Constructing Ideal Secret Sharing Schemes based on Chinese Remainder Theorem Yu Ning, Fuyou Miao*,… University of Science and Technology of China
Contributions Generalization of existing CRT-based (t,n)-SS from Integer Ring to Polynomial Ring Ideal (t,n)-SS based on CRT for Poly. Ring Shamir’s (t,n)-SS : a special case Weighted (t,n)-SS 2
Outline (t,n)-Threshold Secret Sharing ( i.e., (t,n)-SS) Two Typical Secret Sharing Schemes Secret Sharing based on Polynomial Ring over F p Both Types of SS as Special Cases Weighted (t,n)-SS Conclusion 3
(t,n)-Threshold Secret Sharing t-Threshold, n- number of all shareholders A dealer divides a secret s into n pieces, allocates each piece to a shareholder as the share such that 1) any t or more than t shares can recover the secret; 2) less than t shares cannot obtain the secret; 4
Dealer Secret: S Share Shareholder Distribution …… Share: s 1 s 2 s 3 s 100 s 4 Secret Reconstruction S Fig 1. An example of (3,100)-SS 5
Applications of (t,n)-SS Threshold Encryption Threshold Signature Secure Multiparty Computation Many security-related application protocols… 6
2 Typical (t,n)-SSs Shamir’s (t,n)-SS [23]* Share Distribution f(x)=a 0 +a 1 x+a 2 x 2 +…+a t-1 x t-1 mod p Secret: s= a 0 Each Shareholder U i : Public information-x i ∈ F p , private share--f(x i ) Secret Reconstruction m ( m≥t ) shareholders, e.g. {U 1 ,U 2 ,…U m }, compute the secret as: x ∑ ∏ m = m ≥ j 1 ( ) mod , ( ) s f x p m t = 1, j − = i i x x ≠ j i j i 7 *[23] Shamir, A.: How to share a secret. Communications of the ACM 22 (11), 612-613 (1979)
f(x)=a 0 +a 1 x+a 2 x 2 +…+a t-1 x t-1 mod p Secret: s= a 0 Dealer Share Shareholder … distribution Public Info: x 1 Private Share: f(x 1 ) … x i x n … x i+1 x i+2 f(x i ) f(x n ) f(x i+1 ) f(x i+2 ) Secret Reconstruction x ∑ ∏ m m ≥ j Secret: s = 1 ( ) mod , ( ) f x p m t = 1, j − = i i x x ≠ j i j i 8 Fig 1. Shamir’s (t,n)-SS
Remarks Shamir’s (t,n)-SS uses Lagrange Interpolation over finite field F p to recover the secret. Ideal scheme: Information rate 1; No information leaks to t-1 participants Most popular (t,n)-SS scheme cited over 13000 times -- google scholar 9
2 Typical (t,n)-SS Asmuth-Bloom’s (t,n)-SS[1] over 600 times of citation Share distribution: ∈ ∈ : secret : ,modulus of shareholder s Z m Z m i i 0 < < < < = ... ,gcd( , ) 1, m m m m m m (Increasing sequence, pairwise coprime) 0 1 2 n i j ≤ ( ) ... ... * m m m m m m (gap creation ) − + 0 2 1 2 n t n t = α < + ... B s m m m m (range extension ) 0 1 2 t (share evaluation) = mod ; s B m i i 10 [1]Asmuth,C., Bloom,J.:A modular approach to key safeguarding. IEEE transactions on information theory 29 29(2), 208-210 (1983)
Secret Reconstruction M M ∑ ≥ − 1 For authorized subset , | | = ( ) mod mod A A t B s m M ∈ i i A i m m i i = secret: mod ; s B m 0 Remark : Based on Chinese Remainder Theorem(CRT) for Integer Ring Not Ideal—information rate < 1 Hard to choose moduli due to the condition ≤ ( ) ... ... * m m m m m m − + 0 2 1 2 n t n t Awkward scheme [13-20][33]… 11
Questions Can we use CRT to build a (t,n)-SS as ideal as Shamir’s scheme? What is the connection between CRT based (t,n)-SSs and Shamir’s (t,n)-SS ? 12
