Post-War Economics Micro-Level Evidence from the African Great Lakes - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Post-War Economics Micro-Level Evidence from the African Great Lakes Region Olivia D’Aoust Université libre de Bruxelles (SBS-EM, ECARES) and FNRS July 11, 2015

Why?

No. of internal conflicts 0 10 20 30 40 1980 1981 1982 A third of civil conflicts happens in Sub-Saharan Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 1983 1984 1985 World 1986 1987 1988 1989 Source: UCDP/PRIO Dataset 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Divergence in economic growth between conflict-affected and peaceful countries in sub-Saharan Africa 6000 GDP per capita (PPP, constant US$) Peaceful 4000 2000 Conflict−affected 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Source: World Development Indicators

Where?

Where? Mostly Burundi, but also Uganda Uganda Rwanda DR Congo Uganda DR Congo Rwanda Burundi Tanzania Burundi Tanzania

Burundi’s population: half below 14 Male Age groups Female 80+ 75−79 70−74 65−69 60−64 55−59 50−54 45−49 40−44 35−39 30−34 25−29 20−24 15−19 10−14 5−9 0−4 600 400 200 0 0 200 400 600 Population (in thousands) Source: UN, 2010

Belgium’s population: aging Male Age groups Female 100+ 95−99 90−94 85−90 80−84 75−79 70−74 65−69 60−64 55−59 50−54 45−49 40−44 35−39 30−34 25−29 20−24 15−19 10−14 5−9 0−4 600 400 200 0 0 200 400 600 Population (in thousands) Source: Census, 2011

Revenue per inhabitant in 2013: comparing the Great Lakes to Belgium 2013 GDP per capita (US$, PPP) 2000 1000 0 Belgium Burundi DRC Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda Source: World Development Indicators

Revenue per inhabitant in 2013: comparing the Great Lakes to Belgium 40000 2013 GDP per capita (US$, PPP) 30000 20000 10000 0 Belgium Burundi DRC Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda Source: World Development Indicators

What?

Chapter 1 Historical Background New ¡ ¡ First ¡ ¡ Independence ¡ Cons.tu.on ¡& ¡ Plane ¡ ¡ Republic ¡ Power-­‑sharing ¡ crash ¡ ¡ 1962 ¡ 1966 ¡ 1972 ¡ 1976 ¡ 1987 ¡ 1992 ¡ 1993 ¡ 1994 ¡ 1996 ¡ ¡ June ¡ ¡Oct. ¡ ¡ ¡ Government ¡by ¡Tutsi ¡from ¡Bururi ¡Lobby ¡ Power-­‑sharing ¡ Tutsi ¡ ¡ ¡ Elec.ons ¡ Elec.ons ¡ Hutu ¡president ¡ Hutu ¡president ¡& ¡ Coup ¡ Coup ¡ Coup ¡ Tutsi ¡coup ¡ ¡ d’État ¡ d’État ¡ d’État ¡ Ethnic ¡ ¡ Ethnic ¡ ¡ Ethnic ¡ ¡ President ¡dies ¡ massacres ¡ massacres ¡ massacres ¡ in ¡aSempted ¡coup ¡ Civil ¡war ¡onset ¡l ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡2009 ¡

Chapter 1 Historical Background Conflict Coup Arusha Peace Demobilization Demobilization Onset d’État Agreement CNDD-FDD FNL 1993 1996 2000 2005 2009 Ethnic motives Political motives Government (Transition) CNDD-FDD Government (Hutu) Government (Tutsi) vs vs vs CNDD-FDD (Hutu) CNDD-FDD (Hutu) FNL (Hutu) FNL (Hutu) FNL (Hutu) Other smaller groups

Roadmap The cycle of violence Institutions’ legitimacy Facilitating factors Large-scale Micro Macro Reconstruction violence time Unobservable factors Structural transformations

Chapter 2 On the Instrumental Power of Refugees: Household Composition and Civil war in Burundi Institutions’ legitimacy 5 Facilitating 1 factors 3 4 Large-scale Micro Macro Reconstruction violence 2 time Unobservable factors Structural transformations

Did violence during the war and the return of ex-combatants to their villages affect household composition? Villages surveyed Source: 2005 MICS survey

Did violence during the war and the return of ex-combatants to their villages affect household composition? Villages surveyed Violence Source: ACLED

Did violence during the war and the return of ex-combatants to their villages affect household composition? ● Villages surveyed Violence 20km radius

Did violence during the war and the return of ex-combatants to their villages affect household composition? Nr. ex-rebels per 1000 0 0 - 1 Rwanda 1 - 3 3 - 5 > 5 Bujumbura mairie DR Congo Source: CNDRR registers

