Sensor Security: A Kaleidoscopic View Ren Struik (Certicom - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 Sensor Security: A Kaleidoscopic View René Struik (Certicom Research) E-mail: rstruik@certicom.com Certicom Corp. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Research in Motion, Ltd. Slide 1 René Struik (Certicom Research)

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corporation Photo courtesy Dust Networks Slide 2 René Struik (Certicom Research) 2

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 The Promise of Wireless The Promise of Wireless The Economist, April 28, 2007 Slide 3 René Struik (Certicom Research) 3

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 A Note on Security and Ease of Use This document is provided strictly for the purpose of gathering information leading to the development of an ISA standard, recommended practice or technical report. Copies may be reproduced and distributed, in whole or in part, but only for the following purposes: • Review of and comment on the ISA-SP100 draft proposal • Submission to the ISA-SP100 Committee • Informing and educating others about the ISA-SP100 draft standard development process. Slide 4 René Struik (Certicom Research)

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 Security and Ease of Use “Computer users have been taught for years that computer security systems can’t be effective unless they are complex and difficult to use. In reality, this conventional wisdom is completely wrong.” ⎯ Lorrie Faith Cranor, Carnegie Mellon University Security technology can make trust lifecycle management intuitive and hidden from the user. Source: D. Balfanz, G. Durfee, R.E. Grinter, D.K. Smetters, P. Stewart, “Network-in-a-Box: How to Set Up a Secure Wireless Network in under a Minute,” in Proceedings of the 13 th USENIX Security Symposium , August 9-13, 2004. Slide 5 René Struik (Certicom Research)

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 Ease of Configuration and Reconfiguration Ease of configuration: - Merging of networks - Partitioning of networks - Device portability and orphaning - Hand-over of control (remote, backup) Slide 6 René Struik (Certicom Research)

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 Security and Ease of Use – Bridging the Gap Challenge: Bridge the gap between state-of-the-art security that is known and security that is actually being used. Education gap . Conventional wisdom is that “computer security systems can’t be effective unless they are complex and difficult to use”. While this may once have been true, the security profession has witnessed dramatic insights over the last ten years, which has not all been embraced yet by the field. Perception gap. Conventional wisdom is that security technologies are too expensive to implement with sensor and control networks, due to energy constraints, computational and storage constraints. Anno 2008, this perception is challenged for all but the most mundane devices. Examples: e.g., Bluetooth v2.1, ZigBee Smart Metering, and RFID e-Passport. Affordability gap . Conventional wisdom is that the licensing cost of security technologies may present a hurdle. Licensing models, such as those used with the consumer electronics industry, may have some merit for ubiquitous computing as well, since both are concerned with mass-scale deployment of networked devices ("the internet of things") and enforcement of compliance. Examples: ZigBee Smart Energy licensing model for public-key technology; flexible business models for deployment tailored to best fit requirements of various players in the supply chain (i.e., can be moved to most suitable point, so as to promote wide-scale adoption). Slide 7 René Struik (Certicom Research)

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 Devices and Device Ids This document is provided strictly for the purpose of gathering information leading to the development of an ISA standard, recommended practice or technical report. Copies may be reproduced and distributed, in whole or in part, but only for the following purposes: • Review of and comment on the ISA-SP100 draft proposal • Submission to the ISA-SP100 Committee • Informing and educating others about the ISA-SP100 draft standard development process. Slide 8 René Struik (Certicom Research)

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 Gateway “Tunnel” Router Edge Node APP APP Transport Transport Network Network Network Network Network Data Link Data Link Data Link Data Link Data Link* TCP /IP PHY* PHY* PHY PHY PHY Source: Networking-Transport Diagrams ISA SP100.11a (Jay Werb, March 1, 2007).ppt Slide 9 René Struik (Certicom Research)

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 Full stack device, including per-layer and shared parameters Device Address translation table Device- APP APP wide APP address functions parameters parameters Dynamically assigned; Trans address can be changed Transport Transport at will DLL address functions parameters short MAC add Handed out MAC address Network Network by IEEE-RAC; functions parameters = static throughout DeviceID DeviceID lifecycle (no cloning, copying, etc.) Data Link Keying material Data Link parameters functions Trusted module includes Security all security processing and policies secure and authentic storage of all keying material of the PHY PHY Security protocols device, as well as policies functions parameters AES RNG ECC potential shared functions communication layer-specific Slide 10 René Struik (Certicom Research) implementation and parameters stack parameters

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 Full stack device, including per-layer and shared parameters Device Address translation table Device- APP APP wide APP address functions parameters parameters Dynamically assigned; Trans address can be changed Transport Transport at will DLL address functions parameters short MAC add Handed out MAC address Network Network by IEEE-RAC; functions parameters = static throughout DeviceID DeviceID lifecycle (no cloning, copying, etc.) Data Link Keying material Data Link parameters functions Security policies PHY PHY Trust binding Security protocols functions parameters AES RNG ECC potential shared functions communication layer-specific Slide 11 René Struik (Certicom Research) implementation and parameters stack parameters

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 Full stack device, including 802.15.4-2006 transceiver Device Address translation table Device- APP APP wide APP address functions parameters parameters Dynamically assigned; Trans address can be changed Transport Transport at will DLL address functions parameters short MAC add Handed out MAC address Network Network by IEEE-RAC; functions parameters = static throughout DeviceID DeviceID lifecycle (no cloning, copying, etc.) Data Link Keying material Data Link parameters functions Security policies PHY PHY Security protocols functions parameters AES RNG ECC potential shared functions communication layer-specific Slide 12 René Struik (Certicom Research) implementation and parameters stack parameters

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 “Lower”-stack device, including 802.15.4-2006 transceiver Device Address translation table Device- wide parameters Dynamically assigned; can be changed at will DLL address short MAC add Handed out MAC address Network Network by IEEE-RAC; functions parameters = static throughout DeviceID DeviceID lifecycle (no cloning, copying, etc.) Data Link Keying material Data Link parameters functions Security policies PHY PHY Security protocols functions parameters AES RNG ECC potential shared functions communication layer-specific Slide 13 René Struik (Certicom Research) implementation and parameters stack parameters

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 “Lower”-stack device, with just 802.15.4-2006 transceiver Device Address translation table Device- wide parameters Dynamically assigned; can be changed at will short MAC add Handed out MAC address by IEEE-RAC; = static throughout DeviceID DeviceID lifecycle (no cloning, copying, etc.) MAC Keying material MAC parameters functions Security policies PHY PHY Security protocols functions parameters AES RNG ECC potential shared functions communication layer-specific Slide 14 René Struik (Certicom Research) implementation and parameters stack parameters

July 2, 2009 RFIDSec 2009 “Lower”-stack device, with just 802.15.4-2006 transceiver Device Address translation table Device- wide parameters Dynamically assigned; can be changed at will short MAC add Handed out MAC address by IEEE-RAC; = static throughout DeviceID DeviceID lifecycle (no cloning, copying, etc.) MAC Keying material MAC parameters functions Security policies PHY PHY Trust binding at Security protocols functions parameters manufacturing AES RNG ECC potential shared functions communication layer-specific Slide 15 René Struik (Certicom Research) implementation and parameters stack parameters