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Environmental Economics Lunch Seminar September 26, 2013 Carbon Taxation and Social Progress Emmanuel COMBET CIRED A gap between theory and practice Large theoretical consensus among economists Carbon tax = the most efficient instrument for


  1. Environmental Economics Lunch Seminar September 26, 2013 Carbon Taxation and Social Progress Emmanuel COMBET CIRED

  2. A gap between theory and practice Large theoretical consensus among economists Carbon tax = the most efficient instrument for reducing CO 2 emissions VS A frequent blocking of the implementation • Higher energy prices will harm activity, competitiveness and employment • It will affect the most vulnerable (households and industries) • And it will risk to jeopardize other objectives (debt reduction...)

  3. Key lessons from economic literature • No exemption for environmental efficiency • A key question: how to use the carbon tax revenue ? • The most efficient recycling option: lower social contributions • The net impacts on activity and employment are uncertain • The equity objective may justify other recycling options • Very few links with other long term policies (pensions, debt)

  4. Outline: Questions and Analyses 1. Net macroeconomic impact. Lessons from a stylized model 2. Consistency with future goals. Lessons from a CGE model (2020) 3. Equity-efficiency dilemma. Lessons from a CGE model (2004)

  5. A simplified model of second best economy • All the energy consumed is imported • One domestic product, in competition with foreign products • Two factors of production : energy and labour • Fix technical coefficients + households’ energy consumption • Existing tax on energy (quantity) and on labour ( ad valorem ) • Nominal net wage adjusts to unemployment • Net exports adjust to domestic production cost/price

  6. Conditions for a net employment gain The net impact depends on 2 controversial parameters Sensitivity of net exports to domestic price I et II : Gains I 1 III : Losses III II 0 Sensitivity of net wage to unemployment

  7. Conditions for a net employment gain Domaines Unemployment Production Wages Price Consumption Exports I ‐ + + ‐ + + II ‐ + + + + ‐ III + ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ + I : The positive impact on real trade dominates II : The positive impact on wage growth dominates III : The negative impact on energy bills dominates

  8. The state of the economy Domain III (activity and employment losses) is narrow when: 1. Unemployment is initially high 2. Net nominal wage is initially low 3. Energy consumption by households is initially high and higher than the energy consumption by productive systems

  9. To deepen the analysis 1. Empirical information on the initial state 2. Empirical information on the future context 3. Energy-saving potentials & structural change possibilities 4. Behaviour of public administrations (other reforms, targets) 5. Heterogeneity of agents & redistribution

  10. The hybridization of economic and energy data Available energy statistics Step 1 Matrix of quantities Matrix of prices (energy unit) (currency/energy unit) IC FC IC FC MAT MAT Q ij P ij Step 2 M M Energy bills (currency) CI CF MAT V ij = P ij . Q ij M ‘Hybrid matrix’ CF OTHER ENERGY Step 3 OTHER ENERGY V ij Statistical gaps allocated VA to non ‐ energy goods M

  11. Assumptions about future constraints (2020) 1. Higher competition on resources and markets • IMACLIM-R: a barrel of oil at 60€ (optimist, 77€ in 2011) • IMACLIM-R: lower wages /production costs in emerging economies 2. Consequences of the demographic transition • COR: funding needs for pensions 41-48 billions (11 en 2008) • CEPII: important decrease in the households’ saving rate 3. Growth and employment potentials after the crisis • COR: productivity and unemployment from the DGT

  12. The simulation platform IMACLIM ‐ S.2.4 Simultaneous equilibria in monetary and physical units (MTOE) Limited adaptation capacity 20 income classes (technical constraints & basic needs for energy) Final Taxes Prices, Limited adaptation demand Incomes capacity (technical constraints) Exports Rest of the world 4 productions Flows of products & funds Imports (3E + 1 ‘Composite’) Equilibrium unemployment (constraint on the Payroll & other taxes Transfers adjustment of wage) International trade Public administrations competitiveness function of the production costs Public finance modalities France in open ‐ economy (other reforms and multiplicity of objectives)

  13. Interaction of three mechanisms Reform scheme Oil bill Tax burden transfer Change in the levies Change in Structural change production price on national incomes Change in employment intensity Domestic consumption Competitiveness Employment Production

  14. Reconnecting climate, pensions and deficits issues Consider: 1) A 2020 France 2) an objective: funding ‘COR compatible’ pensions over 2004-2020 Three structural reforms (>3 yrs) Higher legal retirement age €200/tCO 2 - Lower SSC & Higher Income Tax (+2 pts) Higher social contributions (+7 pts) 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 Net wages CO 2 emissions GDP Employment

  15. The mechanism of a potential virtuous cycle Higher social 200€/tC02 - Lower CS Reform schemes contributions (CS) + Higher Income Tax (2pts) Oil bill to GDP ratio -1,1% -17,5% Labour intensity -0,3% +0,9% Production price +2,3% +0,5% Net nominal wage -4,7% +5,6% Households’ consumption -1,7% +1,9% Exports (volume ) -1,2% -0,3% The 2 reform schemes are compared to a higher legal retirement age (> 3 yrs.)

  16. And the argument of fairness?

  17. A Trade ‐ off Between Equity and Efficiency Budget neutral reform (Constant Debt/GDP) Employment €0/tCO 2 Historical France (2004) 1.06 €300/tCO 2 - Lower Social Contributions €300/tCO 2 - Transfers to households Inverted Bottom twentile 0.94 Gini consumption 1.06 1.06 index The 2 schemes reduce CO 2 emissions by 34% over the period 1985-2004 1.06 GDP

  18. But there is room for compromises Budget neutral reform (Constant Debt/GDP) Employment €0/tCO 2 Historical France (2004) 1.06 €300/tCO 2 - Targeted Compensations & Lower Social Contributions Inverted Bottom twentile 0.94 Gini consumption 1.06 1.06 index This compromise scheme also reduces CO 2 emissions by 34% over the period 1985-2004 1.06 GDP

  19. But energy vulnerability is ill ‐ explained by ‘income’ Annual energy budget share 80% 60% 40% 20% Living 0% standard INSEE 2001 data, authors’ calculation A variety of technical, geographic and socioeconomic factors

  20. Conclusion Three crucial ‘parameters’ to find the best compromises 1. Balance between wage progression and control of costs 2. Coherence between policies (general reform of public finance) 3. Targeted support towards the most vulnerable to energy prices

  21. Environmental Economics Lunch Seminar September 26, 2013 Carbon Taxation and Social Progress Emmanuel COMBET CIRED - combet@centre-cired.fr Papers available here : http://www.imaclim.centre-cired.fr/spip.php?article23

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