Challenges and opportunities Trends to address New concepts for: - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

• Challenges and opportunities • Trends to address • New concepts for: – Offensive sea control – Sea ‐ based AAW Weapons development – Increasing offensive sea control capacity – – Addressing defensive and constabulary missions • Capability and program implications Text

• In 2001, the Navy planned a new surface warfare approach – New family of CG(X), DD(X), LCS – Employing “Network ‐ centric warfare” – All three ships now cancelled/truncated • Navy has an opportunity to implement new surface warfare concept – Final specifications for Flight III DDG ‐ 51 – Concept and design of follow ‐ on SSC and modifications to LCS – Phased modernization of remaining CGs – New weapons and sensors • This study proposes a plan focused on: – Large and small surface combatants – Results possible by mid ‐ 2020s

China the “pacing challenge” but not the only, or most likely, A2/AD threat the surface forces will face

Iran shows less capable militaries can combine geography and “fire and forget” weapons in effective A2/AD network

Number of Active Conflicts 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 1985 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 Types of Active Conflicts 100% 9% 13% 20% 28% 38% 80% 53% 60% 57% 67% 40% 67% 55% 16% 20% 23% 23% 13% 7% 6% 5% 0% 1946 1961 1976 1991 2006 Extrasystemic Conflict Interstate Conflict Internal Conflict Internationalized internal conflict Proxy, paramilitary, and indirect conflicts on the rise

Historical Budget Authorities 900,000 Army Navy Air Force Defense Wide OIF/OEF DRAWDOWN OIF/OEF DRAWDOWN 800,000 Millions of FY2015 $ 700,000 DoD ‐ wide COLD WAR DRAWDOWN COLD WAR DRAWDOWN 600,000 500,000 VIETNAM DRAWDOWN VIETNAM DRAWDOWN KOREA DRAWDOWN KOREA DRAWDOWN Air Force 400,000 300,000 Navy 200,000 100,000 Army 0 Historical Budget Authorities as Percent of Total DoN Budget Authority 100% Other Spending Percent of Budget by Category 90% 80% 70% R&D and Procurement 60% 50% 40% Operations and Maintenance 30% 20% MILPERS 10% DoN Share of Healthcare 0% Budgets unlikely to rise; pressure continues on R&D and procurement

Cold War “Outer Air Battle” – Enabled carriers to approach within striking distance of Russia – Surface fleet’s contribution was “Up, Out and Down” – Ships & aircraft able to engage Soviet bombers outside anti ‐ ship missile range

Surface-Launched Missile Threat to U.S. Surface Combatants Range: 50 nm 100 nm 150 nm 200 nm 250 nm 300 nm SS-N-19 Variation in Y-values is for illustration only, not intended to reflect relative altitude BrahMos Tondar Karus Nasr Kosar C-801 C-704 C-701 Enemy Combatant Range: 50 nm 100 nm 150 nm 200 nm 250 nm 300 nm U.S. Surface Enemy Combatant Combatant Naval Strike Missile range from IHS Jane’s Navy International. All other ranges from IHS Jane’s Defence: Weapons database. * RGM-84L, a Harpoon Block II variant, is the only variant in service with the U.S. Navy. ** Extended-range Harpoon Block I variant previously in U.S. and foreign service.

• Surface combatants will conduct bulk of sea control – Subs, carriers, amphibious ships conducting power projection in future scenarios • Defeat enemy weapon launchers, not just enemy weapons BAMS SM-6 Future Anti-Ship Missile Secure Data Link DDG Future Anti-Submarine TAGOS Weapon

Mission Missile Number Long ‐ range SM ‐ 6 16 100 Defensive AAW Mid ‐ range SM ‐ 2 32 90 Defensive AAW ESSM 32 (8 cells) 80 BMD SM ‐ 3 6 70 Strike Tomahawk 24 Successful Engagements SUW Harpoon 8 non ‐ VLS 60 S ‐ L ‐ S SS ‐ L ‐ S ASW VLA 10 50 40 30 20 10 0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 Defending Missile Single Shot Pk

• Shift to a single, dense defensive AAW layer – Smaller interceptors; just as capable and more numerous as longer range – Acknowledges challenges against OTH targets – Enables integration of lasers, railgun and electronic warfare • Long ‐ range interceptors used for offensive AAW ASBM EMRG 30 nm Defensive AAW 5 nm ASCM Salvo Ship Self-Defense RAM Laser LCS ESSM DDG JHSV LCS CIWS

• Laser on some Flight III DDG ‐ 51 – 300 ‐ 500 kW able to conduct air defense – Needed power and cooling (~1500kW) too high for other ships – Smaller laser (~60 ‐ 100 kW) could be used for counter ‐ ISR, counter ‐ UAV • EM railgun on JHSV, DDG ‐ 1000 – 32 MJ able to conduct air defense, strike – Power requirement of 17MW – 64 MJ EMRG on DDG ‐ 1000 for strike • Shift defensive AAW to ~30 nm range – Smaller ESSM ‐ like interceptor – EW systems – Laser – Electromagnetic railgun

