States reporting of Annex II exports (AP) and the significance for - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

States’ reporting of Annex II exports (AP) and the significance for safeguards evaluation Filippo Sevini 1 , Renaud Chatelus 1 , Malin Ardhammar 2 , Jacqueline Idinger 2 , Peter Heine 3 1 European Commission Joint Research Centre, ITU Ispra, Italy 2 International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria 3 US DOE Argonne National Laboratory, USA 1

Summary 1. The Additional Protocol 2. Export reporting and the Additional Protocol 3. Use of AP export declarations in State evaluation 4. AP Annex II and the evolution of its source – INFCIRC/254/Part 1 (NSG Trigger list) 5. Discussion 2

1. The Additional Protocol The Model Additional Protocol of 1997 has enabled the • IAEA to gain access to a wider range of locations in a State and State-declared information. The State evaluation process is supported by information • derived from:  obligatory State declarations and other reports,  Agency’s own verification activities (e.g. Short-Notice, Unannounced Inspections, Complementary Access)  other safeguards-relevant information sources Early detection of undeclared/clandestine activities is • supported by satellite imagery, environmental sampling, forensics and information analysis Important indicators: • trade patterns, procurement attempts • R&D activities • 3

2. Export / Import Reporting Requirements Article 2.a.(ix) • … shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing the following information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in Annex II: – For each export: the identity, quantity, location of intended use in the receiving State and date … of export; – Upon specific request, confirmation as importing State of information provided by another State concerning the export of such equipment and material In addition: Article 2.a.(iv) …shall provide the Agency with a declaration containing a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in the activities specified in Annex I to this Protocol

Additional Protocol Export / Imports Reporting Requirements Annex II – List of equipment and non-nuclear material (based on IAEA INFCIRC/254/Part1 Trigger List ) 1. I. Reactors and major equipment 2. II. Non-nuclear material for reactors 1. deuterium, heavy water, and nuclear-grade graphite 3. III. Reprocessing plants and especially designed or 4. prepared (EDP) equipment 5. IV. Fuel Fabrication plants 6. V. Enrichment plants and EDP equipment 1. centrifuge, diffusion, aerodynamic, CHEMEX, laser, plasma, electromagnetic 7. VI. Heavy water production plants and EDP equipment 8. VII. Uranium conversion plants and EDP equipment

Additional Protocol Annex I - Nuclear fuel cycle related activities The manufacture… vii. or assembly of uranium plasma generation i. of centrifuge rotor tubes or systems . the assembly of gas viii. of zirconium tubes centrifuges ix. or upgrading of heavy ii. of diffusion barriers water or deuterium iii. or assembly of laser-based x. of nuclear grade graphite systems xi. of flasks for irradiated fuel iv. or assembly of xii. of reactor control rods electromagnetic isotope xiii. of criticality safe tanks separators and vessels v. or assembly of columns or xiv. of irradiated fuel element extraction equipment chopping machines vi. of aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes . xv. The construction of hot cells

Processes Supporting Safeguards Implementation as Applied to all States Evaluation and implementation cycle 8

Plan verification activities State declarations Analyse & evaluate (State Conduct verification Safeguards conclusions evaluation) activities SG-relevant information from open and other sources (incl. nuclear trade-related data) Results of verification activities Simplified model of evaluation cycle

Consistency analysis process Based on: State declarations, • information from verification activities and • safeguards-relevant information from all other available • sources • E.g. technical cooperation, open source information Applied both to declared nuclear fuel cycle activities and • to other possible safeguards-relevant activities

3. Use of AP export declarations in State evaluation Evaluating the Declaring State Evaluating the Recipient State Do Annex II exports correspond to Are the Annex II imports consistent • • declared Annex I activities? with indigenous NFC* needs? Is the scale of Annex I activities Are there corresponding Annex I • • consistent with indigenous need for activities for the Annex II imports? the NFC* + declared Annex II (if relevant) exports? Are needs for the declared NFC* • If Annex I activities are not for the reflected as Annex II imports, or as • indigenous NFC*, are they reflected indigenous capabilities? as Annex II exports? Evaluating both States : Are known nuclear cooperation or trade agreements reflected as Annex II exports/imports, and vice versa? * NFC = nuclear fuel cycle 11

