Conflicting Interests and Language Change GURT 2014 Christopher - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Conflicting Interests and Language Change GURT 2014 Christopher Ahern & Robin Clark University of Pennsylvania May 20, 2014 Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 1 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Questions What are the causes of language change? What role might “conflicts” of interest play? Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 2 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Outline Negation 1 Analyses 2 Signaling 3 Cycles 4 Conclusion 5 Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 3 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Jespersen [Jespersen(1917)] The Negative Cycle N V 1 N V (N) 2 N V N 3 (N) V N 4 V N 5 Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 4 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Jespersen [Jespersen(1917)] The original negative adverb is first weakened , then found insufficient and therefore strengthened , generally through some additional word, and this in turn may be felt as the negative proper and may then in the course of time be subject to the same development as the original word. Sometimes it seems as if the essential thing were only to increase the phonetic bulk of the adverb... Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 5 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Jespersen [Jespersen(1917)] Cause and/or effect Phonetic Syntactic Semantico-Pragmatic Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 6 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Emphasis [Kiparsky and Condoravdi(2006)] Emphatic negation tends to increase in frequency due to pragmatically motivated overuse which is characteristic of inherently bounded evaluative scales...an obligatory element cannot be emphatic, for to emphasize everything is to emphasize nothing. Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 7 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Emphasis [Kiparsky and Condoravdi(2006)] PLAIN EMPHATIC SOURCE ου...τι ου-δε...εν Ancient Greek (ου)δεν...τι δεν...τιποτε Early Medieval Greek δεν...τιποτε δεν... πραμα Greek Dialects δεν...πραμα δεν...απαντοξη Modern Cretan Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 8 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Emphasis [Israel(1998)] Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 9 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Emphasis [Davis et al.(2007)Davis, Potts, and Speas] Quality Threshold [Potts(2007)] An utterance U by speaker S in context C satisfies quality iff its quality rating, µ C ( U ) , is above the quality threshold C τ for C . Emphasis An emphatic utterance U by speaker S in context C conventionally implicates commitment to some higher quality threshold C ′ τ > C τ , Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 10 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Emphasis [Dahl(2001)] Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 11 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Information Structure [Schwenter(2006)] (The plain-emphatic distinction) is problematic from the present-day perspective of other Romance languages...the post-verbal negative element is heavily regulated by information-structural factors , and specifically by the discourse-old status of the denied proposition. Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 12 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Information Structure [Schwenter(2006)] I NFERABLE DISCOURSE NEW DIRECTLY ACTIVATED N V 1 1 1 N V N 0 1 1 V N 0 0 1 Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 13 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Information Structure Extend [Davis et al.(2007)Davis, Potts, and Speas] Inferability Threshold An utterance U by speaker S in context C satisfies inferability iff its inferability, µ C ( U ) , rating is above the inferability threshold C ι for C . Inferability Discourse New: µ C ( U ) = 0 Inferable: µ C ( U ) ∈ [ 0 , 1 ] Directly Activated: µ C ( U ) = 1 Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 14 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Information Structure The proof is trivial! Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 15 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Causes [Grice(1975)] I am, however, enough of a rationalist to want to find a basis that underlies these facts, undeniable though they may be; I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all or most do in fact follow but as something that it is reasonable for us to follow, that we should not abandon. Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 16 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Crucial points for Games Signaling Games 1 Nash Equilibria 2 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies 3 Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 17 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Signaling Games [Lewis(1969)] One if by land, two if by sea. Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 18 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Signaling Games δ t land t sea S S m one m two m one m two R R R R a land a sea a land a sea a land a sea a land a sea 1 , 1 0 , 0 1 , 1 0 , 0 0 , 0 1 , 1 0 , 0 1 , 1 Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 19 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Signaling Games Sender observes some state of the world, t ∈ T , given probability distribution over states, δ . Sender chooses message, m ∈ M , based on strategy s ∈ [ T → M ] . Receiver interprets message with action, a ∈ A , based on strategy r ∈ [ M → A ] . U S and U R are the utility functions that define preferences over T × A . Expected utility of sender and receiver: EU S ( s , r ) = ∑ δ ( t ) · U S ( t , r ( s ( t ))) t (1) EU R ( s , r ) = ∑ δ ( t ) · U r ( t , r ( s ( t ))) t Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 20 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Nash Equilibria [Nash(1951)] A strategy profile � s ∗ , r ∗ � is a Nash equilibrium if and only if: ∀ s ∈ S , such that s � = s ∗ , EU S ( s ∗ , r ∗ ) ≥ EU S ( s , r ∗ ) ∀ r ∈ R , such that r � = r ∗ , EU R ( s ∗ , r ∗ ) ≥ EU S ( s ∗ , r ) “Something that it is reasonable for us to follow.” -Grice Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 21 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Evolutionarily Stable Strategies [Maynard Smith and Price(1973)] An Evolutionarily Stable Strategy is a strategy that, if all the members of a population adopt it, then no mutant strategy could invade the population under the influence of natural selection Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 22 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Evolutionarily Stable Strategies [Selten(1980)] In the class of asymmetric games, a strategy is evolutionarily stable if and only if it is a Strict Nash Equilibrium . A strategy profile � s ∗ , r ∗ � is a Strict Nash equilibrium if and only if: ∀ s ∈ S , such that s � = s ∗ , EU S ( s ∗ , r ∗ ) > EU S ( s , r ∗ ) ∀ r ∈ R , such that r � = r ∗ , EU R ( s ∗ , r ∗ ) > EU S ( s ∗ , r ) “Something that it is reasonable for us to follow, that we should not abandon.” -Grice Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 23 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Crucial points for Cycles Preferences 1 Simulations 2 Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 24 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Preferences Emphasis and Information Structure Interpretation of game T : Quality of utterance, Inferability of utterance M : Different forms of negation A : Quality of utterance, inferability of utterance Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 25 / 38

Negation Analyses Signaling Cycles Conclusion Preferences Emphasis and Information Structure Interpretation of "conflict" Tendency to exaggerate quality threshold diminishes information conveyed Tendency to assume inferability threshold is met diminishes information conveyed Ahern & Clark (UPENN) Conflicting Interests and Language Change May 20, 2014 26 / 38