Building Digital Trust through Boston University Slideshow Title Goes Here Online Feedback Mechanisms Chris Dellarocas Associate Provost of Digital Learning and Innovation Richard C. Shipley Professor in Management Boston University Boston University Office of the Provost
Event, Date Boston University Slideshow Title Goes Here Boston University Office of the Provost
Toulouse, April 1, 2016 The Ecosystem of Online Review Sites Boston University Slideshow Title Goes Here Platform-operated Stand-alone Stand-alone Consumer-generated Consumer-generated Expert-generated Boston University Office of the Provost
Toulouse, April 1, 2016 Boston University Slideshow Title Goes Here Boston University Office of the Provost
Toulouse, April 1, 2016 Key Challenges and Design Solutions Boston University Slideshow Title Goes Here Problem What can go wrong Possible ways to address Fickle online identities Members can cheat then re ‐ enter market with new Authenticate users – prevent multiple identities identities Reporting biases Members more likely to transact with parties that Report percentiles in addition to raw scores already have a good reputation; as a consequence more Report percentages of “silent transactions” likely to leave good ratings Make it real easy to submit ratings Members don’t rate all transactions; more likely to Allow, and properly highlight, detailed text reviews leave ratings for very good and very bad transactions Reciprocity biases Members reluctant to post anything except a good Allow only one party to rate the other rating for fear of retaliation from transaction partner Simultaneously publish ratings of both parties Socially ‐ induced reciprocity Report percentages of “silent transactions” Fake/unfair ratings Members can post fake ratings to boost their reputation Only verified customers can post ratings or slander their competitors. Display rater profiles and histories Clients can post frivolous ratings. Allow the community to “rate the rater” Clients can use ratings as blackmail to raise Highlight and reward “best” raters unreasonable requests from service providers. Algorithmic detection of “dubious” ratings Allow parties to appeal “unfair” ratings Cold start Nobody trusts new members with no reputation Background checks of new members Require new members to post a bond Utilize an escrow service Newcomers offer low introductory prices Reputation Milking/ Members may try to milk their reputation once they are Discount older feedback/ratings End game “established” or before exiting market Require members to post a bond Offer platform guarantees, ADR Boston University Office of the Provost
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