Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior Christian J. Meyer & Egon Tripodi European University Institute, Department of Economics June 29, 2018 2018 ESA World Meeting, Berlin
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion ‘The Twenty-eight World Health Assembly, [...] urges Member States to promote the development of national blood services based on voluntary unremunerated donation of blood.” — World Health Assembly Resolution 28.72 (1975) Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 2
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion ‘The Twenty-eight World Health Assembly, [...] urges Member States to promote the development of national blood services based on voluntary unremunerated donation of blood.” — World Health Assembly Resolution 28.72 (1975) ◮ Concerns for the quantity and quality of blood supply led to unremunerated donations being the policy objective of the World Health Organization (WHO), the Red Cross, and the Council of Europe Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 2
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion ‘The Twenty-eight World Health Assembly, [...] urges Member States to promote the development of national blood services based on voluntary unremunerated donation of blood.” — World Health Assembly Resolution 28.72 (1975) ◮ Concerns for the quantity and quality of blood supply led to unremunerated donations being the policy objective of the World Health Organization (WHO), the Red Cross, and the Council of Europe ◮ 83% of 88 million whole blood donations globally are reported as voluntary and non-remunerated (WHO, 2017) Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 2
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion Blood Collection in Germany Un Unpaid Pa Paid Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 3
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion Blood Collection in Germany More info Un Unpaid Pa Paid Germany’s market for whole blood has desirable properties Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 3
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion Blood Collection in Germany More info Un Unpaid Pa Paid Germany’s market for whole blood has desirable properties ◮ over 70% of unpaid donations Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 3
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion Blood Collection in Germany More info Un Unpaid Pa Paid Germany’s market for whole blood has desirable properties ◮ over 70% of unpaid donations ◮ largest world-wide supply of blood per capita (WHO 2017) Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 3
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion Blood Collection in Germany More info Un Unpaid Pa Paid Germany’s market for whole blood has desirable properties ◮ over 70% of unpaid donations ◮ largest world-wide supply of blood per capita (WHO 2017) ◮ $110 wholesale price of a blood unit, compares to $190 in Sweden and Switzerland, and $211 in the US Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 3
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion Blood Collection in Germany More info Un Unpaid Paid Pa Germany’s market for whole blood has desirable properties ◮ over 70% of unpaid donations ◮ largest world-wide supply of blood per capita (WHO 2017) ◮ $110 wholesale price of a blood unit, compares to $190 in Sweden and Switzerland, and $211 in the US ◮ some of the safest blood supplies: e.g. low incidence of Hep C and HIV Other dual collection systems Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 3
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion We Study Dual Markets for Charitable Giving ◮ Can a “dual market” increase the supply of charitable donations? Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 4
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion We Study Dual Markets for Charitable Giving ◮ Can a “dual market” increase the supply of charitable donations? ◮ relative to a single market where no one is paid Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 4
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion We Study Dual Markets for Charitable Giving ◮ Can a “dual market” increase the supply of charitable donations? ◮ relative to a single market where no one is paid ◮ relative to a single market where everyone is paid Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 4
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion We Study Dual Markets for Charitable Giving ◮ Can a “dual market” increase the supply of charitable donations? ◮ relative to a single market where no one is paid ◮ relative to a single market where everyone is paid ◮ What economic mechanisms make a “dual” collection system potentially more efficient? ◮ Starting point: We hypothesize that it enables donors to sort ◮ Our focus: Image concerns Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 4
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion We Study Dual Markets for Charitable Giving ◮ Can a “dual market” increase the supply of charitable donations? ◮ relative to a single market where no one is paid ◮ relative to a single market where everyone is paid ◮ What economic mechanisms make a “dual” collection system potentially more efficient? ◮ Starting point: We hypothesize that it enables donors to sort ◮ Our focus: Image concerns ◮ We study these questions in a controlled environment in two steps: Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 4
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion We Study Dual Markets for Charitable Giving ◮ Can a “dual market” increase the supply of charitable donations? ◮ relative to a single market where no one is paid ◮ relative to a single market where everyone is paid ◮ What economic mechanisms make a “dual” collection system potentially more efficient? ◮ Starting point: We hypothesize that it enables donors to sort ◮ Our focus: Image concerns ◮ We study these questions in a controlled environment in two steps: ◮ We use a model of incentivized charitable giving building on Benabou and Tirole 2006 Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 4
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion We Study Dual Markets for Charitable Giving ◮ Can a “dual market” increase the supply of charitable donations? ◮ relative to a single market where no one is paid ◮ relative to a single market where everyone is paid ◮ What economic mechanisms make a “dual” collection system potentially more efficient? ◮ Starting point: We hypothesize that it enables donors to sort ◮ Our focus: Image concerns ◮ We study these questions in a controlled environment in two steps: ◮ We use a model of incentivized charitable giving building on Benabou and Tirole 2006 ◮ We test these predictions in the laboratory Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 4
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion Our Model Produces Three Testable Predictions Model overview Hypothesis 1 (Incentive Effect) Irrespective of whether actions are visible, making monetary incentives available increases donations. Hypothesis 2 (Social Image Effect) Irrespective of whether monetary incentives are available, making actions visible increases donations. Hypothesis 3 (Sorting) In a dual market, a positive share of agents chooses to be not paid. This share is larger when actions are taken in public. Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 5
Introduction Theoretical Framework Experimental Design Results Conclusion Our Model Produces Three Testable Predictions Model overview Hypothesis 1 (Incentive Effect) Irrespective of whether actions are visible, making monetary incentives available increases donations. Hypothesis 2 (Social Image Effect) Irrespective of whether monetary incentives are available, making actions visible increases donations. Hypothesis 3 (Sorting) In a dual market, a positive share of agents chooses to be not paid. This share is larger when actions are taken in public. Donations across market designs Share donating not paid Not paid < Paid = Dual Market s > 0 Private action Not paid < Paid = Dual Market S > s Public action Meyer and Tripodi (EUI): Sorting Into Incentives for Prosocial Behavior 5
Recommend
More recommend
