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San Diego Wildfires 2003-2007 San Diego LAFCO Disaster Preparedness - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

San Diego Wildfires 2003-2007 San Diego LAFCO Disaster Preparedness Role Background County Fire Services not required by State Law San Diego County divests direct responsibility for fire services in the unincorporated county (1975)


  1. San Diego Wildfires 2003-2007 San Diego LAFCO Disaster Preparedness Role

  2. Background • County Fire Services not required by State Law • San Diego County divests direct responsibility for fire services in the unincorporated county (1975) • Creates County Service Areas for fire protection services in unincorporated county/communities • CSAs staffed by local volunteer firefighters • SD County provided various subsidies in addition to annual property tax revenues to CSAs/FPDs • LAFCO role limited at that time

  3. 2003 Wildfires (Cedar Fire) • Major wildfire event, burned over 280,000 acres in San Diego County, over $1.3 Billion in damages • Involved all aspects of multi-jurisdictional (State/County/Local) disaster preparedness: – Local/Regional Emergency Communications – 1st Responders, Auto-Aid, Mutual-Aid – Equipment – planes, helicopters and engines • Resulted in the loss of 2,200 homes and 15 lives – largest wildfire in California history*

  4. 2003 Wildfire Aftermath • How San Diego LAFCO responded: • Conducted studies analyzing funding and coordination for local/regional fire protection/EMS services • Produced reports with recommendations for regional fire protection consolidation, including activation of CSA latent fire protection/EMS powers • Collaborated with County and local Fire Agencies on plans for a County Fire Authority • Developed Multi-Phase plan for consolidation of fire protection/EMS services in the unincorporated County

  5. 2007 Wildfires (Witch/Harris Fires) • 2 nd major fire event in San Diego County within four years, 2 nd largest fire in California history • Burned over 198,000 acres, 1,000 homes destroyed, 2 lives lost, 55 firefighters injured • Total of 350,000 acres burned as fires merged, 500,000 people evacuated • Revealed continued inefficiencies with regional emergency communication systems, evacuation chaos in some unincorporated communities • Accelerated local calls for fire regionalization • Highlighted need for prioritization and funding for effective service levels and additional equipment

  6. M I C R O R E P O R T Reorganization of Structural Fire Protection and Emergency Medical Services in Unincorporated San Diego County San Diego Local Agency Formation Commission

  7. San Diego County Fire Authority • Established in 2008 by LAFCO activation of existing CSA’s latent power for fire protection and emergency medical services • Restricted to specific unincorporated areas of county-wide CSA, covered over one-million acres • CSA 135 (Fire Authority) contracts with CALFIRE for fire service operational responsibilities • Replacement of volunteer firefighters with CALFIRE professionals in unincorporated areas

  8. LAFCO Role • Conducted Studies - Produced Macro/Micro Fire Consolidation Reports • Assembled Advisory Task Force (Fire Chiefs) • Municipal Service Reviews/Determinations • Sphere of Influence Reviews/Determinations • Dissolution of volunteer CSAs and FPDs • Activation/Expansion of Latent Powers for Fire Protection/Emergency Medical Services (EMS) • SOI Establishments/Amendments/Updates • Waived LAFCO processing fees for reorganizations

  9. 2003-2018 • Recent wildfire in December 2017 (Lilac Fire), burned 4,100 acres, 157 buildings, 0 fatalities • Demonstrated improved local/regional emergency communications and response • Total Fire Service Consolidations Since 2003: – 6 CSAs dissolved – 2 FPDs dissolved – 7 Volunteer Fire Companies disbanded – San Diego County Fire Authority/CALFIRE – Elimination of unserved islands

  10. Continuing Issues • Local Control vs. Regionalization • Inadequate Funding – Property Taxes / Fees • Staffing levels – Volunteers / Professionals • Local-Regional Fire Dispatch Coordination and Auto-Aid Agreements (Boundary Drop) • Special Tax Assessments to fund Fire Services requires approval by 2/3 of local voters • Continued Development within Wildfire Areas

  11. Current LAFCO Efforts • Completing Dissolution of remaining CSAs/FPDs • Elimination of unserved islands • Improvements for local/regional fire dispatch • Auto-Aid Agreements (Boundary Drop) • Property Tax Exchange Agreements • Municipal Service Reviews • Sphere of Influence Updates • Encouraging Functional Consolidations

  12. Case Studies • Rancho Santa Fe Fire Protection District / County Service Area No. 107 (Elfin Forest FD) • Pine Valley Fire Protection District / County Service Area No. 135 (Fire Protection/EMS LP Area) – San Diego County Fire Authority • Heartland Fire & Rescue JPA (Cities of El Cajon, La Mesa, & Lemon Grove)

  13. Rancho Santa Fe FPD – CSA 107 • Dissolution of CSA 107 volunteer fire department (Elfin Forest-Harmony Grove) • Annexation to Rancho Santa Fe FPD • In 1987, LAFCO placed CSA 107 within SOI of the much larger Rancho Santa Fe FPD • 2014 Reorganization supported by both agencies, eliminated unserved islands (341 acres) • Extensive property tax negotiations with County to achieve sustainable funding for RSFFPD

  14. Pine Valley FPD – SD County Fire Authority (CSA 135 Fire LP Area) • Dissolution of volunteer FPD (Zero SOI) • Amendment to Service-Specific SOI for CSA 135 (Fire Protection) • Expansion of CSA 135 activated latent fire protection and emergency medical services power area (SD County Fire Authority) • Staffed by CALFIRE via contract with County Fire Authority

  15. Heartland Fire & Rescue (JPA) • Functional Consolidation of Fire Departments for Cities of El Cajon, La Mesa, Lemon Grove • 2010 JPA for organizational management of fire protection, fire prevention services, emergency medical services, and community emergency preparedness • Consolidates Management/Coordinates Operations • Heartland Communications (Dispatch Services) • Unique cooperative fire services agreement provides cost containment opportunities, while maintaining local control

  16. Q/A

  17. What is LAFCO’s Role in Disaster Preparedness Stephen Lucas, Butte Executive Officer CALAFCO Conference October 2018 Yosemite

  18. A Limited Role…until now. • Prior to the Oroville Dam Crisis, LAFCO had little to no role to play. • We provided occasional mapping data and shared contacts when specifically requested.

  19. A Whole New Level of Disaster! Butte County has had many bad fires with significant losses of Property and personal injury. In 2017 the drought brought us the Ponderosa Fire, one of the most recent in Butte County that burned only 4,016 acres, but destroyed 54 buildings…. but only a few short months took us from…

  20. too little rain…

  21. to way too much rain! February 2017

  22. The Day of the Dammed! February 7, 2017: Heavy rains inundate Oroville Lake Dam causing damage to the flood control spillway and forcing the use of the emergency spillway. Essentially free flowing uncontrolled water spills down from dam causing significant concerns about structural damages to both spillways. February 12, 2017: The Butte County Sheriff issues mandatory evacuation of approximately 80,000 Butte County residents and 100,00 more downstream in Sutter and Yuba Counties.

  23. Infrastructure Fails!

  24. Get Out Now!

  25. How Fast to Act?

  26. Crisis Averted…cost of repairs now approaching $1B

  27. Now What? • A visit from the posse…and some questions? – Department of Homeland Security – Federal Emergency Management Agency – CA State of Office of Emergency Services – CA Department of Water Resources

  28. A new paradigm and new role. • LAFCO as CONDUIT – DATA and MAPPING – TRAININGS – COMMUNICATIONS – HAZARD MITIGATION PLANNING (AB 2238 (Aguiar- Curry) – Local hazard management. – EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE – SHELTERING

  29. LAFCO as CONDUIT • One big issue for OEM is not knowing all the resources available out there to help. • Butte LAFCO will begin a collaborative relationship with the Butte County Office of Emergency Management to identify opportunities not currently identified. • Rather than bog them down with data and maps, we will rather maintain this data and have it ready and available in an emergency.

  30. DATA and MAPPING • Provide an updated list of special district contacts. • Provide map layers of special districts to the County to better identify stakeholders. • Provide description of district services.

  31. TRAININGS • Stakeholders are periodically invited to Office of Emergency Management trainings. • Also included are private utilities such as PGE and CalWater Service

  32. COMMUNICATIONS • Biggest component of effective emergency response at a regional level is timely/accurate communication. • Too often, very quick, false or misleading information is presented on social media that gets out in front of "official" communications. This causes the OEM to not only have to provide accurate updates, but forces them to counter/debunk inaccurate reports spread on social media. • The LAFCO website or social media account could help?

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