Robert M artinage e Senior Fellow 1 Agenda Introduction - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Exploiting U.S. Long ploiting U.S. Lon ng- ng g-Term Advantages to Restore g erm Advantages to Resto Te T U.S. Global Power Projection Capability Robert M artinage e – Senior Fellow 1

Agenda Introduction Antecedents of a “ Third” Offset Strategy Why Not “Business As Usual”? Enduring U.S. Advantages Implementing a New Offset Strategy: The GSS Concept Conclusions 2

Introduction DoD D faces a period of fiscal austerity of unknown duration • Nevertheless, numerous national security challenges cannot Nevertheless, • be ignored: – Resurgent Russia R Resurgent Russia – China seeks hegemony in East Asia China seeks hegemony in East Asia C – – North Korea as belligerent as ever N North Korea as belligerent as ever – – Iran expanding its missile arsenal, pursuing nuclear weapons I Iran expanding its missile arsenal, pursuing nuclear weapons – – Radical Islamic threat in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Central Asia Radical Islamic threat in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Central Asia R – – Adversaries deploying A2/AD systems specifically designed to threaten – Adversaries deploying A2/AD systems specifica Adversaries deploying A2/AD systems specifica A – traditional U.S. methods of power projection An offset strategy is needed to address growing scale and complexity of security challenges in a fiscally constrained ty challenges in a ty challenges in a environment 3

Outline Introduction Antecedents of a “Third” Offset Strategy Why Not “Business As Usual”? Enduring U.S. Advantages Implementing a New Offset Strategy: The GSS Concept Conclusions 4

Historical Antecedents Past DoD Efforts to Offset Numerical Inferiority: 1950s – President Eisenhower’s “New Look” defense policy • emphasizes large numbers of nuclear weapons, long-range bombers, and missiles. 1970s – Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Under • Secretary William Perry direct DoD to develop stealth, precision strike weapons, and improved C4ISR. 1950s 1970s HB1001 “ Have Blue” M -65 Atomic Canon “ Atomic Annie” President Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Harold Brown 5 5

Eisenhower’s “New Look” Ei Eisenhower determined to deter the USSR Ei isenhower determined to deter B-47 • • w without bankrupting America. Soviet conventional forces greatly outnumbered U.S. forces – Soviets could probe periphery and start proxy wars to exhaust U.S., as in Korea – 1950–53 Emphasized nuclear weapons, bomber forces, and missile forces as Emphasized nuclear weapons, bom • backstop to conventional forces: Atlas Accelerated fielding of the hydrogen bomb – B-47 and B-52 bombers with KC-135 tankers – Atlas, Titan, and M inuteman ICBMs – George Washington SSBN with Polaris SLBMs – U-2 and Corona satellite for strategic reconnaissance – BM EWS, Nike, airborne alerts, dispersal, and silos for survivability , , , p , , – Air Force budget increased to 47% of Air Force budget increased to 47% of oD f DoD DoD D spending; • Army and M arine Corps budgets shrank U-2 Dragon Lady 6 6

Eisenhower’s “New Look” The Key Lessons B-47 N N N Nation needs a alanced strategy Nation needs a i d a balanced strategy ba b l d y o y to to • • confront full range of anticipated threats. Global air warfare capab Global air warfare capability y provides valuable e strategic • freedom of maneuver. Threats of Threats of symmetric punis of asymmetric punishment as nt can be an effective • Atlas instrument of deterrence. Covert operations an provide a Covert operations s can provide an affordable option for ca • achieving national objectives. Alliances matter – they complicate enemy planning and • rs . impose costs on competitors rs U-2 Dragon Lady 7 7

Brown / Perry Offset Strategy: Stealth, C4ISR and Precision Strike • Sec • SecDef • Sec S S cDe ef Harold Brown and USD William Perry devised technological ef Harold Brown and USD William Perry devised technologic H “ “of “offset strategy” to counter 1970s Soviet conventional buildup. • Core thrusts were • Core thrusts were C ere ere e ISR, PGM s, stealth e IS I SR, PGM s s M s, s stealth th a h aircraft, anti a craft, an i rc ti-a t - ti ti-armor weapons, space ce- ce e-based ISR / / / comms s / navigation – Genesis of F-117, B-2, JSTARS, AWACS, GPS, ATACMS, BAT E-8 JSTARS • Capabilities became integral to 1980s s AirLand d Battle concept • Key Lessons: T echnology multiplied combat effectiveness – Shifted competition into areas of U.S. advantage – “High-low” mix to meet scale of global presence requirement – Institutional commitment to “offset strategy” persisted – ATACM S from Carter to Reagan administration PAVE M over M issile with Bus Assault Breaker Terminally Guided Sub-M unitions Targets Fusion Center Surface Launcher 8 8

Toward a Third Offset Strategy New offset strategy should N New offset strategy should d exploit enduring U.S. advantages d d s in ex xp x ploit e it e nduring ring ng U U.S. advantage • • unmanned op unmanned operations, long unmanned u d op d op peration perations, l ns, l ns, l lon lon ng ng ng- g-range g- ange ra ra r ange a e and low e e an an nd low nd low w- bservable air w- w-observable air o ob ob bservable air operati operations operations, ons ons s s undersea s, s, un un ndersea ndersea a a a warfare, and complex systems engineering in w arfare, and complex systems engineerin arfa are, are are, an d compl d co ex systems enginee ex sy ex s erin g order to o project power despite adversary A2/ AD capabilities o es . es New w strategy should also: • – Reduce dependence on forward bases and space-based capabilities – Foster novel concepts of operation that leverage mix of new and legacy capabilities – Increase emphasis on deterrence by denial and punishment rather than the threat to restore the status quo Premium on survivable forward presence and global responsiveness • Hold targets at risk within A2/AD umbrella and outside immediate combat zone • – Impose long-term costs upon rivals – Leverage alliances to gain positional advantage and share burdens 9 9

Outline Antecedents of a “ Third” Offset Strategy Why Not “Business As Usual”? Enduring U.S. Advantages Implementing a New Offset Strategy: The GSS Concept Conclusions 10

Power Projection: The Capacity Challenge 20 20 20 2014 QDR 014 QDR R argues that U.S. will have sufficient military capacity to defeat R rgues that U.S. will have sufficient military capacity to defeat ar • • one aggressor and “deny the objectives of, or impose unacceptable costs o ne aggressor and deny the objectives of, o ne aggressor and deny the objectives of, o esso on, another aggressor in another region.” US will US will kely lack the capac ll likely lack the capacity to fight and win two major theater wars in lik apac pac ci ci ity y to fight and win two major theater • overlapping timeframes s s – – if if we don’t project power differently. if f As the e 2014 National Defense Panel Review w notes: • “ A global war-fighting capability [is] the sine qua non of a superpower and – thus essential to the credibility of America’s overall national security strategy.” “ U.S. military must have the capability and capacity to deter or stop – aggression in multiple theaters – not just one – even when engaged in a large- scale war.” 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 1 1 1 1

Power Projection: The Capability Challenge Traditional approach to power projection: • – Build up combat power and logistical support. – M aximize airpower sortie generation from close-in land- and sea-bases. – Employ heavy mechanized ground forces. Problems with the traditional approach: • – Requires political access to forward bases and littoral waters. – Depends on unimpeded use of ports and airfields. – Strategically unresponsive – requires months to prepare. – Difficult to implement in multiple theaters simultaneously. – Entails growing operational risk… 12