Mission Missile (replacement) Number • More capacity needed from each VLS cell Offensive AAW SM ‐ 6 32 Defensive AAW ESSM Blk II 96 (24 cells) • Emphasize: BMD SM ‐ 3 6 – relevant capability Strike Tomahawk (NGLAW) 24 – multi ‐ mission SUW Harpoon (LRASM) 8 non ‐ VLS applicability ASW VLA (None) 10 – smaller size; > 1 per cell • Planned solutions are large, single ‐ mission weapons • No ASW weapon able to outrange sub ‐ launched anti ‐ ship missiles Getting the most out of the ship’s main battery – the VLS magazine

Mission Current Missile Number Future Missile Number Offensive AAW SM ‐ 6 16 SM ‐ 6 42 Defensive AAW SM ‐ 2 32 ESSM Blk II 96 (24 cells) ESSM 32 (8 cells) BMD SM ‐ 3 6 SM ‐ 3 4 Strike Tomahawk 24 LRASM 18 SUW Harpoon 8 non ‐ VLS LRASM / SM 18/42 ASW New ASW Missile 8 VLA 10 Multi ‐ mission LRASM Long ‐ range ASROC SM ‐ 6 for offense ESSM for defense

25 20 Number of CGs Ship Count Phased Mod CGs 15 CG ‐ 47 Replacement 10 Operating CG 63 ‐ 73 5 Operating CG 52 ‐ 62 0 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30 FY31 FY32 FY33 FY34 FY35 FY36 FY37 FY38 FY39 FY40 FY41 FY42 FY43 Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Cruiser phased modernization needed for offensive sea control, air defense commander capacity

Misawa Air Base THAAD Batteries THAAD Batteries PAC-3 Batteries PAC-3 Batteries Tokyo Iwakuni Naval Sasebo Air Station Naval Base Yokosuka Naval Base Shore ‐ based BMD systems should replace BMD ships in defense of fixed Cruiser phased modernization needed for offensive sea control, air defense locations overseas commander

150 to 300 nm range engagement Future Anti ‐ Ship Missile Mutually-Supporting Air Defenses Secure Data Link Variable Depth Sonar Passive Listening Future Anti ‐ Submarine Weapon Passive Towed Array Enabling small surface combatants able to contribute to offensive sea control with CGs and DDGs or on their own

160 Follow on SSC SSC reqmt LCS 140 MCM 120 PC Number of Surface Combatants FFG 100 Large Surface Combatant reqmt DDG ‐ 1000 Future Large Surface 80 BMD stations Combatant DDG ‐ 51 Flight III 60 CSG escorts DDG ‐ 51 Flight IIA DDG ‐ 51 Flight II 40 DDG ‐ 51 Flight I 20 CG 0 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 FY26 FY27 FY28 FY29 FY30 FY31 FY32 FY33 FY34 FY35 FY36 FY37 FY38 FY39 FY40 FY41 FY42 FY43 FY44 Growing SSC shortfall requires new approaches to escort, training and security missions so CGs and DDGs can focus on offense

• Modify LCS to be the follow ‐ on SSC LCS Procurement – Only one variant FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 • Equip for defensive AAW, ASW and FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 SUW missions 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 – VLS (24 cell) – 3D radar (not SPY) Follow ‐ on SSC Procurement – ASW mission package FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25 – Same gun 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 • Upgrade selected LCS with VLS

• Evolve to dedicated LCS crews – Forward base 16 LCS • Upgrade selected LCS with VLS • Consider buying more JHSV 4 LCS 8 LCS 8 LCS 8 LCS 4 LCS 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 Days Days Days Days Days Days Days Days LCS 1 Deployed Homeport Deployed Homeport LCS 3 Homeport Deployed LCS forward 60 ‐ 120 days 30 days Crew LCS 1 Off LCS 3 LCS 1 Off LCS 3 LCS 1 Off 101 Hull Hull Hull LCS CONUS 120 ‐ 210 days 180 days Crew Off LCS 3 LCS 1 Off LCS 3 LCS 1 Off LCS 3 102 Hull Hull Hull Crew LCS 3 LCS 1 Off LCS 3 LCS 1 Off LCS 3 LCS 1 103 Hull Hull Shift LCS to dedicated crews; base some in today’s overseas SSC ports

• Separate mission packages from LCS program – Whole MCM mission package – Whole SUW mission package – Parts of ASW mission package • Add new mission packages – Electronic warfare – Humanitarian assistance – Maritime security • Consider expanding non ‐ combatant fleet – Less expensive option for some operations in low ‐ threat environments