Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication Onur G¨ unl¨ u Information Theory and Applications Chair, TU Berlin Joint work with Rafael F. Schaefer (TU Berlin) and H. Vincent Poor (Princeton) ISIT 2020 G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 1

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Motivation for Physical Unclonable Functions (I) Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) Q Q • Logically stable states of a static random access memory (SRAM) cell are ( Q, Q ) = (1 , 0) and (0 , 1) . • The power-up state of an SRAM cell converges to one of the states . • Uniformly random convergence due to random and uncontrollable physical mismatch of the inverters. G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 2

Motivation for Physical Unclonable Functions (II) NVM= Non-Volatile Memory Secret Key Source (e.g., NVM, PUF) Encryption Decryption Key Key Decrypted Message Ciphertext Encryption Decryption Message (Plaintext) (Plaintext) G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 3

Motivation for Physical Unclonable Functions (III) • Wiretap channel (WTC) communication with PUF Outputs used as the Local Source of Randomness at the WTC Encoder ALICE BOB X n Y n M channel M ENCODER DECODER Z n channel EVE G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 4

Problem Definition (I) • Suppose a secret key S is agreed securely using noisy measurements X n and Y n of the PUF outputs X n and a public communication � link , which � Allows multiple measurements via ˜ X and Y vectors; � Accounts for the effects of correlated noise in the measurements � e.g., encoder and decoder measurements are made within a coherence time; � Allows decoder measurement channels to be controllable by a cost-constrained action sequence A n ; � Hides the secret key from an eavesdropper that observes a sequence Z n correlated with ( � X n , Y n , X n ) . G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 5

Problem Definition (II) ˆ S S ( a ) ( b ) A n = f a ( W ) ( a ) = f 1 ( � X n ) W ( W, S ) ˆ S = g ( W, Y n ) ( b ) = f 2 ( � X n , S ) W � X n A n Y n P � X | X � X n P Y Z | X � XA P X X n X n Z n W EVE G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 6

Problem Definition (III) - Enrollment ˆ S S ( a ) ( b ) A n = f a ( W ) ( a ) = f 1 ( � X n ) W ( W, S ) ˆ S = g ( W, Y n ) ( b ) = f 2 ( � X n , S ) W � X n A n Y n P � X | X � X n P Y Z | X � XA P X X n X n Z n W EVE G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 6

Problem Definition (III) - Enrollment ˆ S S ( a ) ( b ) A n = f a ( W ) ( a ) = f 1 ( � X n ) ( W , S ) W ˆ S = g ( W, Y n ) ( b ) = f 2 ( � X n , S ) W � X n A n Y n P � X | X � X n P Y Z | X � XA P X X n X n Z n W EVE G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 6

Problem Definition (IV) - Authentication ˆ S S ( a ) ( b ) A n = f a ( W ) ( a ) = f 1 ( � X n ) ( W, S ) W ˆ S = g ( W, Y n ) ( b ) = f 2 ( � X n , S ) W � X n A n Y n P � X | X � X n P Y Z | X � XA P X X n X n Z n W EVE G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 7

Problem Definition (IV) - Authentication ˆ S S ( a ) ( b ) A n = f a ( W ) ( a ) = f 1 ( � X n ) W ( W, S ) ˆ S = g ( W, Y n ) ( b ) = f 2 ( � X n , S ) W � X n A n Y n P � X | X � X n P YZ | X � XA P X X n X n Z n W EVE G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 7

Problem Definition (IV) - Authentication ˆ S S ( a ) ( b ) A n = f a ( W ) ( a ) = f 1 ( � X n ) W ( W, S ) ˆ S = g ( W , Y n ) ( b ) = f 2 ( � X n , S ) W � X n A n Y n P � X | X � X n P Y Z | X � XA P X X n X n Z n W EVE G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 7

Problem Definition (IV) - Authentication ˆ S S ( a ) ( b ) A n = f a ( W ) ( a ) = f 1 ( � X n ) W ( W, S ) ˆ S = g ( W, Y n ) ( b ) = f 2 ( � X n , S ) W � X n A n Y n P � X | X � X n P Y Z | X � XA P X X n X n Z n W EVE G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 7

Problem Definition (V) ➤ Reliability: Error probability P e = Pr[ ˆ S � = S ] should vanish ; ➤ Secrecy Leakage: S should be independent of ( W, Z n ) ; ➤ Key Rate: R s = log |S| should be maximized ; n ➤ Privacy Leakage: R ℓ ≈ I ( X n ; W, Z n ) should be minimized ; n ➤ Storage: R w ≈ log |W| should be minimized ; n ➤ Action Cost: Expected action cost C ≈ E [Γ( A n )] should be minimized . G¨ unl¨ u, Schaefer, and Poor : Biometric and Physical Identifiers with Correlated Noise for Controllable Private Authentication 8