private information retrieval schemes based on codes
play

Private information retrieval schemes based on codes Julien - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Private information retrieval schemes based on codes Julien Lavauzelle IRMAR, Universit de Rennes 1 Sminaire Mathmatiques Discrtes, Codes et Cryptographie 20/02/2020 Cryptographic primitives based on codes Best-known cryptographic


  1. Private information retrieval schemes based on codes Julien Lavauzelle IRMAR, Université de Rennes 1 Séminaire Mathématiques Discrètes, Codes et Cryptographie 20/02/2020

  2. Cryptographic primitives based on codes Best-known cryptographic primitive based on coding theory : McEliece public-key encryption scheme (+ many variants) 1/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  3. Cryptographic primitives based on codes Best-known cryptographic primitive based on coding theory : McEliece public-key encryption scheme (+ many variants) But... many other ones: – signature (CFS, Wave), identification schemes (Stern), – secret sharing schemes (Shamir), 1/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  4. Cryptographic primitives based on codes Best-known cryptographic primitive based on coding theory : McEliece public-key encryption scheme (+ many variants) But... many other ones: – signature (CFS, Wave), identification schemes (Stern), – secret sharing schemes (Shamir), – proofs of retrievability, 1/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  5. Cryptographic primitives based on codes Best-known cryptographic primitive based on coding theory : McEliece public-key encryption scheme (+ many variants) But... many other ones: – signature (CFS, Wave), identification schemes (Stern), – secret sharing schemes (Shamir), – proofs of retrievability, – private information retrieval . 1/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  6. Outline 1. Private information retrieval 2. PIR schemes with low computation Transversal designs and codes A PIR scheme with transversal designs Towards collusion resistance PIR schemes with lifted codes 3. Other constructions of PIR schemes 4. Conclusion 2/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  7. Outline 1. Private information retrieval 2. PIR schemes with low computation Transversal designs and codes A PIR scheme with transversal designs Towards collusion resistance PIR schemes with lifted codes 3. Other constructions of PIR schemes 4. Conclusion 2/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  8. Problem statement Private information retrieval (PIR): Given a remote database F = ( F 1 , . . . , F M ) ∈ Σ M and an index i ∈ [ 1, M ] , can we retrieve the entry/file F i , without leaking any information on i ? 3/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  9. Problem statement Private information retrieval (PIR): Given a remote database F = ( F 1 , . . . , F M ) ∈ Σ M and an index i ∈ [ 1, M ] , can we retrieve the entry/file F i , without leaking any information on i ? Application: private search, medical data, etc. 3/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  10. Problem statement Private information retrieval (PIR): Given a remote database F = ( F 1 , . . . , F M ) ∈ Σ M and an index i ∈ [ 1, M ] , can we retrieve the entry/file F i , without leaking any information on i ? Application: private search, medical data, etc. Trivial solution: full download. 3/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  11. Definition of PIR Introduced in: Private Information Retrieval . Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz, Sudan. FOCS. 1995 . A database F = ( F 1 , . . . , F m ) stored (in some way) on n servers S 1 , . . . , S n . A user U wants to recover F i privately. A Private Information Retrieval protocol is a set of algorithms ( Q , A , R ) : 4/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  12. Definition of PIR Introduced in: Private Information Retrieval . Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz, Sudan. FOCS. 1995 . A database F = ( F 1 , . . . , F m ) stored (in some way) on n servers S 1 , . . . , S n . A user U wants to recover F i privately. A Private Information Retrieval protocol is a set of algorithms ( Q , A , R ) : ( q 1 , . . . , q n ) 1. U generates a query vector q = ( q 1 , . . . , q n ) ← Q ( i ) and sends q j to server S j . . . U S 1 S 2 S n 4/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  13. Definition of PIR Introduced in: Private Information Retrieval . Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz, Sudan. FOCS. 1995 . A database F = ( F 1 , . . . , F m ) stored (in some way) on n servers S 1 , . . . , S n . A user U wants to recover F i privately. A Private Information Retrieval protocol is a set of algorithms ( Q , A , R ) : ( q 1 , . . . , q n ) 1. U generates a query vector q = ( q 1 , . . . , q n ) ← Q ( i ) and sends q j to server S j . . . U 2. Each server S j computes r j = A ( q j , F | S j ) and sends it back to U ( r 1 , . . . , r n ) S 1 S 2 S n 4/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  14. Definition of PIR Introduced in: Private Information Retrieval . Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz, Sudan. FOCS. 1995 . A database F = ( F 1 , . . . , F m ) stored (in some way) on n servers S 1 , . . . , S n . A user U wants to recover F i privately. A Private Information Retrieval protocol is a set of algorithms ( Q , A , R ) : ( q 1 , . . . , q n ) 1. U generates a query vector q = ( q 1 , . . . , q n ) ← Q ( i ) and sends q j to server S j . . . U 2. Each server S j computes r j = A ( q j , F | S j ) and sends it back to U ( r 1 , . . . , r n ) S 1 S 2 S n 3. U recovers F i = R ( q , r , i ) 4/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  15. Privacy A collusion of servers : set of servers { S j : j ∈ T } , where T ⊂ [ 1, n ] , which exchange information about queries, data, etc. t : = max {| T | , T ⊆ [ 1, n ] is a collusion } ≥ 1 5/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  16. Privacy A collusion of servers : set of servers { S j : j ∈ T } , where T ⊂ [ 1, n ] , which exchange information about queries, data, etc. t : = max {| T | , T ⊆ [ 1, n ] is a collusion } ≥ 1 • Information-theoretic privacy: I ( i ; q | T ) = 0, ∀ T ⊆ [ 1, n ] , | T | ≤ t . • Computational privacy: by varying the index i , distributions of queries q | T = Q ( i ) | T are computationally indistinguishable. 5/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  17. Privacy A collusion of servers : set of servers { S j : j ∈ T } , where T ⊂ [ 1, n ] , which exchange information about queries, data, etc. t : = max {| T | , T ⊆ [ 1, n ] is a collusion } ≥ 1 • Information-theoretic privacy: I ( i ; q | T ) = 0, ∀ T ⊆ [ 1, n ] , | T | ≤ t . • Computational privacy: by varying the index i , distributions of queries q | T = Q ( i ) | T are computationally indistinguishable. Theorem [CGKS95, CG97]. If t = n (in particular if n = 1), then: ◮ for IT-privacy, no better solution than full download , ◮ computational privacy is possible (but remains expensive as of now). 5/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  18. Main parameters of PIR schemes We mostly focus on IT-privacy (hence need n ≥ 2 servers) 6/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  19. Main parameters of PIR schemes We mostly focus on IT-privacy (hence need n ≥ 2 servers) Parameters to be taken into account: – communication complexity (upload and download) – computation complexity (client and servers) – server storage overhead – maximum size of collusions ( t ) 6/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  20. Main parameters of PIR schemes We mostly focus on IT-privacy (hence need n ≥ 2 servers) Parameters to be taken into account: – communication complexity (upload and download) – computation complexity (client and servers) – server storage overhead – maximum size of collusions ( t ) Several possible settings : – bounded vs. unbounded number of entries, – replicated database vs. coded database, – dynamic database vs. static database, – unresponsive or byzantine servers, etc. 6/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  21. Outline 1. Private information retrieval 2. PIR schemes with low computation Transversal designs and codes A PIR scheme with transversal designs Towards collusion resistance PIR schemes with lifted codes 3. Other constructions of PIR schemes 4. Conclusion 6/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  22. Outline 1. Private information retrieval 2. PIR schemes with low computation Transversal designs and codes A PIR scheme with transversal designs Towards collusion resistance PIR schemes with lifted codes 3. Other constructions of PIR schemes 4. Conclusion 6/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

  23. Transversal designs A transversal design TD ( n , s ) = ( X , B , G ) is given by: ◮ X a set of points , | X | = N = ns , • • • • • • • • • • • • . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 7/25 J. Lavauzelle – Construction of PIR schemes based on codes – Séminaire LAGA

Recommend


More recommend