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Risk Financing Immunization The case of Uruguay The case of Uruguay Carlos Steneri Carlos Steneri October 26 th , 2010 Lessons from experience Lessons from experience Recent debt crises taught that roll over risk is the Recent debt


  1. Risk Financing Immunization The case of Uruguay The case of Uruguay Carlos Steneri Carlos Steneri October 26 th , 2010

  2. Lessons from experience Lessons from experience • Recent debt crises taught that roll over risk is the • Recent debt crises taught that roll over risk is the most important challenge debt managers have to deal with. • Sudden capital reversals are the usual trigger of debt crises, mainly when the debtor’s profile amortization has a high concentration of short term amortization has a high concentration of short term maturities. • Debt management strategies that are biased • Debt management strategies that are biased towards reducing financing costs without a proper risk evaluation are prone to enter in this trap. p

  3. • Funding is concentrated in the short term because debt Funding is concentrated in the short term because debt managers: – Take for granted short term funding availability under any circumstances. – Underestimate the probability of fiscal or financial crisis (external or domestic). – Dismiss the real dimension of international contagion. – Ignore fat tails events (uncertain events). I f t t il t ( t i t ) • Once Roll Over constraints appear, policy makers begin to r n the facts from behind run the facts from behind. – Accepting higher financing costs. – Shortening maturities even more. – Triggering a sequence of events characterized by the T i i f t h t i d b th increase in risk aversion and liquidity stringency which deepen the crisis. • That scenario could degenerate in a solvency problem , that eventually lead to default.

  4. Principles in Roll Over Risk I Immunization i i • Financing risk prevention is always less expensive than Financing risk prevention is always less expensive than crisis resolution costs. This principle must be included in any Debt Management Strategy. • Adequate Liability Management (LM) is the crucial tool to achieve that goal. – Stretching out maturities S – Pre-financing short term amortizations ( cash holdings ) • Cash management becomes a strategic component to C h t b t t i t t strengthen financing risk immunization. • The implementation of some sort of Greenspan-Guidotti rule is suitable to achieve that goal.

  5. Principles in Roll Over Risk p Immunization • The optimal policy mix between extension and cash The optimal policy mix between extension and cash accumulation depends on market conditions. • As a general rule, financing risk immunization is done A l l fi i i k i i ti i d cheaper through maturity extension than cash accumulation. – Particularly in times when long term interest rates are low. – Carry trade on reserve holdings is high. • The respective policy sequence is Th ti li i – Look for maturity extension through swaps and buybacks in the short end of the curve and then – Implement some sort of Greenspan-Guidotti rule – Implement some sort of Greenspan-Guidotti rule.

  6. Roll Over Risk Immunization in Roll Over Risk Immunization in Uruguay Fi First Step: Debt Profile Smoothening t St D bt P fil S th i Second Step: Greenspan - Guidotti Rule implementation Rule implementation

  7. First Step: Debt Profile Smoothening p g As of December 2004 As of December 2004 As of September 2010 As of September 2010 2011: 2.5% GDP 2005: 7.9% GDP 2,000 2012: 1.5% GDP 2006: 8.8% GDP 1,800 2013: 0.9% GDP 2007: 5.8% GDP 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034 2036 Source: Debt Management Unit, Ministry of Finance

  8. Second Step: Greenspan - Guidotti R l Rule implementation i l i • PRINCIPLES PRINCIPLES – Fiscal gap is financed with debt. – Macroeconomic policy could be affected by p y y uncertainty (fat tails, sudden Stops, unexpected events). – Cash accumulation to cover short term debt service Cash accumulation to cover short term debt service (interest + amortization). • SETTING THE RULE SETTING THE RULE – Value at Risk model to determine bad states of nature occurrence probability.

  9. Shadowed area show periods when Uruguay Sh d d h i d h U faced financing stringency Source: Ministry of Finance.

  10. DMU DMU´ ´s s studies studies show show that that Markets Markets were were closed closed up up to to: : i) i) 9 9 months months with with a 95% a 95% probability probability; ; ii ii) 14 ) 14 months months with with a 99% of a 99% of probability probability

  11. Results Results • Central Government cash holdings Central Government cash holdings equivalent to: – 9 months protects against 95% of capital reversal risk – 14 months cover 99% of that risk

  12. Uruguay´s Central Government cash Uruguay s Central Government cash holdings could easily cover both events 6% Assets of CG Amortizations 5% 4.50% 4% GDP % of G 3% 2.50% 1.80% 2% 1.50% 1.00% 0.90% 1% 0.70% 0% 2010 2010 2011 2011 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 Sources: Ministry of Economy.

  13. Uruguay pre-funding strategy allowed the country to stay out of capital markets during t t t t f it l k t d i the post Lehman episode (Sept 2008) 1000 900 800 EMBI Uruguay EMBI Uruguay 700 600 bps 500 400 400 300 200 100 0 Sep-06 Mar-07 Sep-07 Mar-08 Sep-08 Mar-09 Sep-09 Mar-10 Sep-10 Source: Bloomberg - JP Morgan

  14. Liability Management diminished financial vulnerabilities vulnerabilities Increasing share of g I Increasing debt i d bt domestic currency 100% 40% with fixed rate denominated debt 35% 95% 30% 90% 25% 85% 20% 20% 80% 15% 75% 10% 5% 70% 0% Local currency denominated debt (% of Total) % of Debt with Fixed Rate Significant g 20 20 improvement in 20% Decreasing roll debt profile 15 over risk 15% 10 10% 5 5 5% % Debt Due in One Year 0 0% Average Time to Maturity (in years) Source: Debt Management Unit, Ministry of Finance

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