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Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory Lecture 12: Anytime Coalition Structure Generation Oskar Skibski University of Warsaw 19.05.2020 Coalition Structure Generation Coalition Structure Generation Find a partition of players = { ! ,


  1. Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory Lecture 12: Anytime Coalition Structure Generation Oskar Skibski University of Warsaw 19.05.2020

  2. Coalition Structure Generation Coalition Structure Generation Find a partition of players 𝑄 = {𝑇 ! , … , 𝑇 " } such that the sum of values of coalitions, i.e. 𝑀 𝑇 ! + β‹― + 𝑀(𝑇 " ) , is maximized. In other words: which coalition structure will form? 2 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  3. Coalition Structure Generation The exact algorithms requires a lot of time… Can we search through only a subset of coalition ? structures and be guaranteed to find a solution that is within a certain bound from the optimum? Let 𝑄 βˆ— = arg max $βˆˆπ’¬ ' 𝑀(𝑄) . ( $ βˆ— Can we find a subset 𝒝 βŠ† 𝒬 𝑂 s.t. 𝛾 β‰₯ )*+ ( $ ∢$βˆˆπ’ for every game (𝑂, 𝑀) ? We define: 𝑀 𝑄 βˆ— bound 𝒝 = min 𝛾 ∈ ℝ ∢ βˆ€ !,# 𝛾 β‰₯ max 𝑀 𝑄 ∢ 𝑄 ∈ 𝒝 3 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  4. Coalition Structure Generation 𝒬 . (𝑂) 1|2|3|4 𝒬 / (𝑂) 12|3|4 13|2|4 14|2|3 1|23|4 1|24|3 1|2|34 𝒬 0 (𝑂) 123|4 124|3 134|2 1|234 12|34 13|24 14|23 𝒬 ! (𝑂) 1234 4 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  5. Worst-case guarantee Minimal set with a bound [Sandholm et al. 1999] For 𝒝 = 𝒬 ! 𝑂 βˆͺ 𝒬 0 𝑂 we have bound 𝒝 = π‘œ , 𝒝 = 2 12! , and 𝒝 is the minimal set with bound smaller than ∞ . Proof: On the blackboard. 5 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  6. Worst-case guarantee Sketch of proof: Fix 𝑄 3 = arg max $βˆˆπ’ 𝑀(𝑄) and 𝑇 βˆ— = arg max 4βŠ†' 𝑀(𝑇) . bound 𝒝 ≀ π‘œ : We know 𝑀 𝑄 3 β‰₯ 𝑀 𝑇 βˆ— . Hence, β€’ 𝑀 𝑄 βˆ— ≀ |𝑄 βˆ— | β‹… 𝑀 𝑇 βˆ— ≀ |𝑄 βˆ— | β‹… 𝑀 𝑄 3 ≀ π‘œ β‹… 𝑀 𝑄 3 . bound 𝒝 β‰₯ π‘œ : Assume 𝑀 𝑇 = 1 if 𝑇 = 1 and 𝑀 𝑇 = β€’ 0 , oth. Then: 𝑀 𝑄 3 = 1 = ! = ! 1 𝑀(𝑄 βˆ— ) . 1 𝑀 1 , … , π‘œ = 2 12! . Clearly, 𝒝 = 𝑇 βŠ† 𝑂 ∢ 1 ∈ 𝑇 β€’ In every ℬ with bound ℬ ≀ ∞ we have at least 1 β€’ partition for every coalition with player 1 (they do overlap, so cannot be in the same partition), so ℬ β‰₯ 2 12! . 6 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  7. Worst-case guarantee What subset of coalition structures should we search ? next? 7 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  8. Worst-case guarantee What subset of coalition structures should we search ? next? Improving the bound [Sandholm et al. 1999] For 𝒝 = 𝒬 ! 