a toolkit for metainferential logics
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A toolkit for metainferential logics David Ripley Monash University - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

A toolkit for metainferential logics David Ripley Monash University http://davewripley.rocks Introduction Introduction Whats up? Some exciting recent work in higher metainferences: BPS A hierarchy (Meta)inferential


  1. A toolkit for metainferential logics David Ripley Monash University http://davewripley.rocks

  2. Introduction

  3. Introduction What’s up? Some exciting recent work in higher metainferences: • BPS ‘A hierarchy…’ ‘(Meta)inferential levels…’ • Pailos ‘A fully classical…’ • Scambler ‘Classical logic…’ • and more

  4. Introduction What’s up? Much of this work is tied to particular languages, models, and logics. But there is plenty of structure here, already being put to good use in this work, that is perfectly general.

  5. Introduction What’s up? My goal for this talk, then, is to explore how much of this work can be done as abstractly as possible. In particular, I will reconstruct the ST hierarchy and show that it matches two-valued classical logic without mentioning values, connectives, etc until the very end

  6. Introduction What’s up? Throughout, the results are mostly not new; they are lifted from the above-mentioned works. The point is to see just how much structure higher metainferences give us

  7. Introduction Language all I assume is that it is a set. For most of the talk, L is any language;

  8. Introduction Levels • • (Numbering in line with Pailos, not BPS/Scambler.) ℓ ranges over levels: − 1 , 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . A meta − 1 inference is a member of L A meta ℓ + 1 inference is [Γ � ∆] , where Γ and ∆ are sets of meta ℓ inferences These are the metainferences.

  9. Counterexamples and consequence

  10. Counterexamples and consequence Counterexample relations I assume some fixed set of models. a relation between models and metainferences This is all ‘local’! A meta ℓ counterexample relation is: a relation between models and meta ℓ inferences A full counterexample relation is:

  11. Counterexamples and consequence Counterexample relations I assume some fixed set of models. a relation between models and metainferences This is all ‘local’! A meta ℓ counterexample relation is: a relation between models and meta ℓ inferences A full counterexample relation is:

  12. Counterexamples and consequence Counterexample relations We can give a full counterexample relation X Given a full counterexample relation X and a level ℓ , the meta ℓ counterexample relation X ( ℓ ) is: the restriction of X in its codomain to meta ℓ inferences by specifying X ( ℓ ) for each level ℓ

  13. Counterexamples and consequence Counterexample relations are all counterexample relations (XRs) the model is a counterexample to the metainference (The brackets are to help keep our eyes from getting hairy.) Meta ℓ counterexample relations and full counterexample relations Given counterexample relation X, model m , and metainference µ , m � X � µ means that X relates m to µ :

  14. Counterexamples and consequence Consequence relations A full consequence relation is a set of metainferences. A meta ℓ consequence relation is a set of meta ℓ inferences

  15. Counterexamples and consequence Consequence relations are all consequence relations (CRs) Given a full consequence relation Σ and a level ℓ , the meta n consequence relation Σ( n ) is Σ restricted to meta ℓ inferences We can give a full consequence relation Σ by specifying Σ( ℓ ) for each level ℓ . Meta ℓ consequence relations and full consequence relations

  16. Counterexamples and consequence Pontificating Keeping an eye on both counterexample relations Probably what we care about is consequence relations. But much of the new metainferential technology requires counterexample relations due to the use of local validity and consequence relations is key.

  17. Counterexamples and consequence Consequence from counterexamples Given a full counterexample relation X, the full consequence relation Given a meta ℓ counterexample relation X, the meta ℓ consequence relation C ( X ) is the set of meta ℓ inferences not in the image of X. C ( X ) is the set of metainferences not in the image of X.

  18. Counterexamples and consequence Consequence from counterexamples It is familiar to fix a counterexample relation and explore effects on consequence relations of restricting or expanding the class of models. This is the reverse: our models are fixed, and it is shifting counterexample relations that effects consequence. (Shifting counterexample relations can simulate restricting models)

  19. Counterexamples and consequence Already some structure This all assumes nothing about the language, about models, etc. (We don’t even have monotonicity of consequence relations!) But there’s already enough here to see some structure and prove some simple results.

  20. Counterexamples and consequence Already some structure Fact Full XRs Full CRs For any full counterexample relation X and level ℓ , C ( X ( ℓ )) = C ( X )( ℓ ) _ ( ℓ ) ℓ XRs C ( _ ) C ( _ ) _ ( ℓ ) ℓ CRs

  21. Counterexamples and consequence Already some structure Example (meta 0 counterexample relations: ST and CL CL) If we care about counterexample: giving just a consequence relation isn’t enough. If we care about consequence: asking for a particular counterexample relation is asking too much There can be distinct counterexample relations X , Y such that C ( X ) = C ( Y ) . full counterexample relations: ST ω and �

  22. Connections between levels

  23. Connections between levels Lowering Given a meta ℓ + 1 counterexample relation X, its lowering ↓ X is the meta ℓ counterexample relation such that for any model m and any meta ℓ inference µ , m � ↓ X � µ iff m � X � [ � µ ] . Given a meta ℓ + 1 consequence relation Σ , its lowering ↓ Σ is the meta ℓ consequence relation such that for any meta ℓ inference µ , µ ∈ ↓ Σ iff [ � µ ] ∈ Σ

  24. Connections between levels Lowering Fact For any meta ℓ + 1 counterexample relation X, C ( ↓ X ) = ↓ C ( X ) . ↓ _ ( ℓ + 1 ) XRs ℓ XRs C ( _ ) C ( _ ) ↓ _ ( ℓ + 1 ) CRs ℓ CRs

  25. Connections between levels Lifting counterexample relations Given a meta ℓ counterexample relation X, its lifting ↑ X is the meta ℓ + 1 counterexample relation such that for any model m and any meta n + 1 inference [Γ � ∆] , m � ↑ X � [Γ � ∆] iff: there is no γ ∈ Γ with m � X � γ , and m � X � δ for all δ ∈ ∆

  26. Connections between levels Lifting counterexample relations Unlike lowering, we cannot lift consequence relations in a way that matches lifing for counterexample relations. (At level 0, ST and CL are such.) There can be meta ℓ counterexample relations X and Y with C ( X ) = C ( Y ) but C ( ↑ X ) ̸ = C ( ↑ Y ) . So there cannot be any operation ↑ on consequence relations such that in general ↑ C ( X ) = C ( ↑ X ) .

  27. Connections between levels Lifting counterexample relations Lifting depends on information carried by a counterexample relation they have not thereby settled that is not there in the consequence relation it determines Or: if someone specifies just a meta ℓ consequence relation, on any particular meta ℓ + 1 consequence relation

  28. Connections between levels Slashing counterexample relations Lifting is a special case of slashing: So X is X X Given a meta ℓ counterexample relation X, its lifting ↑ X is the meta ℓ + 1 counterexample relation such that for any model m and any meta n + 1 inference [Γ � ∆] , m � ↑ X � [Γ � ∆] iff: there is no γ ∈ Γ with m � X � γ , and m � X � δ for all δ ∈ ∆ .

  29. Connections between levels Slashing counterexample relations Lifting is a special case of slashing: Given two meta ℓ counterexample relations X and Y, their slashing X/Y is the meta ℓ + 1 counterexample relation such that for any model m and any meta n + 1 inference [Γ � ∆] , m � X / Y � [Γ � ∆] iff: there is no γ ∈ Γ with m � X � γ , and m � Y � δ for all δ ∈ ∆ . So X ↑ is X / X

  30. Connections between levels Slashing counterexample relations Slashing is key in work on higher metainferences. Just as with lifting, there is no corresponding operation on consequence relations. This depends on the extra detail carried by counterexample relations.

  31. Connections between levels Lowering, lifting, slashing Fact Fact So lowering is a retraction of lifting: Fact Lifting is injective; lowering is not injective and so not invertible For any meta ℓ counterexample relations X , Y: ↓ ( X / Y ) = Y that is, for any meta ℓ counterexample relation X, we have ↓ ( ↑ X ) = X

  32. Excursion 1: more on slashing

  33. Connections between levels Tonicity and distribution Slashing has some exploitable structure fact fact ( X / Z ) ∪ ( Y / Z ) ⊆ ( X ∩ Y ) / Z ( X / Z ) ∩ ( Y / Z ) = ( X ∪ Y ) / Z ( Z / X ) ∪ ( Z / Y ) ⊆ Z / ( X ∪ Y ) ( Z / X ) ∩ ( Z / Y ) = Z / ( X ∩ Y )

  34. Connections between levels Tonicity and distribution The following is enough to settle a great deal: fact fact (So lifting is not monotonic) If X ′ ⊆ X and Z ⊆ Z ′ , then X / Z ⊆ X ′ / Z ′ If X / Z ⊆ X ′ / Z ′ , then X ′ ⊆ X and Z ⊆ Z ′

  35. Connections between levels Tonicity and distribution (More counterexamples at the top) All are distinct; all inclusions shown SS TT ST TS For any XRs T ⊊ S:

  36. Connections between levels TS/SS TT/ST TT/TS TT/SS TS/TT TS/ST TS/TS ST/TT Tonicity and distribution ST/ST ST/TS ST/SS SS/TT SS/ST SS/TS SS/SS TT/TT

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