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BGPSec Interoperability Test QuaggaSRx and BIRD bgpsec IETF 97 Trustworthy Networking Program Seoul, South Korea Nov. 17, 2016 Oliver Borchert (oliver.borchert@nist.gov) NaNonal InsNtute of Standards and Technology 1 Tested Systems:


  1. BGPSec Interoperability Test QuaggaSRx and BIRD bgpsec IETF 97 Trustworthy Networking Program Seoul, South Korea Nov. 17, 2016 Oliver Borchert (oliver.borchert@nist.gov) NaNonal InsNtute of Standards and Technology 1

  2. Tested Systems: QuaggaSRx BGPSEC-IO* (hUps://bgpsrx.antd.nist.gov) Trustworthy Networking Program BIRD bgpsec (hUps://bgpsrx.antd.nist.gov) *BGPSEC Traffic Generator 2

  3. Topology Scenario S1 AS10 AS20 AS30 AS40 AS50 QuaggaSRx BIRD bgpsec BIRD bgpsec QuaggaSRx QuaggaSRx 10.10.0.0/16 10.10.1.0/24 Trustworthy Networking Program 10.10.2.0/24 AS100 ROA’s BGPSEC-IO 10.10.0.0/16-24, 10 10.10.0.0/16 10.10.1.0/24 10.10.2.0/24 AS100 aUempts to hijack the traffic of AS10 3

  4. StarNng AS 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 Trustworthy Networking Program 4

  5. StarNng AS 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 Trustworthy Networking Program 5

  6. Trustworthy Networking Program Switching to AS40 6

  7. Trustworthy Networking Program Switching to AS40 7

  8. Adding Traffic using BGPSEC-IO Trustworthy Networking Program 8

  9. Adding Traffic using BGPSEC-IO Trustworthy Networking Program 9

  10. Adding Traffic using BGPSEC-IO RPKI Origin ValidaNon BGPSEC Path ValidaNon Trustworthy Networking Program 10

  11. Result • The Prefix Hijack was unsuccessful: Trustworthy Networking Program – Announced prefixes passed path validaNon – Announcement failed RPKI origin valida-on • Policy is prefer valid – no switch to shorter invalid route 11

  12. Topology Scenario S2 AS10 AS20 AS30 AS40 AS50 QuaggaSRx BIRD bgpsec BIRD bgpsec QuaggaSRx QuaggaSRx 10.10.0.0/16 10.10.1.0/24 Trustworthy Networking Program 10.10.2.0/24 AS10 AS100 ROA’s BGPSEC-IO 10.10.0.0/16-24, 10 10.10.0.0/16 10.10.1.0/24 10.10.2.0/24 AS100 aUempts to hijack the traffic of AS10 by pre-pending AS10 12

  13. RestarNng Traffic using BGPSEC-IO Trustworthy Networking Program 13

  14. RestarNng Traffic using BGPSEC-IO Trustworthy Networking Program 14

  15. RestarNng Traffic using BGPSEC-IO RPKI Origin ValidaNon BGPSEC Path ValidaNon Trustworthy Networking Program 15

  16. Result • The Prefix Hijack was unsuccessful: Trustworthy Networking Program – Announced prefixes failed path valida-on – Announcement passed RPKI origin validaNon • Policy is prefer valid – no switch to shorter invalid route 16

  17. QuesNons ? Trustworthy Networking Program oliver.borchert@nist.gov NaNonal InsNtute of Standards and Technology 17

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