𝑂 βˆͺ 𝒬 0 𝑂 βˆͺ 𝒬 1 𝑂 and π‘œ > 3 we have bound 𝒝 = βŒˆπ‘œ/2βŒ‰ . Proof: On the blackboard. 8 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  9. Worst-case guarantee Sketch of proof: Assume 𝑄 βˆ— contains 𝑙 singletons { 𝑗 ! , … , 𝑗 " } . If 𝑙 = 0 , then 𝑄 βˆ— ≀ 1 0 and 𝑀 𝑄 βˆ— ≀ 1 0 β‹… 𝑀 𝑄 3 . Assume 𝑙 > 0 . ≀ 𝑀 𝑄 3 . We know that 𝑀 𝑗 ! , … , 𝑗 " ≀ 𝑀 1 , … , π‘œ 12" 12! Also, 𝑄 βˆ— \{ 𝑗 ! , … , 𝑗 " } ≀ ≀ . 0 0 Hence, 𝑀 𝑄 βˆ— ≀ + 1 𝑀 𝑄 3 = 0 β‹… 𝑀 𝑄 3 . 12! 1 0 9 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  10. Worst-case guarantee Sketch of proof (continued): Assume 𝑀 𝑇 = 1 if 𝑇 = 2 and 1 βˆ‰ 𝑇, 𝑀 {1} = 1 and 𝑀 𝑇 = 0 , oth. Then: β€’ 𝑀 𝑄 3 = 1 (since π‘œ > 3 ) = 1 β€’ and 𝑀 1 , 2 , {3,4} … , {π‘œ βˆ’ 1, π‘œ} 0 if π‘œ is even, = 16! β€’ and 𝑀 1 , {2,3} … , {π‘œ βˆ’ 1, π‘œ} 0 oth. 10 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  11. Anytime CSG How to search through the coalition structures ? to improve the guarantee over time? 11 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  12. Anytime CSG 𝒝 / 1|2|3|4 13|2|4 𝒝 ! 1|23|4 14|2|3 12|3|4 𝒝 . 124|3 1|24|3 1|2|34 𝒝 0 14|23 123|4 134|2 𝒝 7 1|234 1234 12|34 13|24 12 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  13. Anytime CSG How to search through the coalition structures ? to improve the guarantee over time? Anytime Coalition Structure Generation Divide the search space into subsets: 𝒬 𝑂 = 𝒝 ! βˆͺ 𝒝 0 βˆͺ β‹― βˆͺ 𝒝 " , such that: bound 𝒝 ! β‰₯ bound 𝒝 ! βˆͺ 𝒝 0 β‰₯ β‹― β‹― β‰₯ bound 𝒝 ! βˆͺ β‹― βˆͺ 𝒝 " = 1. 13 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  14. Anytime CSG Anytime CSG-99 [Sandholm et al. 1999] 1. Search 𝒬 ! 𝑂 . 2. Search 𝒬 0 𝑂 3. Search 𝒬 1 𝑂 . 4. Search 𝒬 12! 𝑂 . 5. … 6. Search 𝒬 / 𝑂 . 𝒝 ! = 𝒬 ! 𝑂 , 𝒝 0 = 𝒬 0 𝑂 , and 𝒝 " = 𝒬 16/2" 𝑂 for 2 < 𝑙 ≀ π‘œ . 14 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  15. Anytime CSG 𝒝 / [1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1] 𝒬 ! (𝑂) 𝒝 . [2,1,1,1,1,1,1] 𝒬 " (𝑂) 𝒝 7 [3,1,1,1,1,1] [2,2,1,1,1,1] 𝒬 # (𝑂) 𝒝 ; [2,2,2,1,1] [4,1,1,1,1] [3,2,1,1,1] 𝒬 $ (𝑂) 𝒝 < [5,1,1,1] [4,2,1,1] [3,3,1,1] [3,2,2,1] [2,2,2,2] 𝒬 % (𝑂) 𝒝 = [6,1,1] [5,2,1] [4,3,1] [3,3,2] [4,2,2] 𝒬 & (𝑂) 𝒝 0 𝒬 ' (𝑂) [7,1] [6,2] [5,3] [4,4] 𝒬 ( (𝑂) 𝒝 ! [8] 15 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  16. Anytime CSG Bounds for Anytime CSG-99 [Sandholm et al. 1999] Define β„Ž π‘š = (π‘œ βˆ’ π‘š)/2 + 2 . After searching 𝒬 > 𝑂 for π‘š > 3 , the bound is β‰ˆ π‘œ/β„Ž(π‘š) . Specifically, for 𝒝 = 𝒬 ! 𝑂 βˆͺ 𝒬 0 𝑂 βˆͺ 𝒬 1 𝑂 βˆͺ β‹― βˆͺ 𝒬 > 𝑂 : bound 𝒝 = 4 π‘œ/β„Ž(π‘š) 𝑗𝑔 π‘œ ≑ βˆ’1 𝑛𝑝𝑒 β„Ž π‘š , π‘œ ≑ π‘š 𝑛𝑝𝑒 2 , π‘œ/β„Ž(π‘š) π‘π‘’β„Žπ‘“π‘ π‘₯𝑗𝑑𝑓. Proof: On the blackboard. 