Fictitious example: Annex I declaration for State A Scale of operation Manufacture of rotor tubes Approximately 10000 last year Assembly of gas centrifuges Approximately 3000 last year Annex II declaration for State A Quantity etc. 2.a.(ix) (a) Export of rotor tubes to State B 1000 items State A has a declared centrifuge enrichment plant under expansion. Is the data consistent? Would further data be needed…? 12

Example, cont. State A has reported the export of 1000 rotor tubes to State B. Is State B known to engage in centrifuge rotor assembly*? Are • there exports from State B of rotor tubes or centrifuge rotor assemblies? Does State B have a declared gas centrifuge enrichment plant? • If so, is there consistency between imports, assembly activities and installment needs in the declared plant? Are there other import activities of possible relevance to the • issue (other 2.a.(ix) exports to State B, trade statistics, etc.)? >>Possible follow-ups/clarifications to be sought? *If an AP is in force, is the assembly a declared AP Annex I activity? If so, 13 what scale?

Main sources of trade- related data for ‘State’ AP 2.a.(ix) exports from other States. [As relevant, • ‘State’ confirmation of imports, subsequent clarifications and, if required, complementary access.] Statistical trade data (sums of transactions per • commodity and counterpart States) Transactional trade data (detailed records of export/ • import transactions) TC (and other) procurement for ‘State’ • Procurement attempts for nuclear-relevant goods • originating in ‘State’ ( cf. Session 23-10 " Analysis of Nuclear Relevant Information on International Procurement and Industrial Activities for Safeguards Purposes" )

Added value of 2.a.(ix) export information A variety of uses strengthening safeguards State Evaluation, e.g.: • External source of information relevant to nuclear fuel cycle activities in the recipient State (whether the State has CSA/AP/66/VOA) • Contributes to consistency analysis of activities in reporting State (Annex I as well as nuclear fuel cycle activities) • A gauge of nuclear -related industrial capabilities (All of the above in conjunction with other information sources) 15

4. AP Annex II and the NSG ‘Trigger List’ Background – AP Annex II Model Additional Protocol, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected): Annex II is a list reflecting INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 1 (NSG TL, October 1995) • Mechanism for updating AP Annexes provided in AP Article 16 • INFCIRC/254/Part 1 now in its 12th revision • Substantial changes of INFCIRC/254/Part 1, particularly following the NSG fundamental list review undertaken 2010- 2013

NSG Fundamental Review 2010-2013  50 Trigger list changes and 40 nuclear dual-use changes Natural Uranium Mining and Milling Highly Enriched Uranium Conversion Uranium Enrichment Uranium Pit Fabrication High Explosive and Non-nuclear Components Industrial equipment Weaponization Graphite or Heavy Water Plutonium Reactor Fuel Fabrication Reactor Reprocessing Pit Fabrication

Main differences Part 1 1995-2013 TL: Complete nuclear reactors • New introductory note explaining the main categories of reactors • Deletion of ‘zero power’ reactors exemption • Implicit inclusion of thorium reactors (by removal of a Pu production limit) • More specific reference to heavy water reactors • Explicit decontrol of fusion reactors 18

Main differences Part 1 1995-2013 /2 • 1.8 Reactor internals (partially covered under 1.2 before), • 1.9 Heat exchangers, • 1.10 Neutron detectors, • 1.11 External thermal shields • 3.5 Neutron measurement systems for process control • 5. Equipment for isotope separation of “other elements” • 5.1.2.(a) 2. Active magnetic bearings • 6.8. Heavy water upgrade systems • 6.9. Ammonia synthesis converters or synthesis units • 7.2. Plants for the conversion of plutonium • + numerous changes to control parameters, explanatory notes etc.

Other important differences 1.6 Nuclear fuel cladding: zirconium metal tubes or zirconium, threshold down to 10 kg (was 500 kg) 2.2. Nuclear grade graphite: threshold down to 1 kg (was 30 tons in 12 months) Technology and software not included in AP Annex II 20