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SINTEF RFI ACTIVITIES June 2019, Helsinki Aiden Morrison, Nadia Sokolova Outline Brief SINTEF Introduction Our motivations for pursuing RFI monitoring Past projects covering GNSS interference Lessons learned, and knowledge gaps


  1. SINTEF RFI ACTIVITIES June 2019, Helsinki Aiden Morrison, Nadia Sokolova

  2. Outline • Brief SINTEF Introduction • Our motivations for pursuing RFI monitoring • Past projects covering GNSS interference • Lessons learned, and knowledge gaps • Ongoing activities, and upcoming monitoring hardware 2

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  4. Navigation Focused Research Areas RFI Monitoring GBAS Indoor Navigation Custom Navigation HW Autonomous system System Design Navigation GNSS for ITS 4 Image sources: [3]

  5. Our motivation for pursuing RFI monitoring • While all GNSS applications are vulnerable to RFI, some have higher potential losses • If my phone loses GNSS due to RFI, I might be slightly inconvenienced • If our drone loses GNSS due to RFI, we might lose a very expensive drone or crash in to important infrastructure • Example of an economic impact • Some applications have higher risks 5

  6. CAT III GBAS-based Automatic Landing GBAS - Ground Based Augmentation System Concept of operation: • Similar to differential GNSS but with extras • Corrections and safety flags are carried from the ground to the aircraft via a dedicated VHF link called VDB • There are typically four ground stations which allow for much more sensitive monitoring for outliers and errors • But the system is very sensitive to signal degradation from RFI 6

  7. Precision Approach Requirements GBAS Precision Operation CAT l CAT ll CAT lll Accuracy [m] Horizontal 16.0 6.9 6.1 Vertical 7.7 2.0 2.0 95 % Time-to-Alert 2 3 2 [s] H: 40 H: 17.3 H: 15.5 Integrity Alert Limit [m] V: 10-15 V: 5.3 V: 5.3 2x10 -5 2x10 -9 2x10 -9 P HMI / approach 10 -7 / 15 sec 5x10 -5 / 5x10 -6 / 15 sec Continuity Failure Rate approach Availability 0.99 – 0.99999 0.99 – 0.99999 0.99 – 0.99999 • Category type identifies system capability, indicating the minimum approach height that can be achieved. • Hitting these performance metrics is hard under ideal conditions. • If weak RFI is present on even one of the four antennas it can reduce availability and continuity • Stronger RFI is an immediate problem – there are several recent examples 7

  8. GBAS and other aircraft events (plus a fancy boat) 8

  9. What we need to know • From the point of view of GBAS, we need to know a few pieces of information about RFI • 1) The occurrence rate • 2) The relative occurrence rate • Future GBAS systems are intended to use both the L1/E1 and L5/E5a bands on GPS and Galileo • In the event of RFI on a single frequency it may be possible to fall back to operation using only the other • 3) Power levels • 4) Spectral occupancy • Unintentionally generated tones are mitigated by the signals themselves • It may be possible to identify individual emitters over differing events and positions • Unfortunately real-time analysis at this level can be computationally expensive • Instead, we take an alternative approach 9

  10. Event detection - 1 • RFI detection concept – how to detect RFI with minimal processing power? • It’s not feasible to analyze all signals in real time in terms of C/N0 – that would require a full multifrequency GNSS receiver and wouldn’t provide us a bitstream for our SDR • Instead we look for in band power level deviation • Must allow for site to site variation and slow variability due to thermal effects etc. But rapid increases in power are strong indicators of RFI • Weak events visible • Strong events up to -10dBm 10 • Example of car-borne jammer events

  11. Event detection - 2 • Mobile Jammer • Cigarette lighter style • 'Stepped CW' signal • Car drove within 10 m • Test conducted with NKOM and FFI • Other monitors deployed • Indra Navia, DFS, NLR, ESTEC • The monitor at ESTEC triggered frequently on adjacent band pulsed power sources (See Event 000) • Also caught a delivery truck or taxi with a jammer • Event 008 is a jamming event • GNSS satellites cannot be tracked in L1 band for duration • There are Drawbacks to this approach 11

  12. Lessons learned & Knowledge gaps • Three major factors motivated the design of a second generation monitoring system • The Manual result collection and analysis required a large amount of user intervention • Far too many "false alarms" • E5b, L2, G2, E6, E1PRS, and G1 not collected/analyzed • These signals all have slightly different characteristics making them more or less suitable to different use cases • Let’s see what this coverage looks like on a signal map 12

