Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory Lecture 12: Anytime Coalition Structure Generation Oskar Skibski University of Warsaw 19.05.2020
Coalition Structure Generation Coalition Structure Generation Find a partition of players π = {π ! , β¦ , π " } such that the sum of values of coalitions, i.e. π€ π ! + β― + π€(π " ) , is maximized. In other words: which coalition structure will form? 2 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Coalition Structure Generation The exact algorithms requires a lot of timeβ¦ Can we search through only a subset of coalition ? structures and be guaranteed to find a solution that is within a certain bound from the optimum? Let π β = arg max $βπ¬ ' π€(π) . ( $ β Can we find a subset π β π¬ π s.t. πΎ β₯ )*+ ( $ βΆ$βπ for every game (π, π€) ? We define: π€ π β bound π = min πΎ β β βΆ β !,# πΎ β₯ max π€ π βΆ π β π 3 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Coalition Structure Generation π¬ . (π) 1|2|3|4 π¬ / (π) 12|3|4 13|2|4 14|2|3 1|23|4 1|24|3 1|2|34 π¬ 0 (π) 123|4 124|3 134|2 1|234 12|34 13|24 14|23 π¬ ! (π) 1234 4 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Worst-case guarantee Minimal set with a bound [Sandholm et al. 1999] For π = π¬ ! π βͺ π¬ 0 π we have bound π = π , π = 2 12! , and π is the minimal set with bound smaller than β . Proof: On the blackboard. 5 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Worst-case guarantee Sketch of proof: Fix π 3 = arg max $βπ π€(π) and π β = arg max 4β' π€(π) . bound π β€ π : We know π€ π 3 β₯ π€ π β . Hence, β’ π€ π β β€ |π β | β π€ π β β€ |π β | β π€ π 3 β€ π β π€ π 3 . bound π β₯ π : Assume π€ π = 1 if π = 1 and π€ π = β’ 0 , oth. Then: π€ π 3 = 1 = ! = ! 1 π€(π β ) . 1 π€ 1 , β¦ , π = 2 12! . Clearly, π = π β π βΆ 1 β π β’ In every β¬ with bound β¬ β€ β we have at least 1 β’ partition for every coalition with player 1 (they do overlap, so cannot be in the same partition), so β¬ β₯ 2 12! . 6 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Worst-case guarantee What subset of coalition structures should we search ? next? 7 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Worst-case guarantee What subset of coalition structures should we search ? next? Improving the bound [Sandholm et al. 1999] For π = π¬ ! π βͺ π¬ 0 π βͺ π¬ 1 π and π > 3 we have bound π = βπ/2β . Proof: On the blackboard. 8 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Worst-case guarantee Sketch of proof: Assume π β contains π singletons { π ! , β¦ , π " } . If π = 0 , then π β β€ 1 0 and π€ π β β€ 1 0 β π€ π 3 . Assume π > 0 . β€ π€ π 3 . We know that π€ π ! , β¦ , π " β€ π€ 1 , β¦ , π 12" 12! Also, π β \{ π ! , β¦ , π " } β€ β€ . 0 0 Hence, π€ π β β€ + 1 π€ π 3 = 0 β π€ π 3 . 12! 1 0 9 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Worst-case guarantee Sketch of proof (continued): Assume π€ π = 1 if π = 2 and 1 β π, π€ {1} = 1 and π€ π = 0 , oth. Then: β’ π€ π 3 = 1 (since π > 3 ) = 1 β’ and π€ 1 , 2 , {3,4} β¦ , {π β 1, π} 0 if π is even, = 16! β’ and π€ 1 , {2,3} β¦ , {π β 1, π} 0 oth. 10 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Anytime CSG How to search through the coalition structures ? to improve the guarantee over time? 11 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Anytime CSG π / 1|2|3|4 13|2|4 π ! 1|23|4 14|2|3 12|3|4 π . 124|3 1|24|3 1|2|34 π 0 14|23 123|4 134|2 π 7 1|234 1234 12|34 13|24 12 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Anytime CSG How to search through the coalition structures ? to improve the guarantee over time? Anytime Coalition Structure Generation Divide the search space into subsets: π¬ π = π ! βͺ π 0 βͺ β― βͺ π " , such that: bound π ! β₯ bound π ! βͺ π 0 β₯ β― β― β₯ bound π ! βͺ β― βͺ π " = 1. 