Altruistic behavior and social signaling: a study of an extreme example DIG Seminar De Caro (XVIIth), Sansom Destroying the https://www.shareicon.net House of Philistines ; from wikigallery.org Intern: Julien Panis-Lie Internship director: Jean-Louis Dessalles 1
Presentation structure Altruism (online): a theoretical puzzle Framework: costly signal theory Internship: altruistic suicide Preliminary results and two-tier model Perspectives 2
Presentation structure Altruism (online): a theoretical puzzle Framework: costly signal theory Internship: altruistic suicide Preliminary results and two-tier model Perspectives 3
Online altruistic behavior: Research question Images extracted from How can (online) https://www.shareicon.net altruistic behavior be explained from a theoretical standpoint? 4
Online altruistic behavior: Research question Images extracted from How can (online) https://www.shareicon.net altruistic behavior be Theoretical puzzle : explained from a - Economic angle: tragedy of the commons theoretical standpoint? (Hardin, 1968) - Biological angle: evolution and maintenance of prosocial behaviors? 5
Presentation structure Altruism (online): a theoretical puzzle Framework: costly signal theory Internship: altruistic suicide Preliminary results and two-tier model Perspectives 6
Costly signal theory Costly behavior Honest signal Delayed benefits Quality? Immediate benefits - Th. biology: Zahavi (1975), Grafen (1990) Individual (sender) - Economics: Veblen (1899), Spence (1974) Audience
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Costly signal theory Costly behavior Honest signal Delayed benefits Quality? Immediate benefits - Th. biology: Zahavi (1975), Grafen (1990) Individual (sender) - Economics: Veblen (1899), Spence (1974) Audience Competition => Honest signal Images extracted from Wikipedia; icon 9 from https://www.iconsdb.com
Helping others on Stack Overflow Profile: first moderator by alphabetical order Contributions Elected moderator (top 0.01%) 10
Helping others on Stack Overflow Profile: first moderator by alphabetical order Contributions Elected moderator (top 0.01%) Social benefits 11
Helping others on Stack Overflow Profile: first moderator by alphabetical order Audience: regular contributors Contributions Elected moderator (top 0.01%) Expertise Social signal Form social bonds Social benefits 12
Helping others on Stack Overflow Profile: first moderator by alphabetical order Audience: regular contributors Contributions Elected moderator (top 0.01%) Expertise Social signal Form social bonds Social benefits How can (online) altruistic behavior be explained from the standpoint of social signaling theory? 13
Presentation structure Altruism (online): a theoretical puzzle Framework: costly signal theory Internship: altruistic suicide Preliminary results and two-tier model Perspectives 14
Altruistic suicide Definition Voluntary behavior Results in death For the sake of a group 15
Altruistic suicide Definition Voluntary behavior Results in death For the sake of a group Advertising poster for the De Caro (XVIIth), Sansom Flag of Imperial Japan; from movie 300 ; from imdb.com Destroying the House of Philistines ; wikipedia.org from wikigallery.org 16
Altruistic suicide Definition Voluntary behavior Results in death For the sake of a group Context Recurrent in history For diverse groups Advertising poster for the movie 300 ; from imdb.com 17
Altruistic suicide Definition Voluntary behavior Results in death For the sake of a group Context Recurrent in history For diverse groups Seems tied to intergroup Whitehouse conflict (2018) Advertising poster for “Martyrs” are often Outcome the movie 300 ; from Durkheim (1897) revered imdb.com This may benefit their Blackwell (2008) family 18
Altruistic suicide as social signal? Costly behavior Honest signal Delayed benefits Quality? Individual (sender) Audience 19
Altruistic suicide as social signal? Costly behavior Honest signal Delayed benefits Patriotism Individual (sender) Audience 20
“Exogenous” model Costly behavior Honest signal Posthumous glory Patriotism Benefits to kin 21
“Exogenous” model Costly behavior Honest signal Posthumous glory Patriotism Benefits to kin During intergroup conflict “martyrs” Hypotheses are revered Social status is in part heritable (Service, 1971) Altruistic suicide may emerge as a Conjecture signal of one’s patriotism 22