  13. RF signal background - 3 of 3 • A chart is helpful: • Ignoring the S-band signals, this chart shows the L-band • Signal plans evolve over time • Uncertain if the GLONASS CDMA plans are still accurate • Most of these signals are now turned on and ’healthy’ • The rise of RFI • As GNSS has risen to solve more and more problems, it has become a larger target • People are right to be paranoid about being tracked, but jamming GNSS is hazardous • If usage based road tolling depends on GNSS it will become a target • This is why we need a radically different front-end • From 2x24 MHz to 4 x 55 MHz • This is a nearly 5x increase in the amount of data • For reasons we will cover later we also want to go from 1 bit to 4 bit • 4x again so ~20x the data relative to the first system • A higher dynamic range is also desirable 13

  14. Quantization concepts and requirements - 3 of 3 • Our design needs to tolerate 6 or 7 orders of magnitude • (Images from wikipedia, Nuand, and Maxim) • 60-70dB+ dynamic range • Each bit of ADC range represents 3dB of amplitude dynamic range, 6dB of power • Each bit of ADC range takes up more data whether or not the signal is using these bits • Therefore – it’s inefficient to throw bits at the problem outside of processing applications that need or benefit from having a wide dynamic range signal • E.g. Novatel 7 series receivers have 8 bit quantization but only turn it on when requested for RFI mitigation, otherwise they use 4 bits to save energy • Instead we need to employ what is called ’gain control’ to feed back from the digitized signal to the analog gain levels • Dynamic range considerations map back to every stage of the design • IP3 etc. Of first gain stage • Maximum power handling of components (SAWs and LNA) • Representation range of the ADCs • Gain Control and feedback to use a VGA • The MAX2120 mixer chip includes a VGA with a 70 dB analog linear range • Also 15dB of digital control range at the baseband, for a combined 85dB • Probably not feasible to use the full range, but still a good start 14 • System block diagram

  15. Design Evolution - Concept • System automation, and updated hardware capabilities Indicator LEDs, and Buttons User configuration options VGA, Keyboard/Mouse Mixer, OCXO, Ethernet Cloud Storage, (USB2) LPF 1 SAW, LNA, Archiving and Retrieval Clocking E1/L1/G1 Splitter GNSS Antenna Ethernet Notifications Raw and Monitor (HDMI) RGMII VGA, (e.g. Email) Interface processed data Mixer, i.MX8 RF Power LPF 2 SOM Meter A Hardware: Embedded LNA, USB3 8x ADC FPGA USB3 computer module (COTS) Splitter FIFO RF via USB3 - RF Power VGA, Hardware: Reconfigurable Meter B Notifications Mixer, USB3 Software: Online multiband front-end. Detection, (e.g. Email) LPF 3 monitoring, analysis and and pre- notification. Periodic SAW, LNA, PCIe to SATA2 processing Other Low Level PCIe SATA2 archiving and reporting. E5/L2/E6 Splitters SATA2 IC SSD VGA, software Interfaces Other Low Level Mixer, Interfaces to FPGA LPF 4 Power In (<90W) 15

  16. Design Evolution - Hardware • First version powered up and ran code • Now in the process of implementing firmware • Why not just buy an off-the-shelf front-end? • A few small reasons • 1) None have integrated power level measurement for environment characterization and triggering • 2) Onboard oscillator and clock generators need to be low phase noise components for GNSS signals • 3) GNSS Pre-filtering /Sensitivity to adjacent band signals: • Front-ends like HackRF, bladeRF, and LimeSDR focus on wide bandwidth • This makes sensitive pre-triggering difficult and pushes up false alarm rates • 4) Many off the shelf solutions use fractional-N PLLs in their mixers • Can introduce large residual code-carrier divergence 16 • Deployment plans...

  17. Deployment plans • Multiple locations in Norway and Europe (e.g. research facilities at ESTEC and NLR). • Several sites to be operated by the Norwegian Public Roads Administration. SINTEF monitors will be co- located with monitoring equipment deployed by Nkom. Patterødkrysset E8 Kilpisjärvi-Skibotn (Busiest intersection in Norway) Road used for autonomous testing 17

  18. Future activities • Starting next year we hope to have phased array based RFI detectors which provide bearing information to the host system • These will be tested for drones based detection and tracking of GNSS RFI sources • I want the drones to be able to ’remove’ the source, but unlikely to get HMS approval 18

  19. Policy outlook • If GNSS based road pricing is adoped there will very likely be a large spike in RFI events • It produces a financial incentive • It will be necessary to have a comittment to both prevention and response • Prevent jamming equipment from entering the country • The credible ability to rapidly detect and localize jamming 19

  20. Teknologi for et bedre samfunn

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