Our work Generalize Asmuth-Bloom’s (t,n)-SS from Integer Ring to Polynomial Ring General Scheme Ideal Scheme Prove Shamir’s (t,n)-SS is a special case of our Ideal Scheme Construct a weighted (t,n)-SS from General Scheme 13
Our work 14
(t,n)-SS based on CRT for Polynomial Ring over F p General scheme Ideal scheme 15
Our General Scheme Setup ≥ = d prime , an integer 1 , ( ) , p d m x x 0 0 0 ∈ pairwise coprime polynomials ( ) [ ], m x F x i p = ∈ deg( ( )) for [0, ] such that d m x i n i i ∑ ∑ n t ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ + ≤ ... and d d d d d d d ( ascending sequence, gap production ) 0 1 2 0 = + = n i i - 2 1 i n t i Share Distribution < α The Dealer pick secret ( ), deg( ( )) ,random ( ),such that s x s x d x 0 ∑ t = + α α + < − ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), deg( ( )) 1 f x s x x m x x d d 0 0 = i 1 i share for th shareholder: i 16 = ( ) ( )mod ( ) s x f x m x i i
Our General Scheme Secret Reconstruction ≥ , any participants e.g., {1,2,..., }, recover the secret ( ): k k k t s x = ( ) ( )mod ( ) f x s x m x 1 1 = ( ) ( )mod ( ) f x s x m x → 2 2 ( ), (by CRT for polynomial ring) f x ... = ( ) ( )mod ( ) f x s x m x k k → = ( ) ( )mod ( ) s x f x m x 0 17
Our Ideal Scheme Only Difference in Setup ≥ = d prime , an integer 1 , ( ) , p d m x x 0 0 0 ∈ pairwise coprime polynomials ( ) [ ], m x F x i p = ∈ deg( ( )) for [0, ] such that d m x i n i i ∑ ∑ n t = = = = + = ... and d d d d d d d 0 1 2 0 = + = n i i - 2 1 i n t i ∑ ∑ n t ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ + ≤ ... and d d d d d d d 0 1 2 0 = + = n i i - 2 1 i n t i (in general scheme) 18
Surprising Gains from Our Ideal Scheme Information rate= 1 , no info. leak Ideal scheme Quite easy to choose pairwise coprime modulus polynomials e.g. + + + d , d ,, d 1 2 ... x x x n 0 0 0 Shamir’s (t,n)-SS as a special case 19
Shamir’s (t,n)-SS as our special case An instantiation of our ideal scheme with d 0 =1 20
Shamir’s (t,n)-SS as our special case CRT for Polynomial Ring over F p Lagrange Interpolation = ( ) ( )mod ( ) f x s x m x over F p 1 1 = x ( ) ( )mod ( ) f x s x m x ∑ ∏ m m = 2 2 j ( ) mod s f x p = 1, j ... − = i 1 i x x ≠ j i j i = ( ) ( )mod ( ) f x s x m x k k Shamir’s (t,n)-SS → = ( ) ( )mod ( ) s x f x m x 0 Our Ideal scheme x i : Public info. of shareholder U i = − = − ∈ since ( ) ( )mod( ), ( ) f x f x x x m x x x F i i i i p 21 (Remainder Theorem for Polynomial)
Weighted (t,n)-SS based on our General Scheme What is Weighted (t,n)-SS Each shareholder U i in subset A has a weight w i ; secret can be recovered if ∑ ≥ i A w t ∈ i 22
Weighted (t,n)-SS based on our General Scheme More natural and easier to realize Weighted (t,n)-SS based on our scheme weight=deg(m i (x))= w i Shareholder with weight w i is allocated a modulus polynomial of degree w i 23
Conclusions General (t,n)-SS Scheme (Poly. Ring) Asmuth- Bloom’s (t,n)-SS (Integer Ring) Ideal (t,n)-SS Scheme General (t,n)-SS Scheme Shamir’s scheme as a special case of Ideal (t,n)-SS Scheme Weighted (t,n)-SS General (t,n)-SS Scheme 24
Conclusions following schemes Potential as an alternative of both schemes Asmuth-Bloom’s Our scheme Shamir’s Scheme Scheme 25
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