Presentation structure Altruism (online): a theoretical puzzle Framework: costly signal theory Internship: altruistic suicide Preliminary results and two-tier model Perspectives 23
“Exogenous” model: results During intergroup conflict “martyrs” Hypotheses Admiration parameter are revered Social status is in part heritable Admiration for a “hero” spills (Service, 1971) over to children Altruistic suicide may emerge as a Gene: propensity to Conjecture signal of one’s patriotism self-sacrifice 24
“Exogenous” model: results During intergroup conflict “martyrs” Hypotheses Admiration parameter are revered Social status is in part heritable Admiration for a “hero” spills (Service, 1971) over to children Altruistic suicide may emerge as a Gene: propensity to Conjecture signal of one’s patriotism self-sacrifice 25
“Exogenous” model: results During intergroup conflict “martyrs” Hypotheses Admiration parameter are revered Social status is in part heritable Admiration for a “hero” spills (Service, 1971) over to children Altruistic suicide may emerge as a Gene: propensity to Conjecture signal of one’s patriotism self-sacrifice Under simplifying assumptions, a non-trivial Nash equilibrium exists, with: 26
“Endogenous” model: ideas Hypotheses Possible social signals Intergroup conflict: risk of ? betrayal by friends Indiv 1 Indiv 2 Group A Group = ? 27 27 Images taken from https://clipartxtras.com
“Endogenous” model: ideas Hypotheses Possible social signals Intergroup conflict: risk of Honor martyrs and their children to signal … ? betrayal by friends patriotism = hero Indiv 1 Indiv 2 Group A Group = ? 28 28 Images taken from https://clipartxtras.com
“Endogenous” model: ideas Hypotheses Possible social signals 2 = Intergroup conflict: risk of Honor martyrs and their children to signal … patriot betrayal by friends patriotism = hero Honoring is capped for potential ‘traitors’ Indiv 1 Indiv 2 Group A Group = ? 29 29 Images taken from https://clipartxtras.com
“Endogenous” model: ideas Hypotheses Possible social signals 2 = Intergroup conflict: risk of Honor martyrs and their children to signal … patriot betrayal by friends patriotism = hero Honoring is capped for potential ‘traitors’ Self-sacrifice as first-order signal During intergroup conflict, honoring and self-sacrifice may co-emerge , Conjecture notably depending on expected cost of betrayal 30 30 Images taken from https://clipartxtras.com
“Endogenous” model: results Hypotheses Parameter Intergroup conflict: risk of Proportion t/2 , betrayal cost DC Honoring is capped for Cap MO potential ‘traitors’ Possible social signals Altruistic suicide Gene1: Self-Sacrifice Gene2a: Patriot Honoring martyrs and their kin Gene2b: Non-Patriot Gene3: Demand
“Endogenous” model: results Hypotheses Parameter Intergroup conflict: risk of Proportion t/2 , betrayal cost DC Honoring is capped for Cap MO potential ‘traitors’ Possible social signals Altruistic suicide Gene1: Self-Sacrifice Gene2a: Patriot Honoring martyrs and their kin Gene2b: Non-Patriot Gene3: Demand
“Endogenous” model: results Hypotheses Parameter Intergroup conflict: risk of Proportion t/2 , betrayal cost DC Honoring is capped for Cap MO potential ‘traitors’ Possible social signals Altruistic suicide Gene1: Self-Sacrifice Gene2a: Patriot Honoring martyrs and their kin Gene2b: Non-Patriot Gene3: Demand
“Endogenous” model: results Hypotheses Parameter Intergroup conflict: risk of Proportion t/2 , betrayal cost DC Honoring is capped for Cap MO potential ‘traitors’ Possible social signals Altruistic suicide Gene1: Self-Sacrifice Gene2a: Patriot Honoring martyrs and their kin Gene2b: Non-Patriot Gene3: Demand
“Endogenous” model: results t = 25% t = 75%
“Endogenous” model: results Hypotheses Parameter Intergroup conflict: risk of Proportion t/2 , betrayal cost DC Honoring is capped for Cap MO potential ‘traitors’ Possible social signals Altruistic suicide Gene1: Self-Sacrifice Gene2a: Patriot Honoring martyrs and their kin Gene2b: Non-Patriot Gene3: Demand
Presentation structure Altruism (online): a theoretical puzzle Framework: costly signal theory Internship: altruistic suicide Preliminary results and two-tier model Perspectives 37
Conclusion Social Benefits Prediction First-order A small fraction of Posthumous glory signal “martyrs” emerges Second- Generalized order Friendship signaling; signal radicalization? Both levels are mutually reinforcing
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