16 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  17. Anytime CSG Sketch of proof: β„Ž π‘š = (π‘œ βˆ’ π‘š)/2 + 2 = π‘œ βˆ’ π‘š βˆ’ 2 /2 + 1 is a number such that partition of the form: β€’ [β„Ž π‘š , β„Ž π‘š βˆ’ 1, 1, … , 1] if 2 ∀ π‘œ βˆ’ π‘š (case A) or β„Ž π‘š , β„Ž π‘š βˆ’ 2, 1, … , 1 if 2|π‘œ βˆ’ π‘š (case B) β€’ appears in level π‘š ([…] contains the list of sizes of coalitions). After searching level π‘š we know that disjoint coalitions of sizes 𝑗 and π‘˜ such that 𝑗 + π‘˜ ≀ π‘œ βˆ’ π‘š βˆ’ 2 appeared in one partition. 17 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  18. Anytime CSG Sketch of proof (continued): Lower bound for the bound: Let 𝑠 = π‘œ mod β„Ž π‘š = π‘œ βˆ’ π‘œ/β„Ž(π‘š) β‹… β„Ž π‘š . Consider partition 𝑄 βˆ— of the form [β„Ž π‘š , β„Ž(π‘š), … , β„Ž π‘š , 𝑠] and game 𝑀 𝑇 = 1 if 𝑇 = β„Ž(π‘š) . We have: 𝑀 𝑄 βˆ— = π‘œ/β„Ž(π‘š) and 𝑀 𝑄′ = 1 . Thus, bound 𝒝 β‰₯ π‘œ/β„Ž(π‘š) . If we have case B (i.e., 2|π‘œ βˆ’ π‘š ) and 𝑠 = β„Ž π‘š βˆ’ 1 , then by adding 𝑀 𝑇 = 1 for one specific coalition of size 𝑠 we get: bound 𝒝 β‰₯ βŒŠπ‘œ/β„Ž(π‘š)βŒ‹ + 1 = βŒˆπ‘œ/β„Ž(π‘š)βŒ‰ 18 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  19. Anytime CSG Sketch of proof (continued): Upper bound for the bound: To see that bound 𝒝 ≀ π‘œ/β„Ž(π‘š) consider the game (𝑂, 𝑀) such that 𝑀 𝑄 βˆ— /𝑀(𝑄 3 ) is the highest. We can assume that 𝑀 𝑇 = 0 for every 𝑇 βˆ‰ 𝑄 βˆ— . Also, we can assume that 𝑄 3 ∩ 𝑄 βˆ— = 1 : if 𝑇, 𝑇 3 ∈ 𝑄 3 ∩ 𝑄 βˆ— , then replacing 𝑇, 𝑇 3 with 𝑇 βˆͺ 𝑇 3 and defining game analogously would result in the same value 𝑀 𝑄 βˆ— /𝑀(𝑄 3 ) . 19 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  20. Anytime CSG Sketch of proof (continued): Now, since 𝑄 3 ∩ 𝑄 βˆ— = 1 it means that in 𝑄 βˆ— there are no two coalitions that appeared in the same partition considered so far. Hence, we get the limit on the number of such coalitions. In case A or case B where 𝑠 β‰  β„Ž π‘š βˆ’ 1 , we get maximum βŒŠπ‘œ/β„Ž π‘š βŒ‹ coalitions for: β„Ž π‘š , β„Ž π‘š , … , β„Ž π‘š , β„Ž π‘š + 𝑠 . In case B with 𝑠 β‰  β„Ž π‘š βˆ’ 1 , we get maximum βŒˆπ‘œ/β„Ž π‘š βŒ‰ coalitions for: β„Ž π‘š , β„Ž π‘š , … , β„Ž π‘š , β„Ž π‘š βˆ’ 1 This implies our thesis. 20 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

  21. Anytime CSG Define: 𝒬 ?@ 𝑂 = 𝑄 ∈ 𝒬 𝑂 ∢ 𝑄 > 2, max 4∈$ 𝑇 β‰₯ π‘Ÿ . Anytime CSG-04 [Dang & Jennings 2004] 1. Search 𝒬 ! 𝑂 . 2. Search 𝒬 0 𝑂 . 3. Search 𝒬 1 𝑂 . 4. Search 𝒬 ?120 𝑂 . 5. … 6. Search 𝒬 ?0 𝑂 . Since many of this steps will not improve the bound, the authors considered 𝒬 ?⌈1(@2!)/@βŒ‰ 𝑂 for π‘Ÿ from ⌊(π‘œ + 1)/4βŒ‹ down to 2 and then search the remaining coalition structures. 21 Oskar Skibski (UW) Algorithmic Coalitional Game Theory

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