Chapter 2 The instrumental power of refugees “Contrary to other refugee exodus from danger [...], it was an organized system of mass mobilization for a political purpose. The refugees settled in their camps, in perfect order, under the authority of their former leaders, ready to be used for further aims.” (Prunier, 2009) [This phenomenon] “devastating effects are nowhere more dramatically revealed than in the three states under consideration [DRC, Rwanda et Burundi] - the transformation of refugee-generating conflicts into conflict-generating refugees.” (Lemarchand, 1997)

Chapter 2 Household Composition and Civil war in Burundi Did violence during the war and the return of ex-combatants to their villages affect household composition? 1 Violence ◮ In more affected locations, there are relatively more adults (men) within households. ◮ In-migrations after the war, or members staying to protect their family and assets are the most likely explanations 2 Ex-combatant returns ◮ In less affected locations, there are more adult men within households ◮ Young ex-combatants originating from smaller households were more likely to go back home rather than forming their own household

Chapter 2 Household Composition and Civil war in Burundi Did violence during the war and the return of ex-combatants to their villages affect household composition? 1 Violence ◮ In more affected locations, there are relatively more adults (men) within households. ◮ In-migrations after the war, or members staying to protect their family and assets are the most likely explanations 2 Ex-combatant returns ◮ In less affected locations, there are more adult men within households ◮ Young ex-combatants originating from smaller households were more likely to go back home rather than forming their own household

Chapter 3 Who Benefited from Burundi’s Demobilization Program? Institutions’ legitimacy 5 Facilitating 1 factors 4 3 Large-scale Reconstruction Micro Macro violence 2 time Unobservable factors Structural transformations

Chapter 3 Who Benefited from Burundi’s Demobilization Program? (a) 2004 (b) 2009 ± Nr. ex-rebels per 1000 0 0 - 1 Rwanda Rwanda 1 - 3 3 - 5 > 5 Bujumbura mairie DR Congo DR Congo

Chapter 3 Who Benefited from Burundi’s Demobilization Program? 0.5 0.4 % of respondents 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 Land Drink/eat Clothing Small shop Working Wedding Housing Health Cattle Repay Savings Education equipment loan

Chapter 3 Who Benefited from Burundi’s Demobilization Program? Did the program improve the living conditions of ex-combatants and their communities? 1 Cash grants ◮ Both ex-combatants’ households and their communities benefited from the cash grants paid by the program, in particular in villages with large returns. ◮ Consumption, current spendings and livestock ownings increased. 2 Cash and in-kind grants ◮ The indirect effect on the community disappeared as the cash gradually escaped the local economy. Among ex-combatant’ households, the boom did not sustain either. ◮ Consumption, current spendings and livestock ownings decreased and converge to initial levels

Chapter 3 Who Benefited from Burundi’s Demobilization Program? Did the program improve the living conditions of ex-combatants and their communities? 1 Cash grants ◮ Both ex-combatants’ households and their communities benefited from the cash grants paid by the program, in particular in villages with large returns. ◮ Consumption, current spendings and livestock ownings increased. 2 Cash and in-kind grants ◮ The indirect effect on the community disappeared as the cash gradually escaped the local economy. Among ex-combatant’ households, the boom did not sustain either. ◮ Consumption, current spendings and livestock ownings decreased and converge to initial levels

Chapter 4 From Rebellion to Electoral Violence Institutions’ legitimacy 5 Facilitating 1 factors 3 4 Large-scale Micro Macro Reconstruction violence 2 time Unobservable factors Structural transformations

Chapter 4 From Rebellion to Electoral Violence What are the drivers of electoral violence?

50 Municipal Presidential Legislative Senatorial Hill 40 Violent episodes 30 20 10 0 01may2010 01jun2010 01jul2010 01aug2010 01sep2010 Source: Ushahidi Amatora Mu Mahoro

Competition between demobilized rebels’ groups 3 Predicted no. of violent events 2 1 0 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 Degree of competition between demobilized rebels

Political competition demand for violence meets the “hard core supporters” supply 6 Predicted effect (log) 4 2 0 10 5 2 No. of 0 ex−rebels −2 0 Political competition (st.)

Chapter 5 Who Benefits from Customary Justice? Rent-seeking, Bribery and Criminality in sub-Saharan Africa Institutions’ legitimacy 5 Facilitating 1 factors 3 4 Large-scale Micro Macro Reconstruction violence 2 time Unobservable factors Structural transformations