13 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Anytime CSG Anytime CSG-99 [Sandholm et al. 1999] 1. Search π¬ ! π . 2. Search π¬ 0 π 3. Search π¬ 1 π . 4. Search π¬ 12! π . 5. β¦ 6. Search π¬ / π . π ! = π¬ ! π , π 0 = π¬ 0 π , and π " = π¬ 16/2" π for 2 < π β€ π . 14 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Anytime CSG π / [1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1] π¬ ! (π) π . [2,1,1,1,1,1,1] π¬ " (π) π 7 [3,1,1,1,1,1] [2,2,1,1,1,1] π¬ # (π) π ; [2,2,2,1,1] [4,1,1,1,1] [3,2,1,1,1] π¬ $ (π) π < [5,1,1,1] [4,2,1,1] [3,3,1,1] [3,2,2,1] [2,2,2,2] π¬ % (π) π = [6,1,1] [5,2,1] [4,3,1] [3,3,2] [4,2,2] π¬ & (π) π 0 π¬ ' (π) [7,1] [6,2] [5,3] [4,4] π¬ ( (π) π ! [8] 15 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Anytime CSG Bounds for Anytime CSG-99 [Sandholm et al. 1999] Define β π = (π β π)/2 + 2 . After searching π¬ > π for π > 3 , the bound is β π/β(π) . Specifically, for π = π¬ ! π βͺ π¬ 0 π βͺ π¬ 1 π βͺ β― βͺ π¬ > π : bound π = 4 π/β(π) ππ π β‘ β1 πππ β π , π β‘ π πππ 2 , π/β(π) ππ’βππ π₯ππ‘π. Proof: On the blackboard. 16 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Anytime CSG Sketch of proof: β π = (π β π)/2 + 2 = π β π β 2 /2 + 1 is a number such that partition of the form: β’ [β π , β π β 1, 1, β¦ , 1] if 2 β€ π β π (case A) or β π , β π β 2, 1, β¦ , 1 if 2|π β π (case B) β’ appears in level π ([β¦] contains the list of sizes of coalitions). After searching level π we know that disjoint coalitions of sizes π and π such that π + π β€ π β π β 2 appeared in one partition. 17 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Anytime CSG Sketch of proof (continued): Lower bound for the bound: Let π = π mod β π = π β π/β(π) β β π . Consider partition π β of the form [β π , β(π), β¦ , β π , π ] and game π€ π = 1 if π = β(π) . We have: π€ π β = π/β(π) and π€ πβ² = 1 . Thus, bound π β₯ π/β(π) . If we have case B (i.e., 2|π β π ) and π = β π β 1 , then by adding π€ π = 1 for one specific coalition of size π we get: bound π β₯ βπ/β(π)β + 1 = βπ/β(π)β 18 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Anytime CSG Sketch of proof (continued): Upper bound for the bound: To see that bound π β€ π/β(π) consider the game (π, π€) such that π€ π β /π€(π 3 ) is the highest. We can assume that π€ π = 0 for every π β π β . Also, we can assume that π 3 β© π β = 1 : if π, π 3 β π 3 β© π β , then replacing π, π 3 with π βͺ π 3 and defining game analogously would result in the same value π€ π β /π€(π 3 ) . 19 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Anytime CSG Sketch of proof (continued): Now, since π 3 β© π β = 1 it means that in π β there are no two coalitions that appeared in the same partition considered so far. Hence, we get the limit on the number of such coalitions. In case A or case B where π β β π β 1 , we get maximum βπ/β π β coalitions for: β π , β π , β¦ , β π , β π + π . In case B with π β β π β 1 , we get maximum βπ/β π β coalitions for: β π , β π , β¦ , β π , β π β 1 This implies our thesis. 20 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
Anytime CSG Define: π¬ ?@ π = π β π¬ π βΆ π > 2, max 4β$ π β₯ π . Anytime CSG-04 [Dang & Jennings 2004] 1. Search π¬ ! π . 2. Search π¬ 0 π . 3. Search π¬ 1 π . 4. Search π¬ ?120 π . 5. β¦ 6. Search π¬ ?0 π . Since many of this steps will not improve the bound, the authors considered π¬ ?β1(@2!)/@β π for π from β(π + 1)/4β down to 2 and then search the remaining coalition structures. 21 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory
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