and biosecurity in the Netherlands Dr. Marianne Donker Director - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Dual-use research of Concern and biosecurity in the Netherlands Dr. Marianne Donker Director Department of Public Health Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports Geneva, July 17, 2012

Responsibilities Dutch Government • Health, Welfare and Sports • Security and Justice • Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation • Foreign Affairs • Infrastructure and Environment • Education, Culture and Science • Social Affairs and Employment • Defense

Relevant Legislation Licensing/permits: COGEM research permits (GMO‟s) Non-proliferation: » Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention- Treaty » United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 » Export control – Australia Group » European Dual Use Regulation PIP-framework (Pandemic Influenza Preparedness) Academic Freedom 3

Problem at hand: a relevant dilemma • Dual Use dilemma: » security versus public health impact » security versus academic freedom • Distinction between: » publication of the specific H5N1 studies and more general „dual use‟ issues » long and short term issues and solutions 4

Short term: specific H5N1 paper(s) • Discussion on the Fouchier-paper: » Heavily debated: information subject to export control (Australia Group); » WHO experts opinion (2-2012); » International conference with countries involved (4-2012); » Export license granted by Netherlands government (4-April 2012); » Sander Herfst et al ., Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus Between Ferrets , Science 22 June 2012: Vol. 336 no. 6088 pp. 1534-1541 5

Long term issues to be addressed: • We have to consider next steps: » National (The Netherlands) » International 6

Challenges in regulation in the Netherlands • Currently no legal biosecurity-requirements. • Knowledge base on biosecurity among micro- biologists could be enhanced. • Limited overview of locations where Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC)-micro-organisms are available. • No legal base for notification of work with DURC-micro-organisms. • Policy on way of treating DURC research in phases of application, execution, publication inadequate. 7

National policy agenda • Reassess Code of Conduct for Biosecurity. • Strengthen legal base for biosecurity. Goals: » oversight, » communication » security requirements. • Create overview of DURC-locations. • Create legally binding biosecurity-requirements. 8

International questions • True “cross border issue” » National policy agenda needed; » Useless without international efforts; » Meetings like these will help us to formulate the international agenda. 9

Questions?