WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Wide Area Environmental Sampling in Iran An Order of Magnitude study 13 November 2006 Garry B. Dillon Former Leader IAEA Iraq Action Team

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Center ANY QUESTIONS? The one thing we learn from experience is We don’t learn from experience

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Conclusions THE TIME IS LONG GONE WHEN WIDE AREA ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING (WAES) APPROACHING THE SCOPE AND VIGOUR OF WIDE AREA MONITORING IN IRAQ COULD BE IMPOSED ON IRAN.

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre News Flash In the celebrations to mark Iran’s voluntary acceptance of WAES the Tehran crowds were treated to a breathtaking display of aerobatics by the national porcine aviation squadron.

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Conclusions

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Conclusions IT COULD BE ASSUMED THAT COUNTRY-WIDE ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING (CWES) IS MOST PROBABLY A NON-STARTER

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Conclusions IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO ASSUME IT DESERVES TO BE TECHNICALLY PROVEN

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Conclusions Clearly it would be preferred if Iran would decide to terminate its enrichment program before it progresses to production-scale

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Conclusions Option exists for Iran to terminate its enrichment program “with dignity” It could declare its pilot-scale program a success having provided a sound basis for the rapid establishment of a production-scale plant - if necessary Necessity caused by indications of difficulties (political or economic) in the supply of LEU reactor fuel

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Conclusions The only available option might be to accept Iran’s enrichment program in exchange for Iran’s active co-operation in the robust implementation of the Additional Protocol

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Conclusions If this option is unacceptable then logically, it follows that, even “Strengthened” IAEA Safeguards are not fit for purpose. Time to fold up our tents and go home?

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Legal basis Articles 5.c & 6.d of the Additional Protocol would enable the IAEA to implement a robust monitoring program in Iran

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Relevant rights IAEA would have the right to conduct: SPECIAL INSPECTIONS (INFCIRC/153) PLUS LOCATION SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING OTHER OBJECTIVE MEASURES

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre OBJECTIVE MEASURES Visual Observation Radiation detection & measurement Other objective measures as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Technologies established in Iraq - end 1998 LOW PROFILE Radiation measurement Facility interior / exterior smear sampling Water & Vegetation sampling Aerosol sampling (“fixed” and mobile) Road-vehicle-borne gamma survey Fluorine detection (under consideration)

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Environmental deposition concentrators

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Technologies established in Iraq - end 1998 MORE INTRUSIVE Helicopter-borne gamma survey Fixed-wing-aircraft-borne gamma survey (in development) Neutron survey – all platforms (in development)

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Verification activities under the Additional Protocol – Helicopter gamma survey

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre No! It says NON-destructive!

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Legal basis Article 9 of the Additional Protocol would provide the IAEA Board of Governors the RIGHT to implement Wide Area Environmental Sampling in Iran

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Some numbers for 2005 Country Area Population GDP Million sq. km Millions $ Billions Iran 1.65 68.7 570/181 Iraq 0.44 27 94/47 UK 0.25 61 1,818 USA 9.63 298 12,310 DSG negligible .002 0.121

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre ????????? 0.00001%

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Some more numbers for 2004 DSG budget including voluntary 121.2 contributions M$ Number of inspections carried out – 2,199 interim statements – results/conclusions Number of calendar days in the field used 14,544 in these inspections Notional cost per inspection $55,116 Notional cost per calendar day in the $8,333 field

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre DISCLAIMER! The data in the following table are produced simply to illustrate operational costs and should not be interpreted to suggest that the exampled network is capable of providing meaningful detection sensitivities .

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre CWES in Iran Table 2a Detection Range 100 km Number of air sampling stations 400 Equipment & installation cost per unit $10,000 Amortisation period years 3 Equipment & installation cost per year $1,333,000 Service visits/year/installation 26 Servicing capacity (units/day – 2 person team) 3 Resource requirements (person years) 44

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre CWES in Iran Table 2b Personnel costs including travel & subsistence $5,000,000 Number of samples collected for analysis/year 10,400 Cost per analysis $1,000 Total annual analytical costs $10,400,000 Total annual cost $16,733,000 Notional overall cost per air-sampling station $41,833 Notional overall cost per analytical result $1,610 Total annual cost including deposition sampling $30,000,000

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Weighting Neglecting edge effects, the number of sampling stations varies inversely with the square of the detection range A detection range less that 100km is verging on the impossible A weighted assessment of where WAES might most usefully be implemented might reduce the number of stations by factor 10

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Opinions Environmental sampling is a powerful tool CWES is a very expensive concept Unfocused CWES is poor value for money Environmental sampling focused by sound intelligence is extremely difficult to defeat

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre Opinions The three most important components of any monitoring strategy are: “Information” “Information” and yes,“Information”

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre What to do if Iran DOES NOT AGREE to abandon enrichment and reprocessing Proceed with robust implementation of rights under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to verify that Iran is not developing or operating clandestine enrichment or reprocessing plants IAEA and motivated states to share information from open source data and satellite imagery analysis to identify sites warranting “Complementary Access” Depend on motivated states to bring to the attention of the IAEA any locations identified by the states’ intelligence capabilities as warranting “Complementary Access”

WAES & ALL THAT WAES & ALL THAT Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre What to do if Iran DOES AGREE to abandon enrichment and reprocessing Proceed with robust implementation of rights under the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to verify that Iran is not developing or operating clandestine enrichment or reprocessing plants IAEA and motivated states to share information from open source data and satellite imagery analysis to identify sites warranting “Complementary Access” Depend on motivated states to bring to the attention of the IAEA any locations identified by the states’ intelligence capabilities as warranting “Complementary Access”