisible good ➢ Heterogeneous: it may be valued differently by different individuals ➢ Divisible: we can share/divide it between individuals • Represented as [0,1] ➢ Almost without loss of generality • Set of players 𝑂 = {1, … , 𝑜} • Piece of cake 𝑌 ⊆ [0,1] ➢ A finite union of disjoint intervals CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 2

Agent Valuations • Each player 𝑗 has a valuation 𝑊 𝑗 that is very much like a probability distribution over [0,1] 𝛽 β • Additive: For 𝑌 ∩ 𝑍 = ∅ , 𝑊 𝑗 𝑌 + 𝑊 𝑗 𝑍 = 𝑊 𝑗 𝑌 ∪ 𝑍 β 𝛽 + 𝛾 • Normalized: 𝑊 0,1 = 1 𝑗 𝛽 • Divisible: ∀𝜇 ∈ [0,1] and 𝑌 , ∃𝑍 ⊆ 𝑌 s.t. 𝑊 𝑗 𝑍 = 𝜇𝑊 𝑗 (𝑌) 𝜇𝛽 CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 3

Fairness Goals • An allocation is a disjoint partition 𝐵 = (𝐵 1 , … , 𝐵 𝑜 ) of the cake • We desire the following fairness properties from our allocation 𝐵 : • Proportionality (Prop): 𝑗 𝐵 𝑗 ≥ 1 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑂: 𝑊 𝑜 • Envy-Freeness (EF): ∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑂: 𝑊 𝑗 𝐵 𝑗 ≥ 𝑊 𝑗 (𝐵 𝑘 ) CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 4

Fairness Goals • Prop: ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝑂: 𝑊 Τ 𝑗 𝐵 𝑗 ≥ 1 𝑜 • EF: ∀𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑂: 𝑊 𝑗 𝐵 𝑗 ≥ 𝑊 𝑗 𝐵 𝑘 • Question: What is the relation between proportionality and EF? Prop ⇒ EF 1. EF ⇒ Prop 2. Equivalent 3. Incomparable 4. CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 5

C UT - AND -C HOOSE • Algorithm for 𝑜 = 2 players • Player 1 divides the cake into two pieces 𝑌, 𝑍 s.t. Τ 𝑊 1 𝑌 = 𝑊 1 𝑍 = 1 2 • Player 2 chooses the piece she prefers. • This is EF and therefore proportional. ➢ Why? CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 6

Input Model • How do we measure the “ time complexity ” of a cake-cutting algorithm for 𝑜 players? • Typically, time complexity is a function of the length of input encoded as binary. • Our input consists of functions 𝑊 𝑗 , which requires infinite bits to encode. • We want running time just as a function of 𝑜 . CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 7

Robertson-Webb Model • We restrict access to valuations 𝑊 𝑗 ’ s through two types of queries: ➢ Eval 𝑗 (𝑦, 𝑧) returns 𝑊 𝑦, 𝑧 𝑗 ➢ Cut 𝑗 (𝑦, 𝛽) returns 𝑧 such that 𝑊 𝑦, 𝑧 = 𝛽 𝑗 𝛽 eval output 𝑦 𝑧 cut output CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 8

Robertson-Webb Model • Two types of queries: ➢ Eval 𝑗 𝑦, 𝑧 = 𝑊 𝑦, 𝑧 𝑗 ➢ Cut 𝑗 𝑦, 𝛽 = 𝑧 s.t. 𝑊 𝑦, 𝑧 = 𝛽 𝑗 • Question: How many queries are needed to find an EF allocation when 𝑜 = 2 ? • Answer: 2 ➢ Why? CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 9

D UBINS -S PANIER • Protocol for finding a proportional allocation for 𝑜 players • Referee starts at 0 , and continuously moves knife to the right. • Repeat: when piece to the left of knife is worth 1 /𝑜 to a player, the player shouts “ stop ” , gets the piece, and exits. • The last player gets the remaining piece. CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 10

D UBINS -S PANIER 1/3 1/3 ≥ 1/3 CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 11

D UBINS -S PANIER • Moving knife is not really needed. • At each stage, we can ask each remaining player a cut query to mark his 1/𝑜 point in the remaining cake. • Move the knife to the leftmost mark. CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 12

D UBINS -S PANIER CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 13

D UBINS -S PANIER 1 3 Τ CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 14

D UBINS -S PANIER 1 3 Τ 1 3 Τ CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 15

D UBINS -S PANIER 1 3 Τ 1 3 Τ ≥ 1 3 Τ CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 16

D UBINS -S PANIER • Question: What is the complexity of the Dubins- Spanier protocol in the Robertson-Webb model? Θ 𝑜 1. Θ 𝑜 log 𝑜 2. Θ 𝑜 2 3. Θ 𝑜 2 log 𝑜 4. CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 17

E VEN -P AZ • Input: Interval [𝑦, 𝑧] , number of players 𝑜 ➢ Assume 𝑜 = 2 𝑙 for some 𝑙 • If 𝑜 = 1 , give [𝑦, 𝑧] to the single player. • Otherwise, let each player 𝑗 mark 𝑨 𝑗 s.t. = 1 𝑊 𝑦, 𝑨 𝑗 2 𝑊 𝑦, 𝑧 𝑗 𝑗 • Let 𝑨 ∗ be the 𝑜/2 mark from the left. • Recurse on [𝑦, 𝑨 ∗ ] with the left 𝑜/2 players, and on [𝑨 ∗ , 𝑧] with the right 𝑜/2 players. CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 18

E VEN -P AZ CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 19

E VEN -P AZ • Theorem: E VEN -P AZ returns a Prop allocation. • Proof: ➢ Inductive proof. We want to prove that if player 𝑗 is allocated piece 𝐵 𝑗 when [𝑦, 𝑧] is divided between 𝑜 Τ players, 𝑊 𝑗 𝐵 𝑗 ≥ 1 𝑜 𝑊 𝑦, 𝑧 𝑗 o Then Prop follows because initially 𝑊 𝑦, 𝑧 = 𝑊 0,1 = 1 𝑗 𝑗 ➢ Base case: 𝑜 = 1 is trivial. ➢ Suppose it holds for 𝑜 = 2 𝑙−1 . We prove for 𝑜 = 2 𝑙 . ➢ Take the 2 𝑙−1 left players. 𝑦, 𝑨 ∗ o Every left player 𝑗 has 𝑊 Τ ≥ 1 2 𝑊 𝑦, 𝑧 𝑗 𝑗 1 1 𝑦, 𝑨 ∗ o If it gets 𝐵 𝑗 , by induction, 𝑊 𝑗 𝐵 𝑗 ≥ 2 𝑙−1 𝑊 ≥ 2 𝑙 𝑊 𝑦, 𝑧 𝑗 𝑗 CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 20

E VEN -P AZ CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 21

Complexity of Proportionality • Theorem [Edmonds and Pruhs, 2006]: Any proportional protocol needs Ω(𝑜 log 𝑜) operations in the Robertson-Webb model. • Thus, the E VEN -P AZ protocol is (asymptotically) provably optimal! CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 22

Envy-Freeness? • “ I suppose you are also going to give such cute algorithms for finding envy-free allocations? ” • Bad luck. For 𝑜 -player EF cake-cutting: ➢ [Brams and Taylor, 1995] give an unbounded EF protocol. ➢ [Procaccia 2009] shows Ω 𝑜 2 lower bound for EF. ➢ Last year, the long-standing major open question of “ bounded EF protocol ” was resolved! ➢ [Aziz and Mackenzie, 2016]: 𝑃(𝑜 𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ) protocol! o Yes, it ’ s not a typo. Go figure! CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 23

Next Lecture • Strategyproofness • Pareto optimality • Restricted case of multiple homogeneous goods • Generalization to the case of indivisible goods CSC304 - Nisarg Shah 24