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PRC RC T HRE HREATS T O A CADEMIA 1) Theft of trade secrets, - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

T HE C HINA I NITIATIVE T HE HE D EPARTMEN OF J USTICE R ESPONDS ENT OF TO E CONOMI MIC A GGRESSI THE C HINESE SE G OVERNMEN TO SSION BY TH ENT AND O THER ER N ATIONAL S ECURITY T HREATS AN Adam S. Hickey PRC RC T HRE HREATS T O A CADEMIA 1)


  1. T HE C HINA I NITIATIVE T HE HE D EPARTMEN OF J USTICE R ESPONDS ENT OF TO E CONOMI MIC A GGRESSI THE C HINESE SE G OVERNMEN TO SSION BY TH ENT AND O THER ER N ATIONAL S ECURITY T HREATS AN Adam S. Hickey

  2. PRC RC T HRE HREATS T O A CADEMIA 1) Theft of trade secrets, sensitive (controlled) technology, and other intellectual property 2) Influence that compromises the free and open exchange of ideas

  3. M AD IN C HIN INA 2025 2025: ADE IN “A R R OADM AP TO T HEFT ” ADMAP U.S. Department of Justice, National Security Division

  4. E CONOMIC E SPIONAGE IN THE U.S. • About 80 80% of all federal eco economic c es espio ionage ge prosecutions have alleged conduct that would ben enef efit the e Chin ines ese e state. • About 60 60% % of trade de se secre ret th theft cases have had some nexu xus to China. na. 4

  5. W HAT AT H AS AS C HI HINA S TOLE OLEN ?

  6. T HE HE PRC RC’ S T ECHNI NIQUE QUES 6 Courtesy of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

  7. T ALENT NT P ROGRAMS • Started by PRC government in 2008. • The PRC government funds above-market salaries, advanced research facilities, and bestows titles and prestige to lure experts to China. • Approximately 7,000 Chinese scientists have returned to China under the program. • While association with a Talent Program is not illegal, it can create incentives to steal, violate export controls, or (at a minimum) a conflict of interest. • Ask employees, partners, consultants if they are participating. 7

  8. U.S. S. V . Z HOU HOU , C HE HEN • Defendant spouses were employed as resear earcher hers at Nationwide Children’s Hospital (NCH) for approximately ten years. • Defendants researched exosome isolation, which plays a key role in the research, identification, and treatment of a range of conditions, including cancer. • Zhou developed a novel el m method hod o of exos osom ome i isol olat ation on which NCH could use for treatment. • But Zhou and Chen founded nded a a Chines nese c e compan any to monetize the technique Zhou developed, using ng i intellec ectual ual p proper perty that at b belong onged t ed to NCH. • The defendants were paid more than $800,000 for NCH’s intellectual property. • Zhou, Chen charged with cons onspirac acy t to o stea eal t trad ade s secret ets, and other offenses. 8

  9. U.S. S. V . B O M AO • The Vi Victim Com Compan pany (VC) C) i is a a leader i in n the he f fiel eld of open-channel controller technology for solid state hard (SSD) drives. • Bo Mao was a pr prof ofes essor at at a a PR PRC C uni niver ersity, and later became a visi siti ting p profe fesso sor r at a Texas university; at the same time, Bo Mao was also working for Company 1, a compe petitor or of VC, which was seeking VC’s technology. • While in the PRC, Bo Mao was collab abor orating ng on resear earch w with a a colleague i eague in Texas as and sought ght access ss t to the V VC’s t technol hnology ogy, o ostens ensibl bly for resear earch h purposes; the VC provided access to its technology to Bo, who agreed to the VC’s restrictions on its IP • Company 1 was directing Bo’s research on the Victim Company’s technology; evidence indicates that Bo, or someone else, was attempting to reve verse se-engi engineer neer the technology. • Bo charged with wire fraud. 9

  10. PRC U RC U NIVER IES B ENEFIT NEFIT F ROM ROM T HEFT IVERSIT SITIES EFT • PRC nationals Hao ao Zhan hang g and Wei Pang charged in a thirty-two count indictment which charged six individuals with econo onomic espi pionag onage e and thef heft of trade of de secre crets ts for their roles in a long-running effort to obtain U.S. trade secrets for the be benefit of of uni niversities and and com ompan anies c cont ontrolled b by the PR he PRC C gov over ernm nment nt. • Zhang and Pang met at a univer ersity i in Southe hern C n Califor orni nia a during their doctor oral al studi dies es in electrical engineering, where they conducted resear earch h that w was funded nded by DARPA. • Zhang and Pang used s stol olen en IP to obt obtain pr prof ofes essor orships ps at Tianjin University, a leading PR PRC C Ministry of of Edu Education on school. • The stolen trade secrets, converted through a joint nt v vent ntur ure e in the PRC, enabled Tianjin University to construct and equip a state-of-the-art facility in the PRC state- sponsored Tianjin Economic Development Area, and to obtain commercial and military contracts. 10

  11. T HE PRC RC G OVERNM ENT E XPLOIT ITS A CADE NMENT ADEMIA IA • In September 2019, a PRC government employee, Zhongsan Liu, who was living in New Jersey, was arrested for a cons onspiracy t to o com ommit vi visa f a fraud. • Liu entered the United States in 2017 to work for the China A a Assoc ociat ation on f for I Internat national onal Exchang hange o of P Personne onnel ( (CAIEP IEP), controlled by the PRC’s State A e Adminis istration o of Forei eign gn Experts A ts Affairs (SAF AFEA), which is responsible for the recruit itmen ent a and certificatio ion o of o over ersea eas talen ent and experts to work in China, and for organiz izing o g over ersea eas t trainin ing g for Chinese technical professionals. • Liu worked to further er t the PRC’s ’s o objec ectiv ives es by recruiting U.S. experts for projects and positions in China, certifying U.S. universities as SAFEA EA training institutes, and participated in S&T conferences which provided opportunities for recruitment. • Liu helped obtain a J-1 visa for a PRC government employee to enter the United States, purportedly to study at a university in Georgia, when in fact this employee was going to work for CAIEP EP, in New York, to recruit in the U.S., and not conduct academic research. 11

  12. W HAT AT S HOUL HOULD B E P ROTE TECTED ? 12

  13. B ES EST S ECURIT ITY P RA RACTI CTICE CES • Awareness building and • Protection of IP and use of communications technology control plans • Coordination within institution • Regular interactions with federal security and intelligence • Training of faculty and students agencies about threat and obligations • Foreign travel safeguards and • Review of foreign gifts, grants, protections contracts, and collaborations • Vetting of international visitors • Review of faculty and student and students foreign financial interests and affiliations • Export control compliance program • Protection of data and cybersecurity 13

  14. C HI NESE S TUDE ND S CHOL HINE TUDENT AND CHOLARS • CSSAs were established to provide on on-camp mpus support t to overse seas s Chinese se students ts abroad; most of the activities do not present a threat. • Some chapters in the U.S. have reportedly received fund funding fr from the he Chi hinese Communist Par arty (C (CCP) and and/or hav have direct link nks to o the he Chi hinese gov overnm nment nt. In certain instances, those connections have reportedly been leveraged to chill ill acade demic ic fre reedo doms. • In one notable instance, a CSSA chapte pter pu public blicly ly critic riticiz ized d a Chin inese grad aduat ation on speaker at a U.S. school who had praised the “ fresh air of free speech ” and democracy in the U.S. and had criticized the Chinese government; the spe speaker la later apo pologiz ized d and asked for “ forgiveness ” and according to reports, the CSSAs re resp sponse was s pr prais ised d by a Chin inese Embassy ssy offic icia ial. 14

  15. T HE HE B IG IG P IC ICTUR TURE Post-WWII Order China’s World Order  China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB),  World Bank, International Monetary Fund One Belt One Road   Rejection of CLOS ruling on the South China Sea, Peaceful settlement of international disputes, e.g. Convention on Law of the Sea (CLOS), UN increased use of UN veto power  Unilateral claims to the South China Sea, constructing and  Open shipping, international navigation rights militarizing artificial islands  Price dumping, massive economic espionage, currency  Free and fair trade manipulation, disputes over WTO  State-owned enterprises, politicians as major  Free enterprise stakeholders, tight political control  Global spread of multiparty democracies with free and fair  One-party state elections  Repression of Falun Gong, Uighurs, Dalai Lama, Christian  Religious freedom churches, and other religious minorities  State-controlled media, the Great Firewall of China, 50  Press freedom, Internet freedom Cent Army 13

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