The Nuclear Tipping Point: U.S. Strategies to Prevent Future - PDF document

The Nuclear Tipping Point: U.S. Strategies to Prevent Future Proliferation A Forces Transformation and Resources Seminar Marshall Hall, Room 155, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC 20319 December 4 th , 2008 Thursday, December 4 th 0815-0830 Welcome and Introductory Remarks Dr. James M. Keagle, Director, Transforming National Security Seminar Series Center for Technology and National Security Policy, NDU 0830-0930 Potential Future Proliferators: Is a New Wave Imminent? What regional security factors might drive states to decide to pursue nuclear proliferation? Would they look for offensive or deterrent capabilities, or seek nuclear weapons for national prestige and influence? Ms. Rebecca K.C. Hersman, Senior Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University Mr. Jon Wolfsthal, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies 0930-0945 Break 0945-1045 International Perspective Panel What are the non-U.S. perspectives on the prospect of nuclear proliferation? How do other countries prioritize the threat and possible responses? Mr. Hyoung-zhin Kim , Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs, Embassy of Korea Mr. Moazzam A. Khan, Minister of the Embassy of Pakistan Mr. Alexander Trofimov, Second Secretary, Political-Military Section of the Russian Embassy 1045-1145 Capabilities and Policy Assessment Exploration of possible links between states seeking nuclear weapons and states with nuclear technology; Has the U.S. been effective at dissuading proliferators? Ms. Sharon Squassoni , Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Colonel Charles D. Lutes , Director, Counterproliferation Strategy, National Security Council 1145-1245 Lunch 1245- 1345 Nuclear Terrorism Could terrorists acquire the materials and expertise for nuclear capability? Can terrorists be deterred, or would they use a weapon immediately? Mr. John McGuinness, Division Chief, Strategic Forces and Issues, Office of Strategic, Proliferation and Military Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State Dr. Bradley H. Roberts, Institute for Defense Analysis Dr. Richard Weitz, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

1345-1445 Preventing Proliferation: Military, Multilateral, & Technological Solutions Can multilateral “carrots” work, or do we need military “sticks” to dissuade potential future proliferators? Can “proliferation-resistant” technologies for reactor designs and fuel cycle management limit proliferation potential? What role can intelligence play? Ambassador James E. Goodby, Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University Mr. Michael Moodie, Director, Proliferation Issues, Long-Range Analysis Unit, National Intelligence Council; Editor-in-Chief, WMD Insights Mr. Leonard S. Spector, Deputy Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies 1445-1500 Break 1500 - 1600 Keynote Speaker Mr. William H. Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy 1600-1700 U.S. Response: Rogue State vs. Friendly State How would the U.S. deal with rogue proliferation: deterrence, preemption, diplomacy? Would the U.S. support a friendly proliferator or condemn them, and at what cost to the NPT or our security alliances? Mr. Thomas Scheber, National Institute for Public Policy Mr. Randy Strauss, Global Strike Policy and Treaty Analyst, USSTRATCOM Dr. Victor Utgoff, Senior Division Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses 1700 Closing Remarks Dr. James M. Keagle, Director, Transforming National Security Seminar Series Center for Technology and National Security Policy, NDU

Preventing Proliferation: Multilateral Solutions James E. Goodby Hoover Institution, Stanford University Growing energy demands and the need to curb greenhouse gases have created the much publicized “renaissance” in proposals for new nuclear reactors. Many projects have reached the advanced planning stage or are already being constructed. Centrifuge technology for enriching uranium also has made significant advances and the cost of separative work has been reduced. The cost will drop further as the transition to centrifuge technology from gaseous diffusion technology continues. The base technology is spreading. Laser technology is just over the horizon. There may be exaggerated expectations associated with the renaissance and the time frame for its full flowering is likely to be very long, but new reactors are being planned on a scale unseen in recent years. All that remains uncertain is the rate of nuclear power growth. Assumptions suggesting that nuclear power growth will be slow depend primarily upon some level of stability in the Middle East so that oil supplies from there are not interrupted, and on there being no rapid and major change in the earth’s climate. If these conditions changed, or if dependence on oil from unstable regions simply becomes too risky for major oil exporters to tolerate, the world could decide to make a transition to a heavy dependence on nuclear power. If the example of France is a guide, it could do so on a global scale in 25 years. On the other hand, if there were another Chernobyl-like accident or some dramatic diversion of nuclear materials from civil power programs to a nuclear bomb, the predicted expansion of dependence on nuclear power might be slowed down or even stopped. On balance, the best bet is that nuclear power plants will become a larger part of the energy mix, which means that managing the nuclear fuel cycle will present “front burner” issues for governments. In the United States, these issues come in the form of a transition to centrifuge-based enrichment technology and possibly to laser- based enrichment, persisting problems regarding storage of nuclear waste material, and whether to begin encouraging the use of plutonium as a reactor fuel. In addition to uncertainties about the rate of growth of nuclear power generation, there are very strong political currents, especially in developing countries, that distort the picture provided by objective economic analyses. One of these is the view held by many nations that a “two-tier” world is unacceptable, that it is not right that some nations are allowed to have enrichment and reprocessing facilities for peaceful nuclear energy programs, while others are forbidden to have that infrastructure. Very few nations would willingly be caught on the inferior side in a permanent “two-tier” system where some nations are entitled to the infrastructure for a civil nuclear power industry, and others are not. Assurances of reliable, uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel, while removing some incentives, do not respond to the “entitlement” motivation. To address that, a mechanism that gives any nation that wants it at least some form of vested interest in one or more major elements of fuel cycle services is required. Another powerful determinant of national policies is the desire to have an option to acquire nuclear weapons. This consideration has played a major role in several national 1