ANDaNA: Onion Routing for NDN Steve DiBenedetto Colorado State - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

ANDaNA: Onion Routing for NDN Steve DiBenedetto Colorado State University ANDaNA: Anonymous Named Data Networking Application NDSS ’12 Steven DiBenedetto, Paolo Gasti, Gene Tsudik, Ersin Uzun

Information Linkage & Leakage I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve

Information Linkage & Leakage I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve { mmHg: 100 }

Information Linkage & Leakage I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve

Information Linkage & Leakage

Information Linkage & Leakage I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Nonce: <rand-int> Lifetime: <int> Loc: /fitbit/key

Information Linkage & Leakage I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Nonce: <rand-int> Loc: /fitbit/key Lifetime: <int> { mmHg: 100 } Loc: /fitbit/key

Information Linkage & Leakage I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Nonce: <rand-int> Loc: /fitbit/key Lifetime: <int> { mmHg: 100 } Loc: /fitbit/key • Encrypted names, payloads, and header fields may link requester to sensitive content or leak information

Onion Routing in NDN I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Nonce: <rand-int> Loc: /fitbit/key /OR-1 /OR-2 23

Onion Routing in NDN I: /OR-1 I: /OR-2 I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Nonce: <rand-int> Loc: /fitbit/key /OR-1 /OR-2 24

Onion Routing in NDN I: /OR-1 I: /OR-2 I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Nonce: <rand-int> Loc: /fitbit/key /OR-1 /OR-2 25

Onion Routing in NDN I: /OR-1 I: /OR-2 I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Nonce: <rand-int> /OR-1 Loc: /fitbit/key /OR-2 26

Onion Routing in NDN I: /OR-2 I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Nonce: <rand-int> Loc: /fitbit/key /OR-1 /OR-2 27

Onion Routing in NDN D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Loc: /fitbit/key { mmHg: 100 } /OR-1 /OR-2 33

Onion Routing in NDN D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Loc: /fitbit/key { mmHg: 100 } /OR-1 /OR-2 34

Onion Routing in NDN D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Loc: /fitbit/key /OR-1 { mmHg: 100 } /OR-2 35

Onion Routing in NDN D: /OR-2 D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Loc: /fitbit/key { mmHg: 100 } /OR-1 /OR-2 36

Onion Routing in NDN D: /OR-1 /OR-1 D: /OR-2 D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve /OR-2 Loc: /fitbit/key { mmHg: 100 } 39

Onion Routing in NDN D: /OR-1 D: /OR-2 D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Loc: /fitbit/key { mmHg: 100 } /OR-1 /OR-2 40

Onion Routing in NDN D: /OR-1 D: /OR-2 D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Loc: /fitbit/key { mmHg: 100 } /OR-1 /OR-2 41

Improvements Over Tor Need fewer relays than Tor (2 vs 3) • – Potentially 1 less Internet-wide RTT ANDaNA paths are HIGHLY ephemeral • – No path setup cost – Change keys and relays at will during a Data stream without interruption – Tor sets up much longer lived circuits in comparison (~ 10 minutes) Symmetric key session-based mode also available • – Can be freely intermixed with public key crypto mode for the same Data stream. NDN gives us a lot for free • – CS improves retransmission and chance for cache hit at exit node – OR prefixes can refer to multiple relays – OR directory more robust to attacks thanks to signed Data 42

The Exit Node Problem D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Loc: /fitbit/key { mmHg: 100 } I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Exclude: <name-comp> Loc: /fitbit/key /OR-1 /OR-2 43

The Exit Node Problem D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Loc: /fitbit/key { mmHg: 100 } I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Exclude: <name-comp> Loc: /fitbit/key /OR-1 /OR-2 44

The Exit Node Problem D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Loc: /fitbit/key { mmHg: 100 } I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Exclude: <name-comp> Loc: /fitbit/key /OR-1 NDN-NP environments are not the general case: both are privacy/security aware /OR-2 45

The Exit Node Problem D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Loc: /fitbit/key { mmHg: 100 } I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Exclude: <name-comp> Loc: /fitbit/key /OR-1 NDN-NP environments are not the general case: both are privacy/security aware /OR-2 46

The Exit Node Problem D: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Loc: /fitbit/key { mmHg: 100 } I: /omh/blood-pressure/steve Exclude: <name-comp> Loc: /fitbit/key NDN-NP environments are not the general case: both are privacy/security aware /OR-2 47

Summary • ANDaNA provides a Tor-like service for NDN, but new tradeoffs to consider • ANDaNA is fundamentally a proxy: use as many (or few) relays as needed 50

Thoughts • What’s the threat model for NDN-NP? • Tradeoffs: – ANDaNA provides low latency anonymity – Mix networks could be used if NDN-NP can tolerate latency • Implementing confidentiality: – Confidentially must be left to applications. – Users don’t own the network, but can own overlays 51

ANDaNA: Onion Routing for NDN Steve DiBenedetto Colorado State - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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