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Protecting your Privacy with FreeBSD and Tor Christian Brffer brueffer@FreeBSD.org MeetBSD Warsaw, Poland November 18, 2007 Overview Who needs anonymity anyway? Anonymization concepts T or FreeBSD What else to take


  1. Protecting your Privacy with FreeBSD and Tor Christian Brüffer brueffer@FreeBSD.org MeetBSD – Warsaw, Poland November 18, 2007

  2. Overview ● Who needs anonymity anyway? ● Anonymization concepts ● T or ● FreeBSD ● What else to take care of? ● Demonstration ● Summary MeetBSD 2007 2

  3. Overview ● Who needs anonymity anyway? ● Anonymization concepts ● T or ● FreeBSD ● What else to take of? ● Demonstration ● Summary MeetBSD 2007 3

  4. Who needs anonymity anyway? ● Journalists ● Informants, whistleblowers ● Dissidents (China, Myanmar...) ● Socially sensitive information (abuse, AIDS) ● Law enforcement (anonymous crime reporting, tips, surveillance...) ● Companies (research competition...) ● Military (covert operations...) MeetBSD 2007 4

  5. Who needs anonymity anyway? ● You? – EU data retention directive ● connection data gets stored for 6 – 24 months ● phone, SMS, IP, e-mail, dial-in data ● (finally we'll be safe from all those terrorists!) – which interests do you have? – who do you talk to? MeetBSD 2007 5

  6. Who needs anonymity anyway? ● Criminals – already do illegal stuff – no problem doing more illegal stuff to get anonymity ● identity theft ● renting bot-nets ● creating bot-nets ● cracking one of the thousands of insecure computers in the net MeetBSD 2007 6

  7. Who needs anonymity anyway? ● Very different groups ● All with the same goal anonymity needs diversity MeetBSD 2007 7

  8. Overview ● Who needs anonymity anyway? ● Anonymization concepts ● T or ● FreeBSD ● What else to take care of? ● Demonstration ● Summary MeetBSD 2007 8

  9. Anonymization concepts ● Proxy (Source: http://www.at-mix.de ) MeetBSD 2007 9

  10. Anonymization concepts ● Proxy – fast – simple – single point of failure MeetBSD 2007 10

  11. Anonymization concepts ● Mix (Source: http://www.tm.uka.de/itm ) MeetBSD 2007 11

  12. Anonymization concepts ● Mix cascade (Source: http://sarwiki.informatik.hu-berlin.de ) MeetBSD 2007 12

  13. Anonymization concepts ● MIX cascade – slow ● public key encryption ● mixing – distributed trust – one MIX secure connection anonymous MeetBSD 2007 13

  14. Overview ● Who needs anonymity anyway? ● Anonymization concepts ● Tor ● FreeBSD ● What else to take care of? ● Demonstration ● Summary MeetBSD 2007 14

  15. T or ● The Onion Router ● Open source, BSD license ● TCP-overlay network ● Provides SOCKS interface ● Available on many platforms: – Windows, Linux, MacOS X – FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD – Solaris, other UNIX systems MeetBSD 2007 15

  16. T or ● Aims to combine positive attributes of proxies and mixes – speed (fast) ● session keys ● TCP multiplexing – distributed trust ● Design goals: deployability, usability, flexibility, simplicity MeetBSD 2007 16

  17. T or (Source: http://www.torproject.org ) MeetBSD 2007 17

  18. T or (Source: http://www.torproject.org ) MeetBSD 2007 18

  19. T or (Source: http://www.torproject.org ) MeetBSD 2007 19

  20. T or ● Exit policies (for nodes) – control which TCP connections can exit your node – default policy blocks SMTP, NNTP and some others – allows the rest (HTTP, SSH...) – reject everything: middleman- or entry-node MeetBSD 2007 20

  21. T or ● Hidden Services – Services with no published IP address – Cannot be physically found – Can be provided anywhere connection to T or network is possible – Resist Denial of Service – Resist censorship – Addresses: duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion MeetBSD 2007 21

  22. T or (Source: http://www.torproject.org ) MeetBSD 2007 22

  23. T or (Source: http://www.torproject.org ) MeetBSD 2007 23

  24. T or ● Legal issues – may be forbidden in some countries – crypto restrictions (Great Britain, “RIPA”) – special laws (Germany, “hacker paragraph”) – destination servers have Exit-Node IP in their logs ● node operator has to answer if there is trouble ● server may get ceized (happened before) ● ... MeetBSD 2007 24

  25. Overview ● Who needs anonymity anyway? ● Anonymization concepts ● T or ● FreeBSD ● What else to take care of? ● Demonstration ● Summary MeetBSD 2007 25

  26. FreeBSD ● Well suited for T or (node) operation ● Operational security – Jails (jail(8)) – Disk/swap encryption (geli(8), gbde(4)) – audit(4) – mac(4) framework ● Hardware crypto(4) acceleration ● Well maintained T or-related ports MeetBSD 2007 26

  27. FreeBSD ● Important ports – security/tor – security/tor-devel – www/privoxy – net-mgmt/vidalia – security/trans-proxy-tor MeetBSD 2007 27

  28. Overview ● Who needs anonymity anyway? ● Anonymization concepts ● T or ● FreeBSD ● What else to take care of? ● Demonstration ● Summary MeetBSD 2007 28

  29. What else to take care of? ● Name resolution – Some applications bypass configured proxy (hi Firefox < version 1.5!) ● Cookies, web-bugs, referrer – Disable cookies/referrer or better use Privoxy ● Connection Exit-Node <-> Destination – Not encrypted! Use secure protocols ● Services that require registration – T or cannot help you there MeetBSD 2007 29

  30. Overview ● Who needs anonymity anyway? ● Anonymization concepts ● T or ● FreeBSD ● What else to take care of? ● Demonstration ● Summary MeetBSD 2007 30

  31. Overview ● Who needs anonymity anyway? ● Anonymization concepts ● T or ● FreeBSD ● What else to take care of? ● Demonstration ● Summary MeetBSD 2007 31

  32. Summary ● T or useful for stealthy net usage ● Can be used to provide resilient services ● FreeBSD a very good choice as a platform All this very much needed in light of recent laws etc T or website: http://www.torproject.org MeetBSD 2007 32

  33. Questions? MeetBSD 2007 33

  34. Thank you for your attention! MeetBSD 2007 34

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