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1 What difference does education make? Education expansion and rapid cohort fertility decline in Thailand, 1970 2010 Thananon Buathong 1,3 Wiraporn Pothisiri 2 Raya Muttarak 3 Mujaheed Shaikh 4 Abstract Most previous studies have shown that


  1. 1 What difference does education make? Education expansion and rapid cohort fertility decline in Thailand, 1970 – 2010 Thananon Buathong 1,3 Wiraporn Pothisiri 2 Raya Muttarak 3 Mujaheed Shaikh 4 Abstract Most previous studies have shown that increased female education is one of the most important factors explaining the rapidly fertility transition. Little is known about the changing association between education and cohort fertility in developing countries which have already experienced the rapid fertility transition. Using data from Thailand Population and Housing Censuses for the years 1970 to 2010 based on the sample of ever-married women aged 45- 54 years, we analyze completed marital fertility of women born between 1916 and 1965. Results show that completed marital fertility declined sharply from 6.42 for the 1916 birth cohort to 2.06 for the 1956 birth cohort because of the family planning policy in 1970s. Meanwhile, the proportion of women in the sample with no education declined sharply from 50% to 6%, but the highest educational level of the majority in the sample is less than primary. The changes in education-specific cohort fertility rate accounted for 85% of the change in completed marital fertility between the oldest and youngest birth cohorts, while only 15% is attributable to the expansion of female education attainment, the decline in the proportion of women with no education. However, the effect of educational composition change became more important, accounted for 25% of the change in cohort fertility between the two recent cohorts. Multivariate analysis confirms the pattern of fertility differentials by education level appear to the “permanent - differences” model (i.e. educational differentials persist throughout the transition) rather than the “leader - follower” model (i.e. diminishing educational differentials as the transition advances). Keyword: Education differentials, Cohort fertility, Decompose, Thailand 1 Chulalongkorn university, Thailand 2 College of Population studies, Chulalongkorn university, Thailand 3 Wittgenstein Centre (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU), Austria 4 Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria

  2. 2 1. Introduction Thailand experienced one of the most rapidly fertility decline of any developing countries in the late 20 th century (Jones, 2011). The number of children ever-born over the reproductive life of Thai women dropped from six on average in 1970 to the replacement level in two decades later. After that the period TFR sustain declined to 1.5 children per woman (UN World population prospect 2015). Previous study indicated that the rapid reduction in the number of children ever-born to ever-married women was the main driver of the period fertility rate dropped to replacement level in Thailand (Hirschman, Tan, Chamratrithirong, & Guest, 1994). Meanwhile, family planning and contraceptive use program in the 1970s was the main cause of marital fertility drop in Thailand (Knodel, Chamratrithirong, & Debavalya, 1987). In the literature on fertility transition, effect of education attainment was extensively studied (Kravdal, 2002). An increase in the education level of women is regarded as one of the key factors explaining the decline in fertility level (Berrington & Pattaro, 2014). There were two plausible paths regarding how the educational differentials in fertility changes over time in developing countries i.e. 1) the “permanent difference” model; or 2) the “leader - follower” model (Bongaarts, 2003). The permanent-difference model was based on the microeconomic perspective. According to these, fertility was influenced by socioeconomic conditions and fertility decline is a natural response to incompatibility of education and work under the changing social and economic structures. The main mechanism underlying negative relationship between education and fertility was related to relative disadvantage of highly educated women in childbearing (Basu, 2002; Cleland, 2002). Therefore, in this context, educational differentials remain significant throughout the fertility transition. On the other hand, the leader-follower model holds that fertility differentials by level of education were a transient phenomenon and fertility level will converge to the same level at the end of the fertility transition (Bongaarts, 2003; Cleland, 2002). This model was based on the theory of diffusion whereby the most educated women make the fertility transition earlier than the least educated, but eventually the norm of small family size and birth control use would become widespread and then diffuse to all segments of the society (Casterline, 2001; Rosero-Bixby & Casterline, 1993). Evidences based on summarizes patterns of educational differentials at different stages of the fertility transition in less developed countries indicated that educational differentials still exist

  3. 3 at the post stage of transition and the educational composition remains a key predictor of overall fertility in late transitional countries (Bongaarts, 2003). However, the results from rapid cohort fertility transition in South Korea shown that the leader-follower model was the suitable model and the widespread of norm of small family size and birth control used from highly educated to less educated was the possible explanations (Yoo, 2014). Yet, little is known about the possible changing association between female education and cohort fertility in Thailand, a middle-income country with rapid fertility decline and substantial educational expansion. To this end, this paper aimed to investigate the association between female education and completed marital fertility in Thailand and how this association has changed during the fertility transition. It was particular importance to gain more knowledge about the changing association between female education attainment and cohort fertility in developing countries where female education has been rising constantly over time while fertility level has been declining. Moreover, observed changing association, if any, will be valuable for population projection, especially in terms of fertility assumption by level of education. 2. Social and economic development during fertility transition in Thailand In this section provide contextual overview, in order to understand the process of fertility transition in Thailand that might drove changes in preexisting conditions that contributed to the drastic fertility decline in the country. Before 1960, Thailand was characterized by high child mortality, high fertility and low-income country. After that Thailand also experienced a sharp decline in child mortality from 148 per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 95 per 1,000 live births a decade later owing to the expansion of primary health-care infrastructure nationwide (Vapattanawong et al., 2007). Consequently, the annual natural population growth rate was considerably high (approximately 3%). The country had been ruled by military viewed on fertility. In 1970, the Thai government launched the National Family Planning Program following the World Bank recommendations to reduce the population growth rate by promoting voluntary modern contraceptive use. At the same time, in the Third Social and Economic Development Plan aimed to transform Thailand from agricultural to an industrial society. In the short term, the plan focused on infrastructure investment and emphasized elementary and vocational education to produce skilled workers. In 1977, there is the change in education policy in Thailand. Since 1977/1978, compulsory education had extended to six years, covering complete primary education. It was the first

  4. 4 time that had been strictly implemented throughout the whole country. Primary schools were transferred back from the Ministry of Interior Affairs to the Ministry of Education, and most major movement within the reform was the establishment of primary schools in every single village for the first time. A sharp increase of the supply of primary schooling by the state in 1977/78 is evidently reflected by a sharp rise in the number of teachers per 1000 children during the period of 1970 to 2000 (Chankrajang & Muttarak, 2017). In late 1980s, Thailand became a middle-income economy and period fertility rate dropped to replacement levels. Rapid social and economic development and successful government-run family planning programs together with a unique cultural setting contributed to radical fertility in Thailand was the key of fertility decline. Generally, childbearing decisions making in Thailand was taken by couples themselves, with minimal influence by other family members and absence of strong parental and kin pressure to have large families. Likewise, the teachings of Thai Buddhism – a religion practiced by 95% of the Thai population, posed no major barriers to contraceptive use (Knodel et al. 1986; Skirbekk et al. 2015). Figure 1: Population pyramid by education level, Thailand, 1970-2050 Thailand 2050 Thailand 1970 Thailand 2010 Projected Observed Observed Source: Wittgenstein Centre Data Explorer, accessed September 8, 2017. http://witt.null2.net/shiny/wic/ The effect of social and economic development on fertility was increased the direct cost of children and reduced benefit of children as labor in farm. Consequently, Thais parent tend to reduce the desired family size and trade off by invest more education for their kid (Knodel et al., 1987). Recent literature shows rapidly education expansion in Thailand (see Figure 1) and if the enrolment rates remained constant as in the year 2000, next three decades, more than 70% of Thai would graduate at least secondary school (KC et al., 2010).

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