Revisiting the Fetishism Objection Sebastian stlund - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Revisiting the Fetishism Objection Sebastian Östlund (kontakt@sebastianostlund.se) KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Division of Philosophy

Overview 1. Instrumental Values and Commodities 2. Capabilities and Functionings as Ambiguously Valuable 3. The Normative Force of the Fetishism Objection 4. Formulating the Finalism Charge 5. A Note on How to Resolve the Tension 6. Conclusion 2

Overview 1. Instrumental Values and Commodities 2. Capabilities and Functionings as Ambiguously Valuable 3. The Normative Force of the Fetishism Objection 4. Formulating the Finalism Charge 5. A Note on How to Resolve the Tension 6. Conclusion Why is this important? We strive toward justice and well-being. We operationalise, measure, and aim to improve various states and freedoms. They require sufficient normative justification. Thus… 3

1. Instrumental Values and Commodities Rawls (1971) argues that primary goods are ” things that every rational man is presumed to want ”, and that ” [t]hese goods normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of life”. Primary goods are proposed to be a currency of distributive justice. Sen (1980) replies that they are not a good metric of personal advantage. They do not take into account what goods do . We should purportedly distribute the resources’ effects (evenly), not simply the resources as such. But why? 4

1. Instrumental Values and Commodities We should purportedly distribute the resources’ effects (evenly), not simply the resources as such. But why? The idea is that Rawls’s primary goods are merely instrumentally valuable, but Sen’s proposal of capabilities and functionings are valuable in a more morally relevant way. What way? Functionings and capabilities are often called ‘intrinsically good’. But this is ambiguous between two readings. Korsgaard (1983) reminds us that we have the (1) intrinsic — extrinsic distinction , and the (2) means — ends or instrumental — final distinction . 5

1. Instrumental Values and Commodities Distinction 1 (Intrinsic versus Extrinsic Values): Intrinsic goods are those things that are good due to their inherent properties. Extrinsic goods are things that have value due to properties outside themselves (e.g. attitudes). Distinction 2 (Instrumental versus Final Values): Instrumental values serve to realise some other important value-object. Money is a means to get food, which in turn is a means to achieve well-being. A final value, in turn, could be well-being, or agency, or some other candidate. Positive final values are desirable , and are, ceteris paribus , worth realising. 6

1. Instrumental Values and Commodities The objection Sen launches against Rawls’s project (and simultaneously against other commodity based accounts of justice) is that focusing on instrumental values is fetishist . This normative term has its origin in Marx’s (1887) expression ‘commodity fetishism’ for when we “regard goods as valuable in themselves and not for (and to the extent that) they help the person” (Sen 1999, 19). This allows for two readings, one under each of the distinctions (1) and (2). 1 This makes functionings and capabilities ambiguously valuable. Re-analysing the fetishism objection could lead us toward a theory that does not suffer from this unclarity. 1 (1) intrinsic — extrinsic 7 (2) Instrumental — final

2. Capabilities and Functionings as Ambiguously Valuable Hurka (2002) claims that a theory is fetishist insofar as it treats instrumental values as intrinsic values. I would agree with Hurka’s intended meaning . It comes out in referencing Nussbaum’s (1990) mentioning “ends” and “tools”. This would amount to amending the terminology to fit Korsgaard’s (and therefore also Richardson’s (2015) and Robeyns’s (2017)). The fetishism objection is about treating instrumental values as though they were final values . If we make this terminological shift, however, we must be cognizant of the effects on the axiological foundation. That is, we must carefully disentangle the intrinsic from the final good. 8

2. Capabilities and Functionings as Ambiguously Valuable In Sen’s (1980, 216) words, “Rawls takes primary goods as the embodiment of advantage, rather than taking advantage to be a relationship between persons and goods” (emphasis in original). We can summarise the fetishism objection as stating that we should focus not on the instrumental value but on the (ambiguously denoted) value established by the dyadic relationship, R , between a commodity or condition, C , and a person, P , such that the functioning R(C, P) holds. As for (singular) capabilities, we may take this as a freedom relationship, F , between a functioning and a person, giving us the schema F(R(C, P), P) . This can help us locate the value. 9

2. Capabilities and Functionings as Ambiguously Valuable Achievement relationship: R Freedom relationship: F Commodity or condition: C Person: P Schema for functionings: R(C, P) Schema for capabilities: F(R(C, P), P) Are functionings and capabilities intrinsically valuable? The intrinsic value lies not only in the commodity or condition, C , nor just in P ’s enjoyment, but in the relationships F and R . So, yes . They are intrinsically valuable. 10

2. Capabilities and Functionings as Ambiguously Valuable This might have been the end of the story. If functionings and capabilities are intrinsically valuable, and the fetishism objection is about treating instrumental values as though they were intrinsic values, then what else is there to investigate? Well, this inappropriately combines distinctions 1 and 2. 2 Intrinsic values are not necessarily indicative of (personal) advantage. Substitute C in R(C, P) with a debilitating disease, D , and it should become clear. The object would be intrinsically valuable, but finally disvaluable. So, intrinsic value is not to be identified with advantage . Moreover, we see that functionings and capabilities are not necessarily positive final values . 2 (1) intrinsic — extrinsic 11 (2) Instrumental — final

3. The Normative Force of the Fetishism Objection If functionings and capabilities are necessarily intrinsic values, but not necessarily positive final values, then… How would the capability approach framework avoid the fetishism objection? By focusing on positive final values. But it does not necessarily do so, as indicated by the debilitating disease case. 12

3. The Normative Force of the Fetishism Objection Even if the solution would be to focus on such final values, it is not clear that the main issue for Rawls is the focus on instrumental values rather than final values. If, for instance, we were to secure a vial containing a pathogen, giving this vial to a person would not primarily be bad because it is a means, but because it is a means to something undesirable . Therefore, important normative force comes from claiming something of non-desirable value to be of desirable final value. This is a generalized form of the fetishism objection that I call ‘the finalism charge’. The fetishism objection is a particular version of this more general “ axiological attack”. 13

4. Formulating the Finalism Charge To only focus on relationships between goods or conditions and people is inappropriate since it does not take the kind of relationship that obtains into account, i.e. if it is positively finally valuable. Thus, when Sen (1980, 218) argues that focusing on Rawls’s primary goods “ still is concerned with good things rather than with what these good things do to human beings ” I pause to add an emphasis on what it is that these goods do to us. 14

4. Formulating the Finalism Charge To (i) treat wealth as an instrument to well-being is arguably more benign than to (ii) treat a freedom to infect oneself with a debilitating disease as an embodiment of advantage simply because the second’s value resides in itself. The first example is fetishist. The other falls victim to the finalism charge. The charge amounts to treating something as a positive final value which in fact is not such a value. This finding seems somewhat negative, but it can be handled constructively. It can be taken as a sign that axiological work remains to be done in the capability approach framework. 15

4. Formulating the Finalism Charge What allows this finalism charge to arise? Robeyns (2017, 41), reminds us that “[f] unctionings and capabilities are value- neutral categories” and that they “are constitutive elements of human life, which consists of both wellbeing and ill- being”. I call the conjunction of these statements “the value -neutrality claim ” . At the same time, it is argued that functionings and capabilities are typically the ends that we are to promote. This is a claim I call “the final value thesis” . The value-neutrality claim and final value thesis create tension. They jointly enable the finalism